Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1262 (GK)
July 29, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on two motions to dismiss the comp1aint. Having considered Plaintiff's complaint, Defendants' motions, and the record in this case, the Court will deny both motions without prejudice, and transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.
I. Background
Plaintiff is a District of Columbia prisoner. On January 29, 2001, Plaintiff was transferred from the Maximum Security Facility at the District's Lorton Correctional Complex to the Red Onion State Prison in Pound, Virginia. Compl., p. 5. Upon his arrival at Red Onion, Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Shelton confiscated his eyeglasses, and told plaintiff that he "could not have them." compl., p. 5. Without his eyeglasses, Plaintiff experienced blurred vision, dizziness, and difficulty walking. Compl., p. v.4. Plaintiff complained of his predicament in letters to the Mayor, to the District of Columbia Department of Corrections' contract monitor, and to the Department's Director, but received no response. Compl., pp. 5, V.2. A nurse gave Plaintiff eyeglasses, without Plaintiff first having had his eyes examined. Compl., p. V.2. These eyeglasses offered no relief. Id. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed inmate grievances to no avail. Id. plaintiff's eyes were examined by an optometrist on March 20, 2001. Id. Plaintiff received eyeglasses on March 28, 2001, but continued to experience blurred vision, headaches, and dizziness. Compl., p. V. 2.
The Lorton correctional complex was closed completely in 2001. certain inmates, such as Plaintiff, were transferred to Virginia state prisons pursuant to a contractual agreement between the District of columbia Department of corrections and the Virginia Department of corrections. Plaintiff was transferred to Red Onion in January 2001, and since has been transferred to a Federal Bureau of Prisons facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of District of columbia's Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; see also Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Warden True's Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 2.
Plaintiff's complaint was prepared using a preprinted form. Between pages 5 and 6 of the preprinted form, Plaintiff inserted three handwritten pages sequentially numbered V.2, V.3, and V.4.
Plaintiff was told to wear the eyeglasses given to him, or pay for eyeglasses with a proper prescription. compl., p. V.2.
In this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff claims that Defendants' failure to provide him adequate medical treatment and eyeglasses with a proper prescription constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Compl., pp. V.3-V.4. He demands monetary damages and a jury trial. Compl., p. 5.
II. Discussion
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual allegations of the complaint must be presumed true and liberally construed in Plaintiff's favor. Shear v. National Rifle Ass'n of America, 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1979). However, the Court is not obligated to derive an inference that is not supported by the facts presented. Kowal v. MCI communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
A. District of Columbia Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
The District of Columbia and Odie Washington, Director of the D.C. Department of Corrections, move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against them.
A municipality is not absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1933. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Inteliigence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). As a muncipality, the District of Columbia cannot be held liable for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief, however, unless "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) To establish Washington's liability in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right." Kentucky v. Graham, 417 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
A suit against a municipal employee in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the municipality itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Atchison v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A suit against Washington in his official capacity, then, is treated as a suit against the District of columbia. See Arnold v. Moore, 980 F. Supp. 28, 36 (D.D.C. 1997)
Insofar as the complaint sets forth a theory of respondeat superior, neither the District of Columbia nor Odie Washington is liable. A municipality "cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeaser or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 691. Nor is a public official vicariously liable for the actions of his subordinates. See Arnold v. Moore, 980 F. Supp. at 35-36 (citing Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (High level public officials are not employers of their subordinates; rather, they are fellow government servants, and cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior.)
