3.) Is disclosure prohibited by Chapter 695 of the General Statutes under the insurance law because the Town is a self-insurer? With regard to the claim that the applicants appeal to the FOIC was not timely and therefore the FOIC had no jurisdiction to enter its order the plaintiffs cite the Court to the Supreme Court case of Board of Education v. FOIC, 208 Conn. 442 (1988) which said in part (at 450): ". . . the time limitations prescribed by 1-21i(d) . . . were mandatory and not directory, and that the FOIC's failure to hear and decide cases within those time limits invalidated any subsequent action by the FOIC . . ."
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 452 (1988). "Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred."
[See Glastonbury Education Assn.v . Freedom of Information Commission , 234 Conn. 704, 712, 663 A.2d 349 (1995) ; see also] Perkinsv . Freedom of Information Commission , 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993) ; Board of Educationv. Freedom of Information Commission , 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988) ; Wilsonv . Freedom of Information Commission , 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980). We consistently have held that this policy requires us to construe the provisions of the [act] to favor disclosure and to read narrowly that act's exceptions to disclosure.
The act mandates that all government records shall be open to the public for its review, subject to certain, limited exemptions. We have acknowledged, repeatedly and forcefully, that the legislative policy embodied in the act represents this state's abiding commitment to “the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.”Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980) ; Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993) (same); Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988) (same). “We consistently have held that this policy requires us to construe the provisions of the [act] to favor disclosure and to read narrowly that act's exceptions to disclosure.
We have acknowledged, repeatedly and forcefully, that the legislative policy embodied in the act represents this state's abiding commitment to "the open conduct of government and free public access to government records." Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980); Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993) (same); Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988) (same). "We consistently have held that this policy requires us to construe the provisions of the [act] to favor disclosure and to read narrowly that act's exceptions to disclosure.
This question of statutory interpretation also must be resolved in light of certain general principles governing the act. First, we have often recognized "the long-standing legislative policy of the [act] favoring the open conduct of government and free public access to government records. . . . [ Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 234 Conn. 704, 712, 663 A.2d 349 (1995)]; see Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993); Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988); Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980). We consistently have held that this policy requires us to construe the provisions of the [act] to favor disclosure and to read narrowly that act's exceptions to disclosure.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 712; see also Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993); Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988); Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980). We consistently have held that this policy requires us to construe the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act to favor disclosure and to read narrowly that act's exceptions to disclosure.
"The overarching legislative policy of the FOIA is one that favors `the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.'" Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993), citing Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980); see also Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988) ("general policy of openness expressed in the FOIA legislation"). The sponsors of the FOIA understood the legislation to express the people's sovereignty over "the agencies which serve them"; see Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 328, citing 18 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1975 Sess., p. 3911, remarks of Representative Martin Burke; and this court consistently has interpreted that expression to require diligent protection of the public's right of access to agency proceedings.
"The FOIC has full authority to determine the existence of public records and the propriety of their disclosure." Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 454, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988). The FOIC properly, albeit implicitly, reached the conclusion that Azzarito and the association had submitted a request for records. The trial court's contrary conclusion relied on distinctions that are overly formal and legalistic in light of the public policy expressed by the FOIA.
First, we note that judicial review of an administrative agency's action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes 4-166 et seq.; and that the scope of review is limited. Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 452, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988). Accordingly, we must decide, in view of all the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or illegally, or abused its discretion.