" Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers" ( Aragona v. State of New York, 147 A.D.3d 808, 809, 47 N.Y.S.3d 115 [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, "[o]wners of one-or two-family dwellings are exempt from liability under Labor Law § 241(6) unless they directed or controlled the work being performed" ( Venter v. Cherkasky, 200 A.D.3d 932, 932, 159 N.Y.S.3d 487 ; seeBoccio v. Bozik, 41 A.D.3d 754, 755, 839 N.Y.S.2d 525 ). The homeowner's exemption "was enacted to protect those who, lacking business sophistication, would not know or anticipate the need to obtain insurance to cover them against such liability" ( Boccio v. Bozik, 41 A.D.3d at 755, 839 N.Y.S.2d 525 ; seeVan Amerogen v. Donnini, 78 N.Y.2d 880, 882, 573 N.Y.S.2d 443, 577 N.E.2d 1035 ; Ramirez v. I.G.C. Wall Sys., Inc., 140 A.D.3d 1047, 1048, 35 N.Y.S.3d 159 ).

Specifically, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was applying lacquer thinner to the kitchen island, as opposed to sanding off the paint as the plaintiff had done to kitchen cabinets on the days prior to the accident, because Betsy told him to use that product, as she did not want any more dust. Accordingly, the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they directed or controlled the injury-producing method of work and failed to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to the homeowner exemption of Labor Law § 241(6) (seeBoccio v. Bozik, 41 A.D.3d 754, 755, 839 N.Y.S.2d 525 ; Garcia v. Martin, 285 A.D.2d 391, 392–393, 728 N.Y.S.2d 455 ; Chura v. Baruzzi, 192 A.D.2d 918, 919, 596 N.Y.S.2d 592 ; cf. Jumawan v. Schnitt, 35 A.D.3d 382, 383, 825 N.Y.S.2d 728 ). Although the defendants submitted affidavits from themselves and Laszlo Terjeki, the principal of plaintiff's employer, stating that the defendants did not give direction to the plaintiff as to how he should perform the work and that any directions were given by Terjeki, these merely created a triable issue of fact.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. "Labor Law § 240 requires contractors and property owners, engaged in, among other things, the construction, demolition, or repair of buildings or structures, to furnish or erect scaffolding, ladders, pulleys, ropes, and other safety devices, which must be constructed, placed, or operated as to give proper protection for workers" ( Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 58). An owner of a one-or two-family dwelling is exempt from liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) unless he or she directed or controlled the work being performed ( see Labor Law § 240; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 127; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 58; Boccio v Bozik, 41 AD3d 754, 755; Arama v Fruchter, 39 AD3d 678, 679; McGlone v Johnson, 27 AD3d 702, 702). "The statutory phrase `direct or control' is construed strictly and refers to situations where the owner supervises the method and manner of the work" ( Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 59; see Boccio v Bozik, 41 AD3d at 755; Arama v Fruchter, 39 AD3d at 679). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court correctly determined that he was not entitled to the protection of the homeowner's exemption.

Specifically, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was applying lacquer thinner to the kitchen island, as opposed to sanding off the paint as the plaintiff had done to kitchen cabinets on the days prior to the accident, because Betsy told him to use that product, as she did not want any more dust. Accordingly, the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they directed or controlled the injury-producing method of work and failed to establish, prima facie, their entitlement to the homeowner exemption of Labor Law § 241(6) (see Boccio v Bozik, 41 A.D.3d 754, 755; Garcia v Martin, 285 A.D.2d 391, 392-393; Chura v Baruzzi, 192 A.D.2d 918, 919; cf. Jumawan v Schnitt, 35 A.D.3d 382, 383). Although the defendants submitted affidavits from themselves and Laszlo Terjeki, the principal of plaintiff's employer, stating that the defendants did not give direction to the plaintiff as to how he should perform the work and that any directions were given by Terjeki, these merely created a triable issue of fact.

have obligations under the statute. "The exception was enacted to protect those who, lacking business sophistication, would not know or anticipate the need to obtain insurance to cover them against [section 240 (1)'s] liability" ( Boccio v Bozik, 41 AD3d 754, 755 [2d Dept 2007], citing Van Amerogen v Donnini, 78 NY2d 880, 882 ["'(i)t is unrealistic to expect the owner of a one or two family dwelling to realize, understand and insure against the responsibility sections 240 and 241 now place upon him' (citations omitted). . . . These owners were perceived as lacking in sophistication or business acumen and 'not in a position to know about, or provide for the responsibilities of absolute liability' (citation omitted)]").

The homeowner exemption is intended to “protect those who, lacking business sophistication, would not know or anticipate the need to obtain insurance to cover them against” liability imposed by NYLL Sec. 240(1) and Sec. 241(6). Boccio v. Bozik, 41 A.D.3d 754 (N.Y.App.Div. 2007). Whether the exemption applies depends on the manner in which the property at issue was used, not the status of the owner.

