Board of Education of Madison County v. Fowler

8 Citing cases

  1. Buckhannon Board Care Home v. West Va. D.H.H.R

    532 U.S. 598 (2001)   Cited 3,970 times   17 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a party becomes a prevailing party once there is a "judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties"

    I do not think these state cases (and Scatcherd, a federal case applying state law) justify expanding the federal meaning of "prevailing party" (based on a "confession of judgment" fiction) to include the party accepting an out-of-court settlement — much less to expand it beyond settlements, to the domain of the "catalyst theory." The only case cited by the dissent in which the conclusion of acknowledgment of liability was rested on something other than a settlement is Board of Ed. of Madison Cty. v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14 S.E.2d 478 (1941), which, in one of the States that considered settlement an acknowledgment of liability, analogized compliance with what had been sought by a mandamus suit to a settlement. This is a slim reed upon which to rest the broad conclusion of a catalyst theory.

  2. Woodside v. Fulton County

    223 Ga. 316 (Ga. 1967)   Cited 15 times

    Judge Pye on his own volition cast the costs against Fulton County. This court held in Walden v. S. M. Whitney Co., 201 Ga. 65, 67 (2) ( 38 S.E.2d 744); "While in all civil actions at law, `except as otherwise provided, the party who shall discontinue, fail, or be cast in such suit shall be liable for the costs thereof' ( Code § 24-3401; Board of Education of Madison County v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35 ( 14 S.E.2d 478)), under our statutes in equity cases `it is the province of the judge . . . to determine upon whom the costs shall fall' ( Code § 37-1105; Bush v. Little, 171 Ga. 206 (2) ( 154 S.E. 886)), and this court will not interfere unless [his] discretion has been abused." This was an equity case in which plaintiff sought an injunction along with damages.

  3. Walden v. Whitney

    38 S.E.2d 744 (Ga. 1946)   Cited 2 times

    2. While in all civil actions at law, "except as otherwise provided, the party who shall discontinue, fail, or be cast in such suit shall be liable for the costs thereof" (Code, § 24-3401; Board of Education of Madison County v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35 ( 14 S.E.2d 478), under our statutes in equity cases "it is the province of the judge . . to determine upon whom the costs shall fall (Code, § 37-1105; Bush v. Little, 171 Ga. 206 (2) 154 S.E. 886), and "this court will not interfere unless [his] discretion has been abused." Hicks v. Atlanta Trust Co., 187 Ga. 314 (2), 315 ( 200 S.E. 301), and citations; Fitzgerald v. Vaughan, 189 Ga. 707 (3), 711 ( 7 S.E.2d 78); Sangster v. Toledo Manufacturing Co., 193 Ga. 685 (7) ( 19 S.E.2d 723).

  4. Bragassa v. Bragassa

    28 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. 1943)   Cited 4 times
    In Bragassa v. Bragassa, 197 Ga. 140 (28 S.E.2d 133), it was held: "A judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, has jurisdiction of a habeas corpus case brought by a nonresident mother against two persons residing in said county, who she alleges are illegally detaining her child from her."

    1. It was erroneous to allow a stranger to the proceedings to intervene. Mandamus is a common-law writ. Board of Education of Madison County v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35 ( 14 S.E.2d 478), and cases there cited. The Code, § 81-1303, forbids the adding of a new party, unless expressly provided by law.

  5. Lewin v. Board of Trustees

    62 Cal.App.3d 977 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 14 times
    In Lewin v. Board of Trustees (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 977, 982 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 385], the court held that a school district must consider positively assured attrition "such as that which had already occurred in the computation period and mandatory retirements."

    There appears to be no California authority on point for administrative mandamus proceedings, but ample authority from this and other jurisdictions supports the general proposition that where the litigant who prevails on the law is denied affirmative relief only because belated conduct of the opposing litigant renders moot the need for judicial relief, the prevailing litigant is entitled to its costs. ( George v. Beaty (1927) 85 Cal.App. 525, 532 [ 260 P. 386]; Board of Education of Madison County v. Fowler (1941) 192 Ga. 35 [ 14 S.E.2d 478]; Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero (1898) 176 Ill. 9 [51 N.E. 758]; Rosenthal v. Shepherd Broadcasting Service (1938) 299 Mass. 286 [ 12 N.E.2d 819, 114 A.L.R. 1502]; Baldwin v. Chesapeake Potomac Telephone Co. (1929) 156 Md. 552 [ 144 A. 703]; Ficklen v. City of Danville (1926) 146 Va. 426 [132 S.E. 705].) Respondent cannot escape statutory liability for costs merely by granting the relief prayed for by the petition before the court has the opportunity to rule on the petition.

  6. Dillard v. Yeldell

    334 A.2d 578 (D.C. 1975)   Cited 8 times
    Recognizing "the availability of a writ in the nature of mandamus to compel a public officer to follow regulations governing the administrative agency"

    Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 290 P. 358 (1930). Bragassa v. Bragassa, 197 Ga. 140, 28 S.E.2d 133 (1943); Board of Educ. v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14 S.E.2d 478 (1941). Whorton v. Gaspard, 239 Ark. 715, 393 S.W.2d 773 (1965); State v. Common Council of City of Racine, 201 Wis. 435, 230 N.W. 70 (1930).

  7. Hollowell v. Va. Marine Resources Com'n

    56 Va. App. 70 (Va. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Noting that "an agency's position was 'substantially justified' . . . if its position was not unreasonable (quoting Jones v. West, 46 Va. App. 309, 333-34, 616 S.E.2d 790, 803 (2005))

    The three cases are Ficklen v. City of Danville, 146 Va. 426, 131 S.E. 689 (1926); Wallerstein v. Brander, 136 Va. 543, 118 S.E. 224 (1923); and Branscome v. Cunduff, 123 Va. 352, 96 S.E. 770 (1918).See Lewin v. Board of Trustees of Pasadena Unified School District, 62 Cal.App.3d 977, 983-84, 133 Cal.Rptr. 385 (1976) (citing Ficklen with approval, and holding that "[r]espondent cannot escape statutory liability for costs merely by granting the relief prayed for by the petition before the court has the opportunity to rule on the petition"); Board of Education of Madison County v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1941) (explaining that the weight of authority is "that where . . . the suit is dismissed because of some subsequent act by the defendant, making unnecessary a further prosecution of the suit, the plaintiff is entitled to costs" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The view of numerous courts in other jurisdictions, in decisions more directly on point, is that mootness of an underlying claim below does not preclude a statutory award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" where those fees have already been incurred.

  8. Markan Realty Company v. Klarman

    109 S.E.2d 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 2 times

    Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the answer. 2. It is well settled that where a defendant pays a plaintiff the amount claimed to be due in a petition after the action is filed against him, or performs in accordance with the prayers of a petition for a writ of mandamus (See Board of Education of Madison County v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14 S.E.2d 478), the court costs, as a matter of law, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, should be assessed against the defendant, but where no effort has been made by the plaintiff, in a case where the trial court orders such costs to be paid by the plaintiff, to have the costs retaxed, no question for decision is presented to the appellate courts (See Carmichael Tile Co. v. McClelland, 213 Ga. 656 (1) ( 100 S.E.2d 902), and a motion for new trial would not raise such question. "The assessment of costs constitutes no part of a verdict, but is one of the duties of the court.