Opinion
July 7, 1970.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Wells & Snydal, Max Snydal, Fort Morgan, for plaintiffs in error.
George A. Epperson, Donald F. McClary, Stanley I. Rosener, Fort Morgan, for defendants in error.
PIERCE, Judge.
This case was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals under authority vested in the Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs in error were respondents and defendants in error were petitioners in the court below. The matter before us for review is the jurisdiction of the court below to entertain a petition for certiorari to review respondents' denial, after public hearing, of petitioners' application for a 3.2 beer license, made under provisions of C.R.S.1963, 75--1--1 et seq.
The record shows that on November 17, 1967, respondents denied petitioners' application. Some five months thereafter, petitioners sought review in the District Court of Morgan County by way of petition for certiorari. We note, however, that C.R.S.1963, 75--1--7(7) (1967 Perm.Supp.), applicable at the time of this action provides that '(a)ny person applying to the courts for review of any licensing authority's decision shall apply for review within thirty days after the date of the decision * * *'.
Issuance of a license to sell 3.2 beer is governed by statute, and as such, is a special proceeding; so also is review of the licensing authority's action. Saunders v. Norton, 98 Colo. 537, 58 P.2d 482; Lien v. Gertz, 158 Colo. 416, 407 P.2d 328. Time limits imposed for review are mandatory and jurisdictional. Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 114 P. 490; Adams v. Decker, 50 Colo. 236, 114 P. 654. City and County of Denver v. Sheldon, 122 Colo. 446, 223 P.2d 618. They may not be enlarged by agreement of the litigants or by the reviewing court. Saunders, supra.
Since the 30 day time limit for petition for review by certiorari, provided for by the above statute, had passed in the instant case, the court below was without jurisdiction to review; its judgment, therefore, was void.
Judgment is reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to dismiss the writ of certiorari.
COYTE and DUFFORD, JJ., concur.