Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney

24 Citing cases

  1. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.

    790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)   Cited 197 times
    Holding that a trial court's failure to certify a class under CR 23 means there was not a class action

    What principle could be more fair, more just, and more importantly, what would be more consistent with the purpose of Section 183 and the common school system it spawned? We further emphasized the mandate of Section 183 in Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26 (1930). Affirming the General Assembly's constitutional duty to provide for an efficient system, the Court idealistically observed the citizens' burden.

  2. Smith v. Board of Education

    111 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1940)   Cited 2 times

    As was said of the office involved in City of Louisville v. Thomas, supra, "The position is created, defined, and controlled by law, and does not arise out of, nor is it dependent upon, contract. It possesses every essential element of a public office within the meaning of the quoted provisions of the Constitution as defined by this court and by other courts and text-writers." The status of a County School Superintendent in Kentucky as a public officer is definitely settled by Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26, 29. The court there held such an appointee to be a public officer with his appointment not subject to rules applicable to contracts. In appointing a Superintendent of Schools, the "board of education was exercising public authority," and, "We do not hesitate to hold that a county superintendent of schools is an officer, and not an employee."

  3. State ex Rel. Jewett v. Satti

    54 A.2d 272 (Conn. 1947)   Cited 7 times

    The appointment by Governor Baldwin exhausted the power of his office to fill the position; it was not vacant on January 1, 1947, after the appointment of the plaintiff; and there was no authority in Governor Baldwin or in anyone else to revoke the appointment of the plaintiff or to appoint another. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 157, 5 L.Ed. 135; State ex rel. Coogan v. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76, 85, 22 A. 686; State ex rel. Scofield v. Starr, 78 Conn. 636, 639, 63 A. 512; Board of Education v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 697, 32 S.W.2d 26; 42 Am.Jur. 960, 107; note, 89 A.L.R. 135. The conclusion of the trial court was correct.

  4. Howard v. Ireland

    138 P.2d 569 (Mont. 1943)   Cited 11 times
    In State ex rel. Howard v. Ireland, 114 Mont. 488, 138 P.2d 569, this Court held that there is a distinction between a superintendent and a teacher in matters of hiring and dismissal.

    He has general supervision of the schools of the district and is the "executive officer of the board of trustees." He is a public officer ( State ex rel. Hill v. Sinclair, 103 Kan. 480, 175 P. 41; Board of Education v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W. 26.) He is given permanency of tenure immediately upon his appointment, under his contract which, by the statute, is automatically renewed from year to year and which may be terminated only upon certain notice. While continuity of service is provided for as a policy, not only in fairness to the appointee but for the good of the schools, it is also necessary for the good of the schools that one holding the position who proves to be unfit should not be continued in the service.

  5. Mitchell v. Bd. of Educ. of Menifee Cnty.

    NO. 2014-CA-000649-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jun. 17, 2016)

    Gulick, 398 S.W.2d at 485-486. In so doing, Gulick quoted from Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W. 2d 26, 28 (1930): When a power is given and has been exercised, and the repository of the power has no further control over the subject, except to remove the appointee for cause, the appointing power is exhausted and may not be reconsidered.

  6. Taylor v. Carter

    333 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    Without question, it has long been held that an appointment is revocable until the last act required of the appointing authority has been accomplished. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26 (Ky.App. 1930). We believe that in this instance, the Council made it very clear that Whatley's appointment was conditional and unofficial, indeed stating specifically at the September 2nd meeting that Whatley's appointment "did not become official until he has withdrawn from the case with Oldham County."

  7. Stagnolia v. Board of Educ. of Harlan County

    714 S.W.2d 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986)

    This result comports with established case law. In Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (1930), the court stated: An appointment to office may be revoked, of course, at any time before the act becomes final.

  8. Board of Ed. of McCreary Cty. v. Nevels

    551 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 5 times

    Prospective appointments to office are generally deemed to be valid. Only one exception exists to that rule. If the term of the appointing body or officer will expire prior to the time that the vacancy will occur, then no power of prospective appointment exists. Maynard v. Allen, 276 Ky. 485, 124 S.W.2d 765 (1939); Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26 (1930); Dixon v. Caudill, 143 Ky. 623, 136 S.W. 1043 (1911). Furthermore, there may be changes in the membership on the board.

  9. Magoffin County Board of Election v. Conley

    445 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969)

    The Board legally acted before the second list was submitted, therefore, we need not consider the import of its submission. In Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26 (1930), we said: "Its function is fully performed when it makes the choice. * * *. When a power is given and has been exercised, and the repository of the power has no further control over the subject, except to remove the appointee for cause, the appointing power is exhausted and may not be reconsidered. If the power belongs to a board, its act is complete when the meeting has adjourned.

  10. Farley v. Board of Education of Pike County

    424 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 1 times

    But once the length of the term has been fixed, the board loses control over the term thus created. Board of Education of Boyle County v. McChesney, 235 Ky. 692, 32 S.W.2d 26, 28 (1930) wherein it is said: 'When a power is given and has been exercised, and the repository of the power has no further control over the subject, except to remove the appointee for cause, the appointing power is exhausted and may not be reconsidered. * * * Thus the appointment became complete, and the power of the board for the time being was exhausted.' "