Complaints filed by pro se litigants are liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The complaint, as drafted, does not allege expressly any policy, custom or practice of the District of Columbia, the execution of which brought about the harms Plaintiff allegedly suffered. Nor does Plaintiff allege Washington's personal involvement or affirmative misconduct in the event from which this claim stems: confiscation of Plaintiff's eyeglasses upon his arrival at Red Onion. Plaintiff does allege that a corrections officer at Virginia's Red Onion State Prison took his eyeglasses, and that, despite written complaints to District of Columbia and Virginia prison officials, Plaintiff did not receive prompt medical attention and proper eyeglasses. As a result, Plaintiff allegedly suffered from blurred vision, dizziness, and headaches, among other effects. These allegations potentially raise issues of some complexity. Regardless of the place of his physical confinement, Plaintiff remains a District of Columbia prisoner. Based on the current record and the procedural posture of this case, it is inappropriate to conclude that the District of Columbia may absolve itself of all responsibility for its prisoners by virtue of their transfer to Virginia prisons pursuant to contractual arrangements. The District of Columbia defendants' motion will be denied without prejudice.
Appointment of counsel to represent Plaintiff may be appropriate to explore the allegations set forth in the complaint. The Court will deny Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice. He may renew his motion in the transferee court. Any decision to appoint counsel, however, is left to the transferee court.
B. Virginia Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Page True, Warden of the Red Onion State Prison, moves to dismiss the complaint on three grounds: that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, that venue in this district is improper, and that unspecified defects in the complaint call for dismissal of the action.
A suit against a state official in his official capacity is, in substance, a suit against the state itself. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars all suits in federal court against a state by citizens of that state or any other state. Id.; see Ali v. District of Columbia, 278 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who is "domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining his or its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim of relief." D.C. Code § 13-422 (2001). Nothing in the complaint suggests that defendant True resides in or maintains a principal place of business in the District of Columbia. Turning then to the District's long-arm statute, a District of Columbia Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who causes tortious injury in the District by an act or omission outside the District if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in a persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code § 13-423(a) (2001). A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists under the long-arm statute "by demonstrating a factual basis for the exercise of such jurisdiction over the defendant." Novak-Canzeri v. Saud, 864 F. Supp. 203, 205 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing First Chicago Int'l v. United Exchange Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988) Plaintiff does not meet his burden. No allegation in the complaint establishes that defendant True in his individual capacity conducts business in, derives revenue from, or persists in any activity that justifies this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him.
The District's long-arm statute sets forth other bases for personal jurisdiction based on conduct. See D.C. Code § 13-423 (2001). None of those alternatives is relevant to this action.
In a civil action where, as here, the Court's jurisdiction is not based solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is propr in "(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b). Venue is not proper in this district under the first subsection because not all of the named defendants reside in one state. Defendant True is in Virginia, and the other defendants are in the District of Columbia. Nor is venue proper in this district under the third subsection as it applies only if no other district is available. Venue in Virginia is proper under the second subsection because the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claim took place in Virginia while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Red Onion State Prison.
If a case is filed in a jurisdiction in which venue is improper, in the interest of justice, the Court may transfer a civil action to any other district where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a). Plaintiff's claims arose in Virginia, and thus the action might have been brought there. For the convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any district or division where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a). In deciding whether to transfer a case, the Court considers several factors, including deference to the Plaintiff's choice of forum, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, ease at access to sources of proof, and practical aspects of trying a case. Boers v. United States, 133 F. Supp.2d 64, 65 (D.D.C. 2001) Nichols v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 895 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1995). Individuals who were directly involved in or have knowledge of Plaintiff's claims are in Virginia. Likewise, paperwork and other evidence likely would be located in Virginia. it appears that a court in Virginia offers a more convenient forum in which to litigate Plaintiff's claims, notwithstanding Plaintiff's transfer to a federal correctional facility in Kansas. Further, transfer of this case may resolve the issues presented with respect to this Court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant True. The Court concludes that venue in the Western District of Virginia is proper, and that transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia is in the interest of justice.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is signed on his day.
TRANSFER ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, on this 25th day of July 2002, it is hereby
ORDERED that the District of Columbia's motion to dismiss the complaint [Dkt. #13] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that True Page's motion to dismiss [Dkt. #16] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel [Dkt. #21] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that this action shall be TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.