Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. Thurman

15 Citing cases

  1. State ex Rel. Woods v. Cole

    178 Okla. 567 (Okla. 1937)   Cited 11 times
    In State v. Cole, 178 Okla. 567, 63 P.2d 730, a taxpayer's action against city officers and Cole, who received the money, it was definitely held that recovery could be had under sections 5964 and 5965, O. S. 1931, upon a showing of illegality of contract and of expenditure, without showing fraud, which is clearly equivalent to a conclusion that bad faith is not necessary if it is true that illegality of the expenditure exists.

    There is no express grant of power to enter into such a contract as the Cole contract, nor express restrictions from so doing. This court held in Board of Education v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996, that a municipal corporation has power and authority to employ an attorney when necessary, in the absence of express restrictions, and that this authority is implied from the power to make contracts and to own property. In that case the municipality had no regular attorney, it is true, but in Board of County Commissioners v. Waldrep, 150 Okla. 228, 1 P.2d 711, we upheld the right of a county to employ an attorney to represent the county in federal court, since the law did not expressly make it the duty of the regular county attorney to appear for the county in federal court.

  2. Simler v. Conner

    282 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1960)   Cited 4 times

    The parties agree that ordinarily an attorney may, in good faith, contract for a percentage or portion of the proceeds of the client's cause of action or claim, not to exceed 50% of the net amount recovered. Title 5, § 7, O.S.A.; Williams v. Wright, 208 Okla. 613, 258 P.2d 162; Renegar v. Fleming, 202 Okla. 197, 211 P.2d 272; Emery v. Goff, 198 Okla. 534, 180 P.2d 175, 171 A.L.R. 457; Correll v. Holt et al., 191 Okla. 622, 132 P.2d 953; Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996; Lashley v. Moore, 112 Okla. 198, 240 P. 704. The relationship of attorney and client is one of special trust and confidence.

  3. Okla. State Med. Ass'n v. Corbett

    2021 OK 30 (Okla. 2021)   Cited 3 times

    The Legislature neither expressly nor implicitly granted the Governor the power beyond negotiation. Id., ¶8, 481 P.3d at 247-48 (Kauger, J., with whom Combs & Gurich, JJ., join concurring); see alsoTreat v. Stitt, 2020 OK 64, ¶8, 473 P.3d 43, 45 (holding certain tribal compacts were invalid because the Governor had exceeded his authority in entering into those compacts); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Thurman, 1926 OK 34, ¶35, 247 P. 996, 1000 (a school board's making of a contract with a private attorney for representation was held to be ultra vires and void when the law only allowed representation by the county attorney). From a review of the OHCA Act and the OMHOA, we find no express or implied legislative authority for the OHCA to implement a wholly new managed care program such as SoonerSelect. We find the actions of the OHCA to implement SoonerSelect by entering into RFPs and awarding contracts was not authorized by the Legislature and is ultra vires.

  4. Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh

    291 N.W.2d 331 (Iowa 1980)   Cited 26 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that contingency fee agreement for defense of unliquidated tort damage claim, based upon percentage of difference between prayer of petition and amount awarded, is void as unreasonable and against public policy

    in estate property for the services of her attorneys in protecting it from creditors' claims); Cline v. Zappettini, 131 Cal.App.2d 723, 281 P.2d 35 (1955) (agreement by party in defense of counter-claims for breach of real estate contract and for real estate commission to pay attorney a percentage of broker fee saved); Sedbrook v. McCue, 104 Kan. 813, 180 P. 787 (1919) (challenge to attorneys' right to property received as contingent fee under agreement with client which gave them one-half of all property they saved the client in defending an action involving a mortgage on the land); Lipscomb's Administrator v. Castleman, 147 Ky. 741, 145 S.W. 753 (1912) (fee based in part on success in defending an action to set aside a deed); Moss v. Richie, 50 Mo.App. 75 (1892) (fee of $300 contingent on successful defense of ejectment action); In re Wise, 172 A.D. 491, 158 N.Y.S. 793 (1916) (agreement to defend claim against inheritance for small retainer and $5000 if the defense was successful); Board of Education v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996 (1926) (fee based on twenty-five percent of amount saved in defending taxpayer suits). These cases are of little assistance here, however, because the attorneys in them were retained to defend claims relating to existing property or seeking liquidated damages and, thus, the fees were based on fixed values or sums.

  5. Town of Mannford v. Watson

    1964 OK 110 (Okla. 1964)   Cited 2 times
    In Watson, 1964 OK 110, 394 P.2d at 506, this Court held that attorneys could not recover from the City of Mannsford under contingent fee contract without proof the fee complied with statutory requirements.

