Bohn v. Heckler

12 Citing cases

  1. Riddle v. Secretary of Health Human Serv

    817 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1987)   Cited 23 times
    Finding floor comments and committee report useful

    I do not understand this case to present the question of the relationship of the EAJA to the award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), a question which has produced significant confusion. Compare Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1984), and Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D.Ill. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983) (awards may be made under both sections) with Dunn v. Heckler, 614 F. Supp. 45, 51 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (award under EAJA can only be for work done in court proceedings, award under § 406(b)(1) can only be for work done at the administrative level, with total fees for both levels limited to 25% of the award) and Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (EAJA does not apply to administrative proceedings, but no 25% limit on combined fees at both levels noted) and Lovell v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 621, 624 (M.D.Pa. 1985) (when attorney fees are awarded under EAJA, no fees are to be awarded under § 406(b)(1)).

  2. Miyoshi v. Bowen

    696 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1988)   Cited 2 times
    In Miyoshi, the plaintiff did not rely solely on her own subjective allegations to establish the severity of her headaches.

    Here, however, we cannot expect further objective evidence to substantiate claimant's medical condition because the diagnosis of that condition must be based upon claimant's symptomology and medical history — factual issues that are already of record and that we understand the ALJ accepts. Since "the plaintiff's entitlement is clear from the record and . . . a remand would simply delay receipt of deserved benefits," Bryant v. Harris, 494 F. Supp. 932, 933 (D.S.C. 1980) (citing Grable v. Secretary of HEW, 442 F. Supp. 465 (W.D.N.Y. 1977)), we reverse the Secretary's decision and order that claimant be awarded the appropriate benefits. See also Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232, 237 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (discussing role of district court when remanding cases). CONCLUSION

  3. Schupbach v. Bowen, (N.D.Ind. 1987)

    673 F. Supp. 941 (N.D. Ind. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    Finding 77.2 hours reasonable

    Id., citing Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 551 n. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The government's position will not be considered unreasonable solely because it lost. Walden v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 1250, 1253 (N.D.Ill. 1987), citing Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232, 239 (N.D.Ill. 1985). To satisfy the burden of showing substantial justification, the government must demonstrate (1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged, (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory propounded, and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts and the theory.

  4. Whiting v. Bowen

    671 F. Supp. 1219 (W.D. Wis. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    By bringing these claims to federal court, claimants like plaintiff have not only redressed their own situations, but helped prompt Congress to pass the Social Security Disability Benefits Act of 1984 which expressly mandates application of the standard which courts previously merely inferred.Sizemore v. Heckler, 608 F. Supp. 911, 917 (D.C.Ill. 1985) See also Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232, 238 (N.D.Ill., E.D. 1985): The explosion of disability litigation in recent years, the high rate at which the federal courts have overturned the Secretary's determinations, and the institutional struggle between the federal courts and the Secretary over the issue of "noncompliance" reflect the useful disciplinary function of legal challenges to the Secretary's decisions and procedures by often impoverished, ill and politically unorganized disability claimants.

  5. Cruz v. Bowen

    668 F. Supp. 669 (D. Utah 1987)   Cited 5 times
    In Cruz v. Bowen, 668 F. Supp. 669 (D.Utah 1987), the court found no causal link between Cruz's suit challenging his initial denial of benefits and the Secretary's favorable redetermination of that denial.

    Some of these courts have found that remand alone is enough to justify entitlement to fees. See Continental Web Press, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 767 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1986); Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232, 236 (N.D.Ill. 1985); Sizemore v. Heckler, 608 F. Supp. 911 (N.D.Ill. 1985); Haney v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 12, 15-17 (N.D.Ill. 1984); Knox v. Schweiker, 567 F. Supp. 959, 964 (D.Del. 1983); Ceglia v. Schweiker, 566 F. Supp. 118, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N Y 1982). Others have found that it is the receipt of benefits that renders a Social Security claimant a prevailing party and not remand in and of itself.

  6. Walden v. Bowen

    660 F. Supp. 1250 (N.D. Ill. 1987)   Cited 2 times
    In Walden v. Bowen, 660 F. Supp. 1250 (N.D.Ill. 1987), Judge Grady denied a cost-of-living adjustment because he found that "[t]he work done by plaintiff's counsel was routine in nature."

    "The government's position is not considered unreasonable solely because it lost." Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232, 239 (N.D.Ill. 1985). Yet in a case where the Secretary's factual finding that the plaintiff was not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence, we fail to see how its position can be substantially justified.

  7. Mathus v. Heckler

    661 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ill. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    In Mathus and Krause, the plaintiffs were held not to be prevailing parties because they won relief solely as a result of new enactments by Congress while their cases were pending in the district court.

    Id. at 17. Similarly, in Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.Ill. 1985), the court held that the plaintiff was a prevailing party where it ordered remand because of "substantive defects" in the evaluation of the ALJ. Id. at 236.

  8. Weber v. Weinberger

    651 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Mich. 1987)   Cited 35 times
    Noting circuit split and legislative history and resolving issue by deciding that government position failed to satisfy even the reasonableness test

    Moreover, other courts have concluded — in the same context — that obtaining a remand, that is, a ruling that an administrative decision is not supported by substantial evidence satisfied the prevailing party requirement under the EAJA. See Haney v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 12. See also Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (plaintiff's actions in rebutting Secretary's position and thus re-establishing prima facie entitlement to benefits satisfies prevailing party test regardless of whether case is remanded to Secretary rather than reversed outright). As a general matter it is true that the "special circumstances" test has been given a somewhat different treatment than the same test under the private attorney general statutes.

  9. Gavin v. Bowen

    635 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1986)   Cited 2 times

    " H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. Ad.News 4993. See also Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232, 237 (N.D.Ill. 1985). Moreover, "where a party has had to engage in lengthy administrative proceedings before final vindication of his or her rights in the courts, the government should have to make a strong showing to demonstrate that its action was reasonable."

  10. Vascera v. Heckler

    624 F. Supp. 1198 (D.R.I. 1986)   Cited 6 times

    Such unanimity of opinion among the circuit courts which have to date addressed the question has failed, nevertheless, to exorcise the spirit of generosity with which some courts have approached the Act vis-a-vis social security remand cases. Although the majority of the district courts have embraced the McGill-Brown-Cook trilogy, e.g., Steffens v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 754, 755-56 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (Bua, J.), others have refused to fly that flag. E.g., Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232, 237-38 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (Moran, J.); Sizemore v. Heckler, 608 F. Supp. 911, 913 (N.D.Ill. 1985) (Plunkett, J.). The cases which refuse to follow the clearly lettered guideposts of the McGill-Brown-Cook trilogy offer, in one form or another, a quadrat of arguments, none of which holds much water.