Opinion
No. 264, 2001.
Decided: March 19, 2002.
Court Below-Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Sussex County Cr.A. Nos. IS00-01-0120 IS00-03-0378, 0379, 0381, 0385 IS99-11-0395-0399.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and STEELE, Justices.
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
ALLAN L. BOLDEN, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 264, 2001 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: February 8, 2002 Decided: March 19, 2002
ORDER
This 19th day of March 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Allan L. Bolden, filed an appeal from the Superior Court's May 9, 2001 order denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2) In this appeal, Bolden claims that: a) the Superior Court abused its discretion in not dismissing his postconviction motion without prejudice to refile since it was without jurisdiction to decide the motion while his direct appeal was pending; and b) the Superior Court improperly denied his motion for postconviction relief on the ground that he had failed to set forth facts supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(3) On May 11, 2000, Bolden was convicted by a Superior Court jury of one count of Burglary in the Second Degree, one count of Felony Theft, two counts of Misdemeanor Theft, two counts of Receiving Stolen Property, one count of Criminal Mischief and several motor vehicle charges.
Bolden was sentenced as an habitual offender to 8 years incarceration at Level V on the burglary conviction, in addition to receiving probationary sentences and fines on the remaining convictions. This Court affirmed Bolden's convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
Bolden v. State, Del. Supr., No. 402, 2000, Walsh, J. (Feb. 26, 2001).
(4) After his direct appeal was filed by his trial counsel, Bolden filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the Superior Court. Because Bolden's direct appeal was pending in this Court, the Superior Court informed him that his postconviction motion would be decided after the decision on his direct appeal was final. On May 9, 2001, after the mandate had issued on Bolden's direct appeal, the Superior Court denied Bolden's postconviction motion.
(5) Bolden's claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion in not dismissing his postconviction motion without prejudice to refile is without merit. Bolden was advised by the Superior Court in a letter dated September 11, 2000 that it would decide the postconviction motion after the decision on his direct appeal was final. Bolden did not object or attempt to voluntarily dismiss the motion. Nor did he attempt to amend his postconviction motion after his direct appeal was decided. There is no evidence that Bolden has been prejudiced in any way because the Superior Court deferred its decision on his postconviction motion until after his direct appeal became final.
(6) In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Bolden must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
(6) Bolden's claim that the Superior Court improperly denied his motion for postconviction relief on the ground that his claims of ineffective assistance were factually unsupported is also without merit. Bolden failed to demonstrate that any alleged errors by his counsel resulted in prejudice to him and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was, therefore, properly denied.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.