Likewise, this Court has held that an individual is not guaranteed the right to communicate views at all times and places or in any manner desired. Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 431 (N.D. 1994); Fargo Women's Health Organization, Inc. v. Lambs of Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401, 407 (N.D. 1992). We have held that "[t]he First Amendment does not require the government to freely grant access to all who wish to exercise free speech on every type of governmental property, without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities."

Whether petitioners violate the Act depends not on what they say, but simply on where they say it.”) (citations omitted). In Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426 (N.D.1994), we upheld a statute that prohibited individuals from gathering signatures for petitions at the state fair unless they did so from a rented booth. Id. at 429.

In order to properly analyze the validity of appellants' actions, we must first determine the character of the RTC and UCCSN areas to which NSG petition circulators sought access.See Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1994) (applying a forum analysis to a regulation limiting speech activities at a state fair). In contending that the RTC CitiCenter is a limited public forum, RTC asserts that its primary purpose is to allow the transfer of passengers between buses, not to provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas.

This court will determine a moot issue, rather than dismiss the appeal, only if the controversy is one of great public interest and involves the authority and power of public officials or if the matter is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Bolinske v. N.D. State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 430 (N.D. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1315, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995). The parties argue the issue raised is of great public interest.

See Mood For A Day, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 953 F.Supp. 1252, 1261 (D.Utah.1995) (county fair was a limited public forum given that “the history of the Fair shows one of its primary purposes is to provide a place to display livestock, agriculture, crafts, and the like in the setting of a family-oriented event”); Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F.Supp.2d 1234, 1243–44 (D.N.M.2000) (applying rational relationship test to exclusion of plaintiff from county fair, noting that a “government entity sponsoring a fair or concert has an interest in ensuring that the particular purposes for the event are met, and in excluding individuals who are disrupting the event in some manner or who threaten to do so”); Marchand v. Grant County, No. 07–182–RHW, 2009 WL 2998184 (E.D.Wash. Sept. 15, 2009) (county fair was a limited public forum for First Amendment purposes). See also Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 432 (N.D.1994) (finding state fair was “a special annual event of very limited duration, with a specific objective of providing thousands of attendees a wide variety of information and entertainment”). In at least two cases, courts presented with PETA First Amendment litigation have concluded have the cases involved limited public fora.

This principle remains true even though the state fair is operated by a quasi-public entity like the fair board. See Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 430-32 (N.D. 1994). It is also relevant under Fourth Amendment principles that the Fair is held at government-owned entertainment facilities, with security being provided by on-or-off-duty law enforcement officers. See Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 658 P.2d 658. 656 (1983) (suspicionless searches imposed as condition of entry to rock music concerts invalidated by court); State v. Carter, 267 N.W.2d 385, 386-87 (Iowa 1978) (same); compare Gallagher "Neil Young Freedom Concert", 49 F.3d 1442, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1995) (no state action, and therefore no civil-rights claim for unlawful search.

However, an appeal in which subsequent events have eliminated an actual controversy is not moot if the controversy is one of great public interest and involves the authority and power of public officials, or alternatively, if the matter is capable of repetition yet evading review. In re Estate of Shubert , 2013 ND 215, ¶ 12, 839 N.W.2d 811 ; Bland , at 381 ; Bolinske v. N.D. State Fair Ass'n , 522 N.W.2d 426, 430 (N.D. 1994) ; N.D. Council of Sch. Adm'rs v. Sinner , 458 N.W.2d 280, 283 (N.D. 1990) ; Pelkey , at 803 ; State v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. , 427 N.W.2d 307, 308-09 n.1 (N.D. 1988). Public interest means more than mere curiosity; it means something in which the public or the community at large has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights are affected. Shubert , at ¶ 13 ; Forum Publ'g Co. v. City of Fargo , 391 N.W.2d 169, 170 (N.D. 1986). Public interest does not mean something as narrow as the interest of a particular locality affected by the matter in question.

See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). While a person has a constitutional right to intrastate travel, that right is not absolute and may be restricted. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶ 13, 763 N.W.2d 761 (citing Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 256 (3d Cir. 1990); Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 431 (N.D. 1994)). This Court has held that when an accused engages in an intentional course of conduct directed at the victim, which would cause a reasonable person to experience fear, intimidation or harassment, the conduct is no longer constitutionally protected because the accused does not have a constitutional right to engage in activities that harm another person.

State v. Barth, 2006 ND 134, ¶ 8, 702 N.W.2d 1. Evidence of constitutionally protected activity is inadmissible. Curtis, at ¶ 7. [¶ 9] The right to free speech is not absolute and may be restricted. Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 431 (N.D. 1994). An individual's constitutional rights may be restricted by a judicial order. See State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶¶ 13-14, 763 N.W.2d 761 (holding defendant's right to travel had been restricted by a judicial order).

See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 256 (3rd Cir. 1990). Cf. Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass'n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 431 (N.D. 1994) ("[T]he federal constitution does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and [in all] places," and "the government may regulate the time, place, and manner of that expressive activity."). [¶ 14] Here, the district court recognized there is a constitutional right to travel and Holbach's conduct is generally constitutionally protected, but further concluded Holbach's travel had been restricted through proper process by the conditions of his probation.