It does not mean that Lendlease cannot be held liable as a statutory agent of NYP-an entity that the New York State legislature, through its enactment of the absolute-liability Section 240(1), has determined should bear the responsibility for faulty equipment that causes injuries. Cf. Boccio v. Bozik, 41 A.D.3d 754, 755 (2d Dep't 2007) (noting that the language of the homeowners' exemption of NYLL § 240(1)-that a homeowner cannot be liable if it does “direct or control” the work-“refers to the situation where the owner supervises the method and manner of the work” and “protect[s] those who[] lack[] business sophistication”). II. NYLL § 200 and Negligence Claims

oss v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494; Nagel v D R Realty Corp., 99 NY2d 98; Long v Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 NY2d 154, 56 NY2d 805; Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 NY2d 290, 45 NY2d 776; Latino v Nolan Taylor-Howe Funeral Home, 300 AD2d 631; Kelleir v Supreme Indus. Park, 293 AD2d 513; Pasquarello v Citicorp/Quotron, 251 AD2d 477; Mills v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 262 AD2d 901; White v Farash Corp., 224 AD2d 978.) Hodges Walsh Slater, LLP, White Plains ( Paul E. Svensson of counsel), for respondents. I. Defendants-respondents are entitled to the homeowner exemption under Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 (6) because they did not exercise direction and control over the method and manner of plaintiff-appellant's work. ( Ferrero v Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 AD3d 847, 8 NY3d 841; Siconolfi v Crisci, 11 AD3d 600; Tilton v Gould, 303 AD2d 491; Sarvis v Maida, 173 AD2d 1019; Mayen v Kalter, 282 AD2d 508; Duarte v East Hills Constr. Corp., 274 AD2d 493; Schwartz v Foley, 142 AD2d 635; Boccio v Bozik, 41 AD3d 754; Acosta v Hadjigavriel, 18 AD3d 406; Ryba v Almeida, 44 AD3d 740.) II. Defendants-respondents are not liable under Labor Law § 200 because they were not responsible for the manner in which the work was performed and did not exercise supervisory control over plaintiff-appellant's work methods. ( Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54; Comes v New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876; Ferrero v Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 AD3d 847; Kajowski v Irvico Realty Corp., 37 AD2d 991, 30 NY2d 481; Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343; Persichilli v Triborough Bridge Tunnel Auth., 16 NY2d 136; Snyder v Gnall, 57 AD3d 1289; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121.)

First, the defendant must show that the work was conducted at a dwelling that is a residence for only one or two families" (Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d at 126, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123 ; see Labor Law §§ 240[1] ; 241; Rodriguez v. Gany, 82 A.D.3d 863, 864, 918 N.Y.S.2d 187 ). "The second requirement ... is that the defendants ‘not direct or control the work’ " (Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d at 126, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123, quoting Labor Law §§ 240[1] and 241 ; see Rodriguez v. Gany, 82 A.D.3d at 864, 918 N.Y.S.2d 187 ). " ‘The expressed and unambiguous language of [Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241 ] focuses upon whether the defendants supervised the methods and manner of the work’ " (Nai Ren Jiang v. Shane Yeh, 95 A.D.3d 970, 971, 944 N.Y.S.2d 200, quoting Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d at 127, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123 ; see Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d 54, 59–60, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323 ; Boccio v. Bozik, 41 A.D.3d 754, 755, 839 N.Y.S.2d 525 ; Arama v. Fruchter, 39 A.D.3d 678, 679, 833 N.Y.S.2d 665 ). Here, the defendants proffered evidence establishing that Kathleen owned the one-family dwelling and that she did not direct or control the work being performed (see Arama v. Fruchter, 39 A.D.3d at 679, 833 N.Y.S.2d 665 ).

t to receive the protection of the homeowners' exemption, the defendant must satisfy two prongs required by the statutes. First, the defendant must show that the work was conducted at a dwelling that is a residence for only one or two families” (Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d at 126, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123 ; see Labor Law §§ 240[1], 241[6] ; Rodriguez v. Gany, 82 A.D.3d 863, 864, 918 N.Y.S.2d 187 ). “The second requirement ... is that the defendants ‘not direct or control the work’ ” (Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d at 126, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123, quoting Labor Law §§ 240[1], 241[6] ; see Rodriguez v. Gany, 82 A.D.3d at 864, 918 N.Y.S.2d 187 ). “ ‘The expressed and unambiguous language of both [Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) ] focuses upon whether the defendants supervised the methods and manner of the work’ ” (Nai Ren Jiang v. Yeh, 95 A.D.3d 970, 971, 944 N.Y.S.2d 200, quoting Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 A.D.3d at 127, 867 N.Y.S.2d 123 ; see Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d 54, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323 ; Boccio v. Bozik, 41 A.D.3d 754, 755, 839 N.Y.S.2d 525 ; Arama v. Fruchter, 39 A.D.3d 678, 679, 833 N.Y.S.2d 665 ). Here, it was undisputed that the home where the accident occurred was a single-family residence owned by the appellant.