The order explained: "The superior court's order remanding the matter to John Muir Health is not a final, appealable order. (See Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424 ; see also Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 318 .) Furthermore, the order and judgment at issue here are not appealable as a final determination of a collateral matter.

Thus, where a judgment “partly granted [a] writ petition and remanded the proceeding” to the Dental Board “ ‘to reconsider your action’ with respect to the calculation of damages,” that judgment was not an appealable order. ( Ibid., citing Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 653.) “We may, however, exercise our discretion and treat an appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate.” ( Village Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., at p. 1140, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 857; see also Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court, at pp. 1430, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 653;Green v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 786, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 140.)

As a general rule, orders remanding matters for further proceedings to an administrative body are not appealable. (Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430.) That is exactly what the trial court's judgment here did—the trial court issued a judgment directing the Commission to hold a new hearing on the merits, including on Dresmal's statute of limitations defense.

Rodgers contends the trial court’s order remanding the case to the Commission and retaining jurisdiction over any issues that arise after the Commission considers the matter is not a final judgment and thus is not appealable. (Village Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent ControlBd. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139-1140; Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430.) We are not convinced the trial court’s order constitutes a remand order in that the retention of jurisdiction was conditioned on a further, then unforeseen, issue developing when the Commission computed the amount owed Rodgers.

Prior to oral argument we advised the parties of our concern that the trial court's order remanding this case to Commission was not appealable. (See Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430-1431 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 653].) Notwithstanding the lack of appellate jurisdiction, the parties have asked that we reach the merits of their respective claims.

A remand order under these circumstances is not appealable at present. (Hall v. Superior Court (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 792, 797; City of Carlsbad v. Scholtz (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 294, 296; Village Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139-1140; Bolsa Chica Land Trust v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 493, 501-502; Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430; Kumar v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1055; Ng. v. State Personnel Bd. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 600, 607, fn. 1; see 2 Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2016) § 16.11, pp. 16-9 to 16.10.) Further, based on the showing to date, this is not a proper case to treat as a mandate petition.

DCR could have asked this court to treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate. (See Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430 [treating appeal from nonappealable remand order as a petition for a writ of mandate].) If DCR believed the dismissal was error, it could have petitioned for rehearing or sought review in the Supreme Court, as the appellant in Dhillon did.

Accordingly, we treat Hall's purported appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate. (Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430–1431, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 [remand order was not appealable but appellate court exercised its discretion to treat appeal as a petition for writ of mandate].) III.

No appeal therefore lies from such orders. (Gillis v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 311, 318; Village Trailer Park, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139-1140 ; Bolsa Chica Land Trust v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 493, 501-502; Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430; Kumar v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1055; Ng v. State Personnel Bd. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 600, 604; see Talmo v. Civil Service Com. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210, 224-226; Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2014) § 16.11, pp. 5/13-5/14.) Each of the post-judgment orders that are the subject of these three related appeals is an interlocutory order.

However, rather than dismiss the appeal, we treat the purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate because it presents a question of public importance, the parties have fully briefed the propriety of the trial court's ruling, and both parties desire a resolution of the merits of the appeal. ( Olson v. Cory 1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401, 197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720 ; Mounger v. Gates (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1254, 239 Cal.Rptr. 18 ; see, e.g., Board of Dental Examiners v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1430–1431, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 [remand order was not appealable but appellate court exercised its discretion to treat appeal as petition for writ of mandate]; see generally, 9 Witkin, supra, § 128, pp. 198–200.)