We note that, where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, the interpretation of a contract is a question of law which can be decided on a motion for summary judgment. ( Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 662.) However, as a question of law, the interpretation of the agreement can be made on review independently of the trial court's judgment.
• 1 Both orders appealed from granted motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment should be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact yet to be decided by a trier of fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( Marquette National Bank v. Walgreen Co. (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 680, 682, 467 N.E.2d 954; Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 662, 458 N.E.2d 644.) Defendant maintains that Pinzur was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The principle of "`[l]iberal construction of an insurance policy in favor of the insured must yield to rules of reasonable construction.'" JG, 218 Ill. App.3d at 1066, quoting Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 666 (1983). Plaintiff's reliance on Dixon is misplaced.
Where no factual dispute exists, the question of law is properly reviewed independently of the circuit court's judgment. See Scottish York International Insurance Group/Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Comet Casualty Co. (1990), 207 Ill. App.3d 881, 885, 566 N.E.2d 477; Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 662-63, 458 N.E.2d 644. • 1 Although the decision of whether to grant declaratory relief is discretionary with the circuit court (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-701; Howlett v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill.2d 135, 142, 370 N.E.2d 1036), the exercise of this discretion is subject to a "searching," or independent, appellate review and is not given the same deference as in other contexts.
Correspondingly, where certain facts are not in dispute with respect to the terms of a contract, the construction of the contract and its effect on insurance coverage are questions of law which can properly be determined on a motion for summary judgment. Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 458 N.E.2d 644. • 4 The statute governing misrepresentations made in insurance applications is section 154 of the Illinois Insurance Code. As previously stated, that statute provides that only a misrepresentation which has "been made with actual intent to deceive" or which "materially affects * * * the acceptance of the risk" can defeat a policy for insurance. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par. 766.)
However, we do not believe this proposition requires strained or unreasonable interpretations which would have the effect of invalidating the contract between the parties. As stated in Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 666, 458 N.E.2d 644, 649, "[l]iberal construction of an insurance policy in favor of the insured must yield to rules of reasonable construction." • 2 In the case at bar, we do not believe the policy can be reasonably construed to provide coverage for retaliatory discharge.
Harvey Wrecking Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (1968), 91 Ill. App.2d 449, 456, 235 N.E.2d 385. See also Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 666, 458 N.E.2d 644. • 2, 3 When considering whether an insurance company must defend its insured in a suit filed against it, the court must look to the complaint itself. If the complaint alleges facts within the coverage of the policy or potentially within the coverage of the policy, the duty to defend has been established.
The construction of the language of an insurance policy is a question of law properly decided on a motion for summary judgment. ( Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 662.) As a question of law, the interpretation of a contract can be determined on review independent of the trial court's judgment.
While we do not quarrel with the trial court's holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact present, we do question the propriety of the judgment here with respect to the trial court's finding that the truck involved in the accident was an automobile within the meaning of Comet's family automobile policy and the common definition of such term. As the construction of Comet's policy is a question of law ( Sawyer Fruit Vegetable Co-Operative Corp. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 407, 453 N.E.2d 826), the question of coverage of the truck is a proper issue to be determined upon review, independent of the trial court's judgment ( Bohen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 458 N.E.2d 644), as it is incumbent upon this court to determine whether the law has been properly applied based upon the record. Fidelity General Insurance Co. v. Nelsen Steel Wire Co. (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 635, 270 N.E.2d 616.
As a question of law, the question of the coverage provided under the terms of the policy can be determined upon review independent of the trial court's judgment. Butler, 199 Ill. App.3d at 1021; Bohnen International, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 657, 662-63. According to the applicable terms of an amendatory endorsement to Shaw's policy with Ansvar, "Your Covered Auto" means: