B.O.E., City S.D. of N.Y. v. Mills

2 Citing cases

  1. In re of Board of Education of the City School

    25 A.D.3d 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    Crew III, J. The relevant facts are fully set forth in our prior decisions in this matter ( 8 AD3d 834; 300 AD2d 981). Briefly, in July 1999, respondent Robert E. Riccobono (hereinafter respondent) was removed from his position as Community Superintendent of District 19 in the New York City School District pursuant to paragraph eight of his employment contract and, more specifically, Education Law §§ 2590-1 and 2590-h, the latter of which incorporates by reference Education Law § 2590-f. Respondent appealed that decision to respondent Commissioner of Education, who sustained that portion of the appeal contending that respondent was removed from his position in violation of Education Law § 2590-1 and ordered that: "[respondent] be restored to his status as a paid employee of the district, at the same rate of pay he was receiving at the time of his dismissal, with back pay and benefits from the time of his dismissal, less any compensation he may have otherwise earned; subject, however, to whatever further proceedings, if any, the current Chancellor may elect to pursue, consistent with [Education Law a

  2. In re of Board of Education of the City School

    8 A.D.3d 834 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    CREW III, J. When this matter was last before us, we upheld respondent Commissioner of Education's finding that respondent Robert Riccobono had been removed from his position as Community Superintendent of District 19 in the New York City School District in violation of Education Law § 2590-l due to the Chancellor's failure to comply with the statutory directives set forth therein ( 300 A.D.2d 981). Ultimately, however, we withheld decision in this matter, as the Commissioner failed to address the propriety of Riccobono's removal under Education Law § 2590-h, the alternate ground for dismissal relied upon by the Chancellor, and remitted the matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Upon remittal, the Commissioner concluded that where, as here, the superintendent in question has a protected property interest in his or her employment, Education Law § 2590-h requires notice and a pretermination opportunity to respond to the charges at hand As these minimal due process protections were not afforded Riccobono, the Commissioner found that his removal under Education Law § 2590-h was improper.