Boker v. Industrial Com

13 Citing cases

  1. McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n

    289 Ill. App. 3d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 7 times

    Section 19(k) of the Act provides in relevant part that a penalty may be imposed when there has been an unreasonable or vexatious delay in payment of compensation or when proceedings instituted by the employer are frivolous or for purposes of delay. Boker v. Industrial Comm'n, 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 56, 489 N.E.2d 913, 917 (1986). Section 19(l) of the Act similarly provides for the imposition of a penalty when the employer "without good and just cause" fails to pay or delays payment of TTD payments.

  2. Archer Daniels Midland v. Ind. Comm'n

    138 Ill. 2d 107 (Ill. 1990)   Cited 101 times
    Rejecting the employer's claim that because the employee was dilatory with his rehabilitation efforts, he was not entitled to TTD benefits where the employee's rehabilitation counselor testified that the employee's progress was satisfactory and where the time frame requested by the employer would have required the employee to engage in more hours of rehabilitation than authorized by his physician

    As the arbitrator suggested, Midland did not offer Brooks any appropriate light work and made no showing that other suitable light work, including locksmithing, was available for him. See Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 55 (where the court held that TTD benefits were properly cut off because the claimant's employer had offered the claimant a light-duty job consistent with his physical limitations, but the claimant refused the job). Because the record supports the Industrial Commission's finding that Brooks' condition had not stabilized and that he was still totally disabled, the appellate court erred in holding that the Industrial Commission's decision regarding the award of TTD benefits after December 20, 1985, was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

  3. Interstate Scaffolding v. Workers' Comp

    385 Ill. App. 3d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 2 times

    In general, these lines of cases provide that an employee is not entitled to TTD benefits. See, e.g., Stone v. Industrial Comm'n, 286 Ill. App. 3d 174, 179-80 (1997) (failure to cooperate); Hayden v. Industrial Comm'n, 214 Ill. App. 3d 749, 755-56 (1991) (same); Gallentine v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 880, 887 (1990) (refusal of light-duty work); Presson v. Industrial Comm'n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 876, 880-81 (1990) (same); Boker v. Industrial Comm'n, 141 Ill. App. 3d 51, 54-55 (1986) (same); but see Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ill. 2d 107, 116-17 (1990) (rejecting the employer's claim that because the employee was dilatory with his rehabilitation efforts, he was not entitled to TTD benefits where the employee's rehabilitation counselor testified that the employee's progress was satisfactory and where the time frame requested by the employer would have required the employee to engage in more hours of rehabilitation than authorized by his physician); Jewel Food Cos. v. Industrial Comm'n, 256 Ill. App. 3d 525, 531-32 (1993) (rejecting the employer's claim that the employee failed to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation where the employee contacted 25 employers on his own, he contacted some of the leads provided by his vocational counselor, he advised counselor that he could not meet his financial obligations if he accepted a low-paying job, and he made a "concerted effort" to return to work for the employer). Although the cases cited b

  4. Schmidgall v. Industrial Commission

    268 Ill. App. 3d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 10 times
    In Schmidgall, the claimant testified at his arbitration hearing that he was experiencing constant pain as a result of his work-related injury and his doctors had not released him to return to work.

    To prove a temporary total disability claim, the employee must show not only that he did not work but that he also was unable to work. ( Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 55, 489 N.E.2d 913, 917.) The determination of when recovery or stabilization of a condition occurs is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission, and unless its findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, that determination will not be set aside on review.

  5. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Indus. Comm'n

    575 N.E.2d 1234 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 11 times
    In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 215 Ill. App. 3d 659, 575 N.E.2d 1234 (1990), this court held that "overtime" consists of compensation for hours beyond those the employee regularly works each week and extra hourly pay above the employee's normal hourly wage. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 666.

    Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a). See also Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 489 N.E.2d 913. • 5 The Commission can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and a reviewing court will not disregard them simply because the court might have drawn other inferences.

  6. Gallentine v. Industrial Comm'n

    201 Ill. App. 3d 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 22 times

    Additionally, the Commission was also correct in reversing the arbitrator's award for attorney fees under section 16, as attorney fees are not recoverable in the absence of section 19(k) penalties. ( Waldschmidt, 186 Ill. App.3d 477, 542 N.E.2d 726; Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 489 N.E.2d 913.) Here, the arbitrator only awarded penalties under section 19( l), so the award of attorney fees by the arbitrator was inappropriate.

  7. Palmer House v. Industrial Comm'n

    558 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    To prove a claim for temporary total disability, the employee must show not only that he did not work, but also that he was unable to work. ( Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 489 N.E.2d 913.) The determination of whether an employee is temporarily totally disabled is a question of fact to be determined by the Industrial Commission, and unless its findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, they will not be set aside on review.

  8. Orkin Pest Control v. Industrial Comm'n

    543 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    ( Certi-Serve, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n (1984), 101 Ill.2d 236.) Moreover, an employee is temporarily totally disabled for the purposes of the Act until he is restored or stabilized. ( Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51.) Here, the evidence supports the Commission's decision to award claimant TTD benefits from October 27, 1986, to July 1, 1987.

  9. Waldschmidt v. Industrial Comm'n

    542 N.E.2d 726 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    Where there is a delay in paying compensation, it is the employer's burden to show it had a reasonable belief that the delay was justified. Whether the employer's conduct justifies the imposition of penalties is to be considered in terms of reasonableness and is a factual question for the Commission. Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 57, 489 N.E.2d 913, 918. In this case, claimant predicates his entitlement to section 19(k) penalties on unreasonable delay in payment of temporary benefits.

  10. Christman v. Industrial Comm'n

    536 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 9 times
    In Illinois-Iowa, there was testimony about claimant's age, education and prospects for rehabilitation, including the testimony of a vocational consultant.

    Thus, attorney fees under section 16 may not be awarded when penalties are imposed pursuant to section 19(l). See Boker v. Industrial Comm'n (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 51, 489 N.E.2d 913. Accordingly, we set aside the decision of the Commission insofar as it imposes penalties under section 16 and 19(k) and need only review the propriety of the penalties imposed under section 19(l).