The doctrine permits a litigant to bring a facial challenge to a law that impacts speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. SeeBroadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612–13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R–1 v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 702–03 (Colo.1998). In the past, this court has suggested that the overbreadth doctrine potentially applies to other forms of constitutionally protected conduct besides expression protected by the First Amendment.
The doctrine permits a litigant to bring a facial challenge to a law that impacts speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 612–13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) ; Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R–1 v. Wilder , 960 P.2d 695, 702–03 (Colo.1998). In the past, this court has suggested that the overbreadth doctrine potentially applies to other forms of constitutionally protected conduct besides expression protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Shepard, 983 P.2d 1, 3–4 (Colo.
However, a party may challenge a law as overbroad regardless of whether that party's speech is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Maryland v. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57 (1984); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 703 (Colo. 1998). "Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society — to prevent the statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court."
A provision is not unconstitutionally vague simply because it could have been drafted with greater precision. Bd. of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 703 (Colo. 1998). However, "[a] statute must be sufficiently specific in order to give fair warning of the conduct prohibited and, simultaneously, sufficiently general to address the essential problem under varied circumstances and during changing times."
A provision is not unconstitutionally vague simply because it could have been drafted with greater precision. Bd. of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 703 (Colo. 1998). "A statute must be sufficiently specific in order to give fair warning of the conduct prohibited and, simultaneously, sufficiently general to address the essential problem under varied circumstances and during changing times."
Rather, a law is unconstitutionally vague only if it is vague "in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 703 (Colo. 1998) ). ¶ 37 Because vagueness challenges are predicated on a lack of notice, "such challenges cannot succeed in a case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct puts them at risk."
Rather, a law is unconstitutional only if it "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Wilder , 960 P.2d 695, 703 (Colo. 1998) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati , 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) ). Overall, "[t]he vagueness doctrine is not an exercise in semantics to emasculate legislation; rather, it is a pragmatic means to ensure fairness.
Rather, a law is unconstitutional only if it "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Wilder , 960 P.2d 695, 703 (Colo. 1998) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati , 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) ). Overall, "[t]he vagueness doctrine is not an exercise in semantics to emasculate legislation; rather, it is a pragmatic means to ensure fairness.
However, "[a] law is unconstitutional only if it "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.'" Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 703 (Colo. 1998) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)). We may sustain a facial vagueness challenge only "where the enactment is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications.
School boards "have the responsibility of implementing and carrying out the educational programs of their respective communities and must have authority adequate to enable them to discharge that responsibility." Blair v. Lovett, 196 Colo. 118, 124, 582 P.2d 668, 672-73 (1978); see also Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 699 (Colo. 1998) (noting that local school authorities have broad discretion in operating schools). In entering into the settlement agreement with Dr. Pierce, the District and the Board acted in a manner consistent with legitimate governmental interests and administrative responsibilities.