Opinion
Case No. 2:02CV1364 DAK
May 27, 2003
ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment, and Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The court has carefully considered the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties and has determined that oral argument will not materially assist the court in deciding these motions. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Order.
Defendants originally filed a motion to dismiss on January 9, 2003. On January 13, 2003, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition. On January 14, 2003, Plaintiff filed an Amended Response. On January 30, 2003, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, and on February 18, 2003, he filed a Motion for Default Judgment. Defendants then, on March 12, 2003, filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, but rather filed a Request for Hearing on the pending motions.
Even though Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, the court, in ruling on the pending motions, has considered all of Plaintiff's filings in this matter, including his previous responses to the original Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff generally claims violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a variety of alleged wrongs including Defendants' failure to provide him with a pre-deprivation hearing to review exculpatory evidence before the arrest warrant was issued, false arrest and imprisonment, loss of his liberty and due process rights, negligent and intentional conduct, malicious prosecution and abuse of civil process, failure to supervise, municipal and supervisory liability, various violations of Utah law, deprivation of his state contractor's license, and humiliation and mental distress. He seeks $25,065,000 in compensatory damages and also seeks punitive damages against Defendants.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must determine whether the factual allegations in the complaint, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal is appropriate only when "the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims to entitle him to relief." Cotrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int'l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999). "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Sutton v. Utah School for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). The court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, construe those facts liberally in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and "resolve all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor." Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1232. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "erect a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim." Cottrell, 191 F.3d at 1251 (quotations omitted). Granting a defendant's motion to dismiss is a "harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice." Id. (quotations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motions for Default Judgment
The court summarily denies Plaintiff's two motions for default judgment. The first motion, filed on December 30, 2002, was filed prematurely. On the same date, Defendants filed a motion to extend their time to respond to the Complaint. The motion was granted on January 6, 2003, giving Defendants until January 14, 2003 to respond. Defendants then timely responded on January 9, 2003.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 30, 2003, and then filed a second motion for default judgment on February 18, 2003, which again was prior to Defendants' response being due, even if they were served with the Amended Complaint on the same date that it was filed in this court. There is, however, no evidence in the record as to when Defendants were actually served with the Amended Complaint. In any event, the court would not grant a motion for default judgment in the circumstances of this case. Thus, Plaintiff's motions for default judgment are denied.
B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
Regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, the court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff's action must be dismissed for a variety of reasons. First, Plaintiff's claims against the State of Utah Attorney General's Office and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed because these Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, the Attorney General's office and the Individual Defendants sued in their official capacities are not "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, all claims are dismissed except the claims asserted against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
In addition, Defendants argue that collateral estoppel (i.e., issue preclusion) bars Plaintiff's claims in this action because the same issues have been adjudicated in a previous state court action. Specifically, Defendants argue that the issues in this case are identical to the issues decided in the previous case, the issues were decided in a final judgment on the merits, the issues in the previous action were competently, fully, and fairly litigated, and that the opposing party in the instant action was privy to the previous action. Thus, Defendants contend that all of the elements of the collateral estoppel doctrine are satisfied and Plaintiff's claims are therefore barred.
It is not entirely clear to the court that the issues in the previous suit were identical to all of the issues in this suit, as Plaintiff's previous Complaint does not appear to be based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For example, the state court's determination that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act would not preclude the claims in the instant case, as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not provide immunity from a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, in the previous case, Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim was not dismissed on the merits because the claim was determined to be premature, and thus, such a claim is not precluded in this case. Additionally, the claims against Defendant Wright were dismissed without prejudice in the previous case, eliminating the preclusive effect of the previous action on the claims now asserted against Wright.
With the exception of the malicious prosecution claim, it is unclear to this court why the dismissal of any other claim against Wright was without prejudice. In any event, because the dismissal was without prejudice, the determinations made regarding Wright cannot have preclusive effect in this action.
