Ryerson and Universal each also appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgments entered upon the verdicts that had been directed against them with respect to their third party complaints. The Appellate Court affirmed, ( Bohannon v. Ryerson, 16 Ill. App.2d 402,) and we granted leave to appeal. The cases were consolidated in the Appellate Court and in this court. The action involves multiple parties and multiple claims for relief. It is therefore governed by section 50(2) of the Civil Practice Act which provides that in such a case "* * * the court may enter a final order, judgment or decree as to one or more but fewer than all the parties or claims only upon an express finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.

However, before Goldblatt Brothers could be exposed to liability by the act of the Huiner Company, some relationship or circumstance must be shown to exist between them giving rise to derivative or vicarious liability. ( Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 407.) The evidence adduced at trial revealed no such circumstance or relationship, nor did it reveal that Goldblatt Brothers could be held responsible for the Huiner Company's improper performance of its duties under the contract.

And, if a person is not under a nondelegable duty or is liable because of his own act or omission, he is precluded from seeking indemnity. Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602; Yankey v. Oscar Bohlin Sons, Inc., 37 Ill. App.2d 457, 186 N.E.2d 57; Shulman v. Chrysler Corp., supra. [2] The amended third-party complaint demonstrates no relationship or circumstance which creates a nondelegable duty on Kruzel.

Petition for leave to appeal was denied by the Appellate Court in the original action and a direct appeal was taken to the Appellate Court in the third party actions. The Appellate Court in Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Sons, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602 (1958), affirmed the judgments entered in the third party actions. Petition for leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court, however, and in an opinion filed on January 23, 1959, the judgment of the Appellate Court was vacated for want of an appealable order due to the absence of a certification as required by section 50 (2) of the Civil Practice Act. Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Sons, Inc., 15 Ill.2d 470, 155 N.E.2d 585 (1959).

John Griffiths Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141 N.E. 739; Gulf, M. O.R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., supra. In the Moroni case, supra, the court was careful to distinguish Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602 (reversed on other grounds, 15 Ill.2d 470, 155 N.E.2d 585), where an owner was denied indemnity from his general contractor and subcontractor because the owner himself was found guilty of negligence in supplying faulty materials. This form of negligence was differentiated from that in the Moroni case, where the owner's liability under the Scaffold Act had been based merely on his status as an owner.

ort-feasors, and as such not entitled to recover over from a possible joint tort-feasor; liability under the Structural Work Act extends to those in charge of construction who make wilful violations of the Act, wilful violations being knowing violations; the common law negligence counts were based on the defendants architects allegedly actively failing to provide for adequate support for the roof, failing to calculate a sufficient safety factor to be used in the scaffolding, failing to oversee and inspect the scaffolding to determine whether or not it was safe to use, and otherwise failing to apply the degree of skill customarily brought to such work by competent architects in and about the community; if they were liable at all it would be only as active tort-feasors and the law precludes indemnification between active tort-feasors; if they were not liable there would be no need for indemnification: Yankey v. Oscar Bohlin Son, Inc., 37 Ill. App.2d 457, 186 N.E.2d 57 (1962). And see: Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602 (1958). As of the time of the motion to dismiss the third-party complaint here, it appeared that if the plaintiffs were able to prove the allegations of the complaint the defendants architects would be active tort-feasors and not entitled to indemnity, but if as alleged, in substance, in their answer and third-party complaint they were free from negligence and any wilful violation of the Structural Work Act and the incidents occurred as the result of the alleged acts of Fisher-Stoune, Inc., then the plaintiffs would be unable to recover damages from them

Under either theory, Bohlin would be liable as an active tort-feasor, and as such not entitled to recover over from a joint tort-feasor. Bohanon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602; Schulman v. Chrysler Corp., 31 Ill. App.2d 168, 175 N.E.2d 590. Liability under the Scaffold Act extends to those in charge of construction who make wilful violations of the act, wilful violations being knowing violations. Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. P. Ry. Co., 22 Ill.2d 305, 321, 175 N.E.2d 785. The common law negligence count was based on Bohlin's actively taking part in converting the excavator to a hoist and failing to inspect the equipment even though a safety supervisor was provided.

The prohibition against recovery from the other tort-feasor who was the agent, is not prohibited as a matter of law in this State (Gulf, M. O. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783). Contribution among tort-feasors is permissible and can be enforced so long as the parties do not stand in pari delicto (Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602). It is apparent then that the judgment order entered below dismissing the third party complaints was improper and should be reversed.

And an active tort-feasor is not entitled to contribution for damages paid in an action under the Structural Work Act. Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 404, 148 N.E.2d 602, reversed on other grounds, 15 Ill.2d 470, 155 N.E.2d 585. The only question is whether plaintiffs were guilty of active negligence.

G.M. O. might not escape statutory liability under the Scaffolding Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, sec. 60 (1959), as interpreted in Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Ill.2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958), but nothing in the act requires it to waive the right to hold the contractor liable under the general principle set forth in the Griffiths and Gulf, M. O.R. Co. v. Dixon cases, supra. Much reliance is placed by Intrusion on the case of Bohannon v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 402, 148 N.E.2d 602 (1958). That case is distinguishable because there the court held that both the counterclaimant and the counterdefendant were active joint tort-feasors.