    "Thus, the purpose of said sections is to create such lien analogous to liens created by statute, the better to secure laborers and other employees, and to create a certain liability of the adverse party for the fee. * * *" See also Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996, where we approved, in part, a contingent fee contract entered into between the School Board and its attorney. The Town of Mannford also argues that there is no evidence that the Town Board ever approved orally or in writing the proposed contingent fee contract upon which this action was brought.

  6. Renegar v. Fleming

    211 P.2d 272 (Okla. 1949)   Cited 5 times
    In Renegar v. Fleming, 202 Okla. 197, 211 P.2d 272, we held that if it appears that a contract for an attorney's fee was induced by fraud or misrepresentation, or that, in view of the nature of the claim, the compensation is so excessive as to evidence a purpose on the part of the attorney to obtain an improper or undue advantage over the client, the contract will not be upheld or enforced, but may be canceled in an action brought by the client.

    In McArthur v. Lotridge, 177 Okla. 184, 58 P.2d 326, in passing upon the validity of a contract for a contingent fee, we said: "A contract between attorney and client providing for a fee upon a contingent basis is not binding unless entered into in good faith (Board of Education v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996), and such contract is rendered voidable if made with suppression or reserve of material facts or of apprehended difficulties (6 C.J. 740, § 316). In the Thurman case the rule is stated as follows: `A contract between attorney and client upon a contingent basis, to be binding, must be made in good faith without suppression or reserve of fact and without undue influence, and the compensation bargained for must be just and fair.

  7. Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Childers

    197 Okla. 331 (Okla. 1946)   Cited 49 times
    In Veterans, there was a legislative appropriation directed to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, a private agency, for assistance to war veterans and their families in obtaining benefits of federal and state legislation enacted in their behalf, free of any control or management of or by any officer or agency of the state.

    And if so, the majority should have disowned its own brain children born and christened by them June 11, 1946, and heretofore, as to reasoning, cited with contempt. The majority, to clear the field of law, should have overruled and cut out the underbrush of its own former per curiam opinion and decision of 1926, Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996, to adhere to the dissenting views therein expressed. Generally speaking, public officers, in the performance of public duties, must avail themselves of the means as the law has provided, and while such means exist there can be no necessity to imply others.

  8. Bourne v. Cole

    53 Wyo. 31 (Wyo. 1938)   Cited 2 times
    In Bourne, this court approved specialized legislation permitting the Attorney General to employ special assistants in a contingent fee compensatory fashion to seek out unpaid school and state royalties.

    See also Clough v. Hart, 8 Kan. 487. The courts of Oklahoma have applied the same rule in Commissioner v. Ridings, 220 P. 96; Board of Education v. Thurman, 247 P. 996; Board v. King, 294 P. 101. The same question arose in Platte County v. Gerrard, (Nebr.)

  9. McArthur v. Lotridge

    58 P.2d 326 (Okla. 1936)   Cited 3 times

    While the present action is not one between attorney and client, certain rules of law arising from that relationship must govern in the disposition of this appeal. If movant was actuated by bad faith toward Miss Stewart in procuring the contract with her, she was then justified in discharging him as her attorney. His authority as such attorney would thereupon cease and his lien claim upon her cause of action fail. A contract between attorney and client providing for a fee upon a contingent basis is not binding unless entered into in good faith (Board of Education v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996), and such contract is rendered voidable if made with suppression or reserve of material facts or of apprehended difficulties. 6 C. J. 740, sec. 316. In the Thurman Case the rule is stated as follows:

  10. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co. v. Tulsa County

    42 P.2d 537 (Okla. 1935)   Cited 6 times
    In St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Tulsa County, 171 Okla. 180, 42 P.2d 537, we considered a similar question, and following Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Excise Board of Washington County, 168 Okla. 619, 35 P.2d 274, we held that a county excise board does have authority to so apportion the maximum millage rate under the 1933 amendment to section 9, article 10, of the Constitution.

    We have held that county commissioners may not employ an attorney to aid and assist the county attorney, and the protestant here relies upon those decisions. See Board of County Commissioners v. King, 147 Okla. 34, 294 P. 101; Board of Education v. Thurman, 121 Okla. 108, 247 P. 996; Board of County Commissioners v. Jones, 4 Okla. 341, 51 P. 565. Those decisions are not applicable here by reason of the provisions of the charter of the city of Tulsa. The state laws no-where authorize county commissioners to employ attorneys to assist the county attorney, and by reason thereof county commissioners are restricted to the use of the county attorney and his regularly appointed and qualified assistants provided for by the laws of this state.