Opinion
No: 4:01CV00806 GH
April 25, 2002
ORDER
On May 18, 2000, the pro se plaintiff filed suit in the District of Columbia against numerous defendants alleging a civil conspiracy in the illegal indictment against him in United States v. BOLDEN, 4:00CR00022 WRW. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages.
On April 4, 2000, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs petition for writ of prohibition in the criminal case.
By order filed on June 29, 2001, the D.C. district court, in addressing plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissed the claims against the former Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury since respondeat superior is inapplicable in a Bivens action. The remaining claims against U.S. District Judge William R. Wilson, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge Henry L. Jones, Jr., former United States Attorney Paula Casey, Assistant United States Attorney Robert J. Govar, Assistant United States Attorney Todd L. Newton, FBI Special Agent Dixon Land, IRS Agent John Fettes, Chief Probation Officer Claretha G. Nelson, and Probation Officer Rodney Seals were transferred to this district as the proper venue. The case was filed in this Court on November 23rd.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on September 5, 2000, based on his unrebutted Administrative Notice of facts and on the "United States" only having jurisdiction in Washington, D.C.
Defendants filed a combined response/cross-motion to dismiss on September 15, 2000. They assert that the claims against them in their official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity, the defendants performing their duties in connection with plaintiff's criminal trial enjoy absolute immunity, and the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on any claim asserted against them in an individual capacity.
Plaintiff responded on October 19, 2000, that defendants are continuing to fraudulent identify themselves for "the fictitious entity known as "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA," a name found nowhere in statutory law spelled in ALL CAPS." He continues to argue that there is no jurisdiction for the criminal charges to be brought against him.
Plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendants from contacting him in relation to the criminal proceedings in light of this civil suit which was denied by the D.C. court. On October 19, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider. As the motion to reconsider has no merit, the motion is denied.
The Court first notes that a similar argument about fictitious names was rejected in United States v. Washington. 947 F. Supp. 87, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996):
Finally, the defendant contends that the Indictment must be dismissed because "KURT WASHINGTON," spelled out in capital letters, is a fictitious name used by the Government to tax him improperly as a business, and that the correct spelling and presentation of his name is "Kurt Washington." This contention is baseless.
The Court finds the following excerpts from the case of Namey v. Reilly, 926 F. Supp. 5, 7-9 (D. Mass. 1996) provide an excellent summary of immunity:
The common law doctrine of judicial immunity grants judges absolute immunity for damages resulting from actions undertaken in their official judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). As the Supreme Court has explained, providing judges with immunity preserves the integrity of the legal process by allowing them to "be free to act upon [their] own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to [themselves]." Bradley v. Fisher. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). Immunity also "protects judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants." Forrester. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225, 108 S.Ct. 538, 543, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988).
Federal courts have extended absolute immunity to certain other officials "closely associated with the judicial process." Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500, 88 L.Bd.2d 507 (1985). In determining whether immunity reaches the actions of an official. courts examine the function performed by the official, not his rank or status. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2613, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); Cleavinger. 474 U.S. at 200-01, 106 S.Ct. at 500-01. Under this functional view, immunity has been extended to officials performing discretionary tasks that assist judges in the decision-making process, compare Briscoe v. LaHue 460 U.S. 325, 335-36, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1115-16, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (witnesses, including police officers, are immune for their testimony in judicial proceedings) and Imbler v. Pachtman 424 U.S. 409, 424-27, 96 S.Ct. 984, 992-93, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (granting prosecutors absolute immunity with respect to initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution), with Antoine v. Byers Anderson. Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 2172, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993) (court reporters are not absolutely immune for failure to produce a transcript of a federal criminal trial), as well as to officials engaging in tasks closely analagous to those of a judge. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2914, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (federal hearing examiner immune from suit). The issue posed by this case is whether the defendants' acts are "closely associated with the judicial process" such that they are entitled to absolute immunity.
The Eighth Circuit recently addressed a similar issue in Anton v. Getty, 78 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1996). In Anton, a federal parolee brought a Bivens action against probation officers, contending that they violated his constitutional fights by "concluding that his release plan was unacceptable and recommending that his parole be delayed." Id. at 396. The Eighth Circuit found that the information and recommendations provided by probation officers to the parole hearing examiners play a significant part in the decision-making process. Id. The court, thus, concluded that in preparing materials for the Parole Commission, probation officers are entitled to immunity. [FN8] Id.
See also, Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1037 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing § 1983 body of law applies to Bivens actions), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1137, 118 S.Ct. 1839, 140 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1998).
Therefore, the claims against U.S. District Judge William R. Wilson, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge Henry L. Jones, Jr., former United States Attorney Paula Casey, Assistant United States Attorney Robert J. Govar, Assistant United States Attorney Todd L. Newton, Chief Probation Officer Claretha G. Nelson, and Probation Officer Rodney Seals must be dismissed with prejudice. Likewise, the claims against Land and Fettes in their official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity.
Turning to the individual claims against Land and Fettes, the Court cannot find at this stage of the proceedings and utilizing the standards governing a motion to dismiss that they are entitled to qualified immunity since plaintiff has alleged that the investigation and pursuit of charges against him was for racist motives. "To withstand the application of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must assert a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; that right must be clearly established at the time of the violation; and, given the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, there must be no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged action indeed violated that right." Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1998). When that standard is applied here, the Court concludes that the constitutional right to be free from investigation motivated by race was clearly established and that there are material factual disputes presented by plaintiffs allegations in the complaint as to whether a reasonable official would have known that the actions of Land and Fettes indeed violated that right.
However, the Court finds that any possible claim plaintiff would have against Land and Fettes as to the validity of the investigation and charges against him involves the outcome of the criminal case. Hence, the Court is persuaded that this action against Land and Fettes cannot proceed at this time in light of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (in order to recover damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render conviction or sentence invalid, a plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been overturned). Until the criminal case is resolved, the claims against Land and Fettes must be stayed and the case dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, plaintiff's November 23rd motion (#0-1) for summary judgment and his November 23rd motion (#0-1) for reconsideration of petition for temporary restraining order are denied. The defendants' November 23rd motion (#0-1) to dismiss is granted. The dismissal is with prejudice as U.S. District Judge William R. Wilson, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge Henry L. Jones, Jr., former United States Attorney Paula Casey, Assistant United States Attorney Robert J. Govar, Assistant United States Attorney Todd L. Newton, Chief Probation Officer Claretha G. Nelson, and Probation Officer Rodney Seals and is denied without prejudice as to FBI Special Agent Dixon Land and IRS Agent John Fettes.