Both parties objected on different grounds to the Supplementary Report, and this court again held a hearing on the matter. Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258 (D.R.I. 1995). Like the Special Master, this court then refused to make any adjustment for "deferred tax liabilities," as WRC requested.
See id. See also Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 901 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1995), appeal dismissed, 86 F.3d 1146 (1st Cir. 1996); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258 (D.R.I. 1995); Flanders + Medeiros, Inc. v. Bogosian, 868 F. Supp. 412 (D.R.I. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 65 F.3d 198 (1st Cir. 1995); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 831 F. Supp. 47 (D.R.I. 1993); Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1991); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 749 F. Supp. 396 (D.R.I. 1990). I. Background
Finally, a fair-value determination is "necessarily a fact-specific process." McLoon Oil, 565 A.2d at 1003; accord Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258, 261 (D.R.I. 1995). "[T]he weight to be given to particular evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court."
. . ." Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258, 265 (D. R.I. 1995). Most importantly, prejudgment interest must "compensate 'the plaintiffs for the value of the use of the principal withheld from them."' J. Kirkland Grant, Appraisal Rights: Allowance for Prejudgment Interest, 17 B.C. Ind. Com. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1975) (citations omitted).
See La Esperanza de P.R., Inc. v. Perez y Cia. de P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1997). For further detail, see Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 158 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 973 F.Supp. 98 (D.R.I. 1997); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 901 F.Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1995), appeal dismissed, 86 F.3d 1146 (1st Cir. 1996); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F.Supp. 258 (D.R.I. 1995); Flanders + Medeiros Inc. v. Bogosian, 868 F.Supp. 412 (D.R.I. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 65 F.3d 198 (1st Cir. 1995); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 831 F.Supp. 47 (D.R.I. 1993); Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1991); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 749 F.Supp. 396 (D.R.I. 1990). Elizabeth Bogosian ("Bogosian") and James Woloohojian turned against Harry Woloohojian in 1979, after Harry had ceased to perform any further services for WRC, yet continued to draw full salary.
In April 1995, the district court adopted as its findings the report of a special master valuing Bogosian's WRC stock at $4,901,801. See Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258, 261, 266 (D.R.I. 1995). Bogosian's personal attorney.
Instead, the Court will limit itself to addressing the facts essential to the two matters currently before it and refer any interested reader to the more comprehensive discussion of this case's background in previous decisions, particularly the First Circuit's discussion in Bogosian, 158 F.3d at 2-6 and Judge Francis Boyle's treatment in Bogosian, 973 F. Supp. at 100-06. See Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 93 F. Supp.2d 145 (R.I. 2000), on remand from, 158 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1998), aff'g in part, rev'g in part Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 973 F. Supp. 98 (R.I. 1997); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258 (R.I. 1995); Flanders + Medeiros, Inc. v. Bogosian, 868 F. Supp. 412 (R.I. 1994), aff'd. in part, rev'd in part, 65 F.3d 198 (1st Cir. 1995); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 831 F. Supp. 47 (R.I. 1993); Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898 (lst Cir. 1991); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 749 F. Supp. 396 (R.I. 1990). STANDARD IN BENCH TRIAL
Since then, plaintiff and defendant have made several trips to this and various other courts on a variety of issues relating to this receivership and other business ventures. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 158 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1991); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 167 F. Supp.2d 491 (D.R.I. 2001); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 93 F. Supp.2d 145 (D.R.I. 2000); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258 (D.R.I. 1995); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 749 F. Supp. 396 (D.R.I. 1990); Woloohojian v. Bogosian, 685 A.2d 278 (R.I. 1996) (mem.); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 685 A.2d 274 (R.I. 1996) (mem.); Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 672 A.2d 462 (R.I. 1996) (mem.); Woloohojian v. Bogosian, 645 A.2d 493 (R.I. 1994) (mem.). In the course of liquidating EJ's assets, the receiver sold two properties, one at 1149 Cowesett Road in Warwick (Cowesett Road property) and the other at the corner of Route 2 and Cowesett Road in Warwick (Route 2 property). Thereafter, in September 2001, the receiver submitted his thirty-third and final report to the Superior Court.
In contrast to § 7-1.1-74, § 7-1.1-901 is silent on both the rate and the method of the interest computation to be used after determining the purchase price of the shares. Although the trial justice believed that the use of compound interest was within her discretion in equitable proceedings generally, based upon her reading of Chokel v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1996), and Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 882 F. Supp. 258 (D.R.I. 1995), we hold that this decision as applied to § 7-1.1-901 proceedings was erroneous. Instead, we agree with the First Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Bogosian v. Woloohojian, 158 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998).