Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Super. Ct. No. 27602. Harry L. Jacobs, Commissioner.
William A. Davies, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
James N. Fincher, County Counsel, and James B. Tarhalla, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Levy, J., Cornell, J.
Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court issued at a contested six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing as to his son R. We will deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Dependency proceedings were initiated in December 2006 after R. was born prematurely at 34 weeks gestation and his mother Mary tested positive for methamphetamine. At the time, Mary was homeless and had lost custody of her three other children because of her drug use. Petitioner was also homeless and incarcerated on felony assault and battery charges as well as a parole violations. He admitted to recreational use of methamphetamine.
Mary did not seek extraordinary writ relief from these proceedings.
In March 2007, the juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction and denied Mary reunification services. The court ordered services for petitioner, which required him to complete an initial assessment for domestic violence and follow any recommended treatment, enroll in a parenting education course, complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow any recommendations, and submit to random drug testing. A six-month review hearing was set for September 2007.
Over the next six months, petitioner made minimal effort to comply with his court-ordered plan. In April 2007, he completed a drug and alcohol assessment. The drug and alcohol counselor recommended petitioner complete an anger management program, attend the center for drug treatment, attend Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings a minimum of twice a week for 90 days, and submit to random drug testing. Instead, petitioner attended parenting classes, which he completed in late August 2007. When asked why he did not enroll in anger management, petitioner stated he could not participate in anger management and parenting classes at the same time. However, he did not enroll in an anger management program until September.
Further, petitioner failed to enroll in the residential drug treatment facility ordered by the court. According to the caseworker, he first refused to be admitted to the facility and then, while waiting for a bed to become available, he became so verbally combative that the staff refused to deal with him. As an alternative, the caseworker told petitioner he could attend the Salvation Army program in Fresno. However, petitioner refused that program as well, stating it was too far from where he lived. During this timeframe, petitioner tested presumptively positive for drugs by failing to submit to drug testing.
In mid-June 2007, the caseworker drove petitioner to the Salvation Army in Stockton where he tested positive for drugs and admitted to the caseworker he used drugs “earlier in the week.” Nevertheless, the intake coordinator made an exception and admitted him to the program. Within three hours of his admission, petitioner was already refusing to follow the program rules. The next morning, he was dismissed from the program because he did not want to follow the rules, did not want to work, and did not want to be in a drug program. A week later, petitioner informed the caseworker he entered a sober living home. However, he became angry and left the facility after she told him it did not satisfy his services plan requirements because it was not a treatment facility. A week after that, petitioner entered another sober living facility from which he was discharged because he refused to pay the program fees even though he had money. Petitioner reentered the program at the end of July.
With respect to visitation, petitioner visited R. monthly at the agency facility. According to the social worker who supervised the visits, petitioner slept for the majority of the hour-long visits.
In summarizing petitioner’s progress for the juvenile court, the agency reported that petitioner had only begun to address his drug abuse, had yet to address his anger management problem, and had not demonstrated his ability to properly care for R. during visits. Under the circumstances, the agency concluded there was not a substantial probability R. could be returned to petitioner’s custody after another six months of services and recommended the court terminate his services at the six-month review hearing.
The six-month review hearing was conducted as a contested hearing in October 2007. Petitioner’s position at the hearing was that he made significant progress in completing his reunification services and the court should order them to continue. To that end, he testified he was mid-way through his anger management course, which he expected to finish in another eight sessions. He denied any drug use after March 2007 and explained his failure to drug test in April and May was because he lost his drivers license. He testified he had been participating in intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment three times a week for three months and living with his parents. He expected to complete treatment in November 2007. He stated he would participate in any services to reunify with his son as long as the agency paid for it.
On cross-examination, petitioner denied sleeping during visitation and testing positive for drugs in June. Nor could he recall telling the caseworker he was using drugs in June. He testified he began attending AA/NA meetings in late June and had about 180 signatures.