While Defendants have not specified which issues in the previous case have preclusive effect in the instant case, it appears that the state court determined that all of the claims against the Individual Defendants — except Wright — were barred based upon absolute prosecutorial immunity. The previous determination by the state court of that issue precludes the instant claims — except for the malicious prosecution claim — against Shurtleff and Macanas.
Even if the previous determination did not have preclusive effect, Shurtleff and Macanas would be entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity in this action. Defendants do not argue that Wright, as an investigator, is entitled to prosecutorial immunity, and thus this court makes no determination on that issue.
Furthermore, although Defendants did not raise such an argument, the doctrine of claim preclusion (as opposed to issue preclusion) precludes most of Plaintiff's claims in the instant action. Claim preclusion requires that both cases involve the same parties or their privies, that the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or be one that could have and should have been raised in the first action, and the suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ¶ 58, 44 P.3d 663 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). While the doctrine of claim preclusion would not bar Plaintiff's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because it was not ripe for adjudication in the previous action, and it would not bar the claims against Wright because any previous claims were dismissed without prejudice, it does bar all other claims because such claims were either previously litigated and adjudicated or could have and should have been raised in the first action because the case at bar involves the same facts and events that were the subject of Plaintiff's previous case in state court. Thus, with the exceptions noted above, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Accordingly, after the above determinations, Plaintiff is left with his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Defendants Shurtleff, Macanas, and Wright in their individual capacities and with all his individual capacity claims against Wright. These claims, however, also fail.
Defendants argue that "[c]ommon law malicious prosecution may not be redressed under § 1983 because § 1983 is not `a source of substantive rights.'" Mem. in Supp. at 11. However, Tenth Circuit law is clear that a malicious prosecution claim is redressable under § 1983. See, e.g., Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that "we conclude that our circuit takes the common law elements of malicious prosecution as the `starting point' for the analysis of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, but always reaches the ultimate question, which it must, of whether the plaintiff has proven a constitutional violation.") Defendants presumably base their argument on the fact that Plaintiff stated in his Amended Complaint that his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim was brought under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when he should have stated that it was brought under the Fourth Amendment. However, it is clear from the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff is alleging a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, and the fact that he incorrectly listed the constitutional amendment under which it is brought will not compel the dismissal of his claim, particularly when he is a pro se Plaintiff.
Not only has Plaintiff failed to allege any affirmative links between the alleged constitutional violation and each Defendant's conduct, which is an independent reason for dismissal, but the court also finds that there is no constitutional right to a pre-arrest hearing or investigation regarding alleged exculpatory evidence. See Watson v. Kansas City, 80 F. Supp.2d 1175, 1192-93 (D. Kan. 1999); Potts v. Philadelphia, 224 F. Supp.2d 919, 933-34 (E.D. Penn. 2002). Because all of Plaintiff's claims appear to be based on Defendants' alleged failure to conduct a pre-arrest hearing or investigation, the court's determination that no constitutional violation occurred disposes of all of Plaintiff's claims.
Even if Plaintiff were entitled to such pre-arrest procedures, Plaintiff has not carried his burden in demonstrating that this alleged constitutional right is clearly established. Thus, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in any event.
As additional bases for dismissal, the court also finds that to the extent that Plaintiff's claims are based on alleged violations of state law, they do not support a § 1983 claim, and those claims are dismissed. Regarding Plaintiff's claim pertaining to loss of his contractor's license, Plaintiff has failed to allege how Defendants' actions relate to this alleged loss. Further, he has not alleged that he has exhausted his administrative remedies with the state agency administering such licenses. Finally, in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He has not set forth a prima facie case of discrimination under § 1981, and thus, that claim fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [docket entry #16] is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment [docket entries ##3 15] are DENIED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [docket entry #7] is MOOT due to Plaintiff's subsequent filing on an Amended Complaint and Defendants' subsequent filing of the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [docket entry #14] is MOOT. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.