In September 2011, the district court granted Bode & Grenier's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, and denied appellants' motion for summary judgment based on res judicata. Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 59 (D.D.C.2011). In November 2011, Bode & Grenier amended its complaint, adding a claim for attorney's fees.
It is rarely awarded. See Bode & Grenier, L.L.P. v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 65 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Avianca v. Corriea, 1992 WL 93128, at *12 (D.D.C. April 13, 1992)). In determining the appropriateness of the remedy in this case, the court will apply District of Columbia law.
“[A] magistrate judge's report and recommendation is reviewed de novo.” Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, the Court need not address whether such allegations could state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the instant motion. To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must allege that “ ‘(1) defendant owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty; (2) defendant breached that duty; and (3) to the extent plaintiff seeks compensatory damages—the breach proximately caused an injury.’ ” Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 915 F.Supp.2d 109, 115 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 64 (D.D.C.2011) ). “A real estate broker, like any other agent, owes a fiduciary duty to his principal.” Laufer, 482 A.2d at 364 (citations omitted).
“[A] magistrate judge's report and recommendation is reviewed de novo.” Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 60 (D.D.C.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
(emphases added)); Bode & Grenier, L.L.P. v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 64 (D.D.C.2011) (“In order to state a claim under District of Columbia Law for breach of fiduciary duty, [plaintiffs] must allege ... [,] to the extent plaintiff seeks compensatory damages[,] the breach proximately caused an injury.” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).
To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under D.C. law, a plaintiff must allege that “ ‘(1) defendant owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty; (2) defendant breached that duty; and (3) to the extent plaintiff seeks compensatory damages—the breach proximately caused an injury.’ ” Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 64 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 543 F.Supp.2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C.2008)). “As a general rule, the mere existence of a contract does not create a fiduciary duty.”
To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under D.C. law, a plaintiff must allege that “ ‘(1) defendant owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty; (2) defendant breached that duty; and (3) to the extent plaintiff seeks compensatory damages—the breach proximately caused an injury.’ ” Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 64 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 543 F.Supp.2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C.2008)). “As a general rule, the mere existence of a contract does not create a fiduciary duty.”
To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under D.C. law, a plaintiff must allege that “ ‘(1) defendant owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty; (2) defendant breached that duty; and (3) to the extent plaintiff seeks compensatory damages—the breach proximately caused an injury.’ ” Bode & Grenier, LLP v. Knight, 821 F.Supp.2d 57, 64 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Paul v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 543 F.Supp.2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C.2008)). “As a general rule, the mere existence of a contract does not create a fiduciary duty.”
"The magistrate judge's [R&R] is reviewed de novo." Bode & Grenier, L.L.P. v. Knight, 821 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Magistrate Judge Robinson determined that the ALJ's decision that plaintiff could perform sedentary work "failed to build a sufficient 'logical bridge' from the evidence - the medical opinions presented before him - to his specific conclusion that [p]laintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary work."