Following petitioner’s testimony, Mary’s attorney made an oral motion for the court to modify its prior order denying Mary reunification services (§ 388) and put her on the stand to testify. Following her testimony and argument, the court denied the motion to modify. The court also adopted the recommended findings and orders, terminating petitioner’s reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing to implement a permanent plan. This petition ensued.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims he substantially complied with his services and where he did not comply, it was because the services were inadequate. He seeks a directive from this court ordering the juvenile court to continue reunification services. We decline to grant relief.
Generally, reunification services are limited to six months in cases such as this where the child was under the age of three years when removed from parental custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) The purpose of the six-month limitation on services is to provide the juvenile court greater flexibility in meeting the needs of young children where the “[parent has] made little or no progress in [his or her service plan] and the prognosis for overcoming the problems leading to the child’s dependency is bleak.” (Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 611, 612.) Consequently, the juvenile court may schedule a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26 on the six-month review date if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in reunification services. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) However, the court must continue services to the 12-month review hearing if it finds reasonable services were not provided or it finds a substantial probability that the child may be returned to parental custody within another six months. (Ibid.)
Services are reasonable when the supervising agency identifies the family’s problems, offers services targeting those problems, maintains reasonable contact with the parent(s), and makes reasonable efforts to assist in areas where compliance is difficult. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) To be reasonable, the services provided need not be perfect. The “standard is not whether [they] were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.” (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) Having failed to challenge the content of the services plan by direct appeal from the dispositional hearing, petitioner has waived his right to argue the services provided were inadequate. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 47.) Consequently, we focus our review on the reasonableness of the agency’s efforts to implement the services as ordered. In so doing, we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) Substantial evidence is “reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings challenged....” (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.) In this case, we find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding petitioner was provided reasonable services.
Petitioner’s two major impediments to reunifying with R. were his lack of anger control and his drug abuse. He does not explain how the agency contributed to his failure to initiate anger management counseling or inhibited his ability to complete it. On the contrary, he admitted that he delayed enrolling in counseling until after he completed his parenting course. Once he decided to avail himself of the services, he had no problem enrolling and, by the six-month review hearing, was halfway through the course. Therefore, to the extent petitioner argues the agency failed in its duty to help him access anger management counseling, his argument must fail.
Similarly, any claim the agency failed to help petitioner access drug treatment must also fail. The record is replete with instances in which the agency tried to help petitioner access drug treatment. However, petitioner refused to cooperate. Petitioner makes much of the fact that he could not get into the court-ordered residential drug treatment program. However, he ignores the fact that he undermined his chances of admission to the program by his belligerent attitude with the staff. Further, when the caseworker tried to help petitioner get into the Salvation Army’s program, petitioner first refused to enter treatment there and then, once admitted, refused to comply with the program rules.
The appellate record makes very clear that petitioner simply refused drug treatment. Instead, he attempted to substitute residence at a sober living environment, knowing that it did not satisfy his court-ordered services plan. Consequently, any failure to complete the required services was by petitioner’s own choice and bears no reflection on the agency’s efforts to help him comply. Therefore, we concur petitioner was provided reasonable services.
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding there was not a substantial probability R. could be returned to petitioner’s custody after another six months of services. In order to find a substantial probability of return, the court must find the parent regularly visited the child, made significant progress in resolving the problem prompting removal of the child, and demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of the case plan and provide for the child’s safety, protection and well-being. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
Even assuming the quality of petitioner’s visitation were of a quality to consider continuing services, petitioner’s refusal to engage in drug treatment and his continuing use of drugs evidence his lack of progress in resolving his drug problem. Moreover, petitioner was dishonest about when he last used drugs. He denied using drugs after March 2007 and could not explain his positive drug test the following June. Petitioner also made it clear he would only participate in further services if the agency paid for them. Such denial and lack of commitment do not bode well for successful reunification and cast doubt on petitioner’s capacity and ability to complete his case plan objectives and safely parent R. Consequently, we also concur there was not a substantial probability of return and affirm the juvenile court’s orders terminating petitioner’s reunification services and proceeding to permanency planning.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.