Opinion
No. 00 C 2905.
December 14, 2004
TO: THE HONORABLE GEORGE W. LINDBERG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On May 13, 1996, Amjad Hinawi, a Hamas terrorist operating in Israel and the Occupied Territories, shot at a group of students who were waiting for a bus. One of those students was David Boim, a Brooklyn-born citizen of both the United States and Israel, who was living at the time in Jerusalem with his parents, both Israeli citizens and United States nationals. In the attack, David was shot in the head and killed. A Palestinian Authority court convicted Mr. Hinawi of participating in Boim's murder, and sentenced him to ten years in prison on February 17, 1998.
On May 12, 2000, David Boim's parents sued Mr. Hinawi, along with another terrorist, and various organizations and one individual they allege funded and otherwise supported the attack. Specifically, the Boims named as defendants the Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI"), the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development ("HLF"), the Islamic Association for Palestine ("IAP") and the American Muslim Society (collectively, "IAP/AMS"), the American Middle Eastern League for Palestine ("AMELP"), the United Association for Studies and Research ("UASR"), and Mohammed Salah, under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which provides that "[a]ny national of the United States injured in his person . . . by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his estate, survivors or heirs, may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees." 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (West 2000).
With the exception of Mr. Hinawi, who was properly served with the complaint in prison, all of the parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge, and the case was reassigned to this Court on April 13, 2001. Because Mr. Hinawi did not expressly consent to the reassignment, Judge Lindberg, the district judge to whom the case was originally assigned, retained the case against Mr. Hinawi.
When Mr. Hinawi failed to answer the complaint, the Boims moved for a default judgment against him. On September 24, 2003, Judge Lindberg granted the motion, but referred to this Court the determination of any damages to be assessed against Mr. Hinawi. Thereafter, this Court entered default judgment against two other defendants, AMELP and UASR, and ordered that the question of damages against all three defaulting defendants be determined in conjunction with the trial against the non-defaulting defendants. See Boim v. QLI, et al., No. 00 C 2905 (N.D. Ill. Minute Order dated April 6, 2004).
The case proceeded through discovery, and, in the fall of this year, the plaintiffs and the non-defaulting defendants filed various motions and cross-motions for summary judgment. To summarize the Court's findings on those motions, the Court determined that HLF, IAP/AMS, and Mohammed Salah were liable to the Boims as a matter of law, and found that the remaining issues — the question of liability as to defendant Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI") and the determination of any damages award — should go to a jury. See Boim v. QLI, et al., 340 F. Supp.2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
These issues were, in fact, tried before a jury beginning December 1, 2004, and, on December 8, 2004, the jury returned its verdict, finding QLI liable and awarding the Boims $52 million in damages. As mandated by the statute, the Court trebled the jury's award, and entered judgment for the Boims in the amount of $156 million.
Because of the nature of the Boims' claim and injury, the liability to be imposed on the defendants is joint and several. See In re Uranium Trust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1257 (7th Cir. 1980). This means that the defendants who have been found to be liable are jointly liable for the entire damage award, and the Boims may look to any one of these defendants for full satisfaction of the award; this is so even if the liability is imposed because of a defendant's default. Id. at 1262-63. See also Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1570 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[m]ultiple tortfeasors who concurrently cause an indivisible injury are jointly and severally liable; each can be held liable for the entire injury") (citations omitted). Accordingly, the judgment in this case should reflect that defendant Hinawi is jointly and severally liable with the other liable defendants — the defaulting defendants, as well as the non-defaulting defendants — for the full amount of the damage award.