Statutes must be given their reasonable construction to effectuate the end proposed. Board of County Commissioners v. Barr, 68 Okla. 193 173 P. 206. Automobiles are comprehended within the terms "equipment" and "machinery," as well as in the term "vehicles." State v. Freels, 136 Tenn. 483, 190 S.W. 454; Acacia Oil Gas Co. v. Tidal Oil Co., 91 Okla. 237, 217 P. 372; Landau v. Sykes (Miss.

"In a suit instituted in this court to review an award of the State Industrial Commission, the suit must be to review an error of law, and not an error of fact. Their decision as to all matters of fact is final." The court in that case cited with approval the case of Board of Commissioners v. Barr, 68 Oklahoma, 173 P. 206. In the case of Choctaw Portland Cement Co. v. Short Lamb. 79 Okla. 109, 189 P. 760, in the second paragraph of the syllabus, this court said:

See also, Whiteneck v. Board of Com'rs of Woods County, 89 Okla. 52, 213 P. 865; Board of Com'rs of Okmulgee County v. State, 83 Okla. 48, 201 P. 998. Petitioner's concluding argument is that the provision in the Workmen's Compensation Law, 85 O.S. 1951 § 1[ 85-1] et seq., for liability of a county conflicts with the constitutional provisions of section 26, art. 10, and section 57, art. 5. Each of these provisions was discussed in Board of Com'rs of Marshall County v. Lacy, 161 Okla. 138, 17 P.2d 398. See, also, Board of Com'rs of Cleveland County v. Barr, 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206. Since Board of Com'rs Cleveland County v. Barr, supra, this court has consistently recognized and enforced the liability of counties in workmen's compensation cases. We hold that there is no violation of either section 26, art. 10 or section 57, art. 5, in making a county liable under the Workmen's Compensation Law.

"The law is now well settled in this state that in a proceeding in this court to review an order of the State Industrial Commission, such proceeding is to review errors of law and not of fact. The finding of facts by the Industrial Commission is conclusive upon this court, and will not be reviewed by this court where there is any competent evidence in support of same. Southern Surety Co. v. Tabor, 88 Okla. 103, 212 P. 128; Raulerson v. State Indus. Com., 76 Okla. 8. 183 P. 880; Wilson Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 77 Okla. 312, 188 P. 666; Northeast Okla. Ry. Co. v. State Indus. Com. 88 Okla. 146, 212 P. 136; Choctaw Portland Cement Co. v. Lamb, 79 Okla. 109, 189 P. 750: Board of County Commissioners v. Barr. 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206; Stephenson v. State Indus. Com., 79 Okla. '228, 192 P. 580; Booth Flynn v. Cook, 79 Okla. 280, 193 P. 36; Oscar Grace v. Vaught, 108 Okla. 187, 235 P. 590: Fitzsimmons v. State. Indus. Com., 108 Okla. 276, 236 P. 616; St. Louis Mining Smelting Co. v. State Indus. Com., and R.J. Turner, 113 Okla. 179. 241 P. 170. * * *" The foregoing opinion was cited with approval in White Oak Refining Co. v. Whitehead, 149 Okla. 297, 298 P. 611, at page 300 (Okla. Reports) of the opinion.

Even though we consider all the other sections of the act valid, the provisions thereof could hardly be said to be applicable to employment of day laborers on county highways. In Board of County Commissioners v. Barr, 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206, it is said: "* * * The Legislature never intended such an impracticable procedure as would require the board, before employing any individual teamster or other laborer, to convene and to do so sitting as a body.

She did speak finally of having seen a letter from the company acknowledging receipt of a note for a lesser amount than that called for in the policy declared on. No doubt there was not sufficient proof of the loss of the document or its existence to warrant secondary proof of its contents. Any of the cases cited in either brief practically so demonstrate. Adams v. King, 68 Okla. 190, 170 P. 912, as well as the same case on rehearing, 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206, most clearly demonstrates that the proof in this case of the existence of the letter and of its being forwarded and of its contents falls short of meeting the requirement as to secondary evidence. The case of Farmers Nat. Bank v. Hartoon, 60 Okla. 193, 159 P. 844, is cited to the same effect. It has some of the aspects of the procedure that this case has. It is clear there that the introduction was regarded as highly prejudicial, and it is more so in this case.

"By the provisions of section 10, of article 2, of the Workmen's Compensation Law (chapter 246, Sess. Laws 1915), the decision of the State Industrial Commission is made final as to all questions of fact, and on appeal to this court from an award of the Industrial Commission, the court is without jurisdiction to weigh the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the same preponderates in favor of or against the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission." Board of Com'rs of Cleveland County v. Barr, 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206; Francis Vitric Brick Co. v. State Indus. Com., 76 Okla. 314, 185 P. 525; Stephenson v. State Indus. Com., 79 Okla. 228, 192 P. 580; Choctaw Portland Cement Co. v. Lamb, 79 Okla. 109, 189 P. 750. From our review of the evidence before the Commission, we cannot say there was an entire lack of evidence to support the order made. It is true that pre-eminently qualified experts were of the opinion that claimant might be suffering from contusion of some kind and so rendered unfit to do his usual labor.

The law is now well settled in this state that in a proceeding in this court to review an order of the State Industrial Commission such proceeding is to review errors of law and not of fact. The finding of facts by the Industrial Commission is conclusive upon this court, and will not be reviewed by this court where there is any competent evidence in support of same. Southern Surety Co. v. Tabor, 88 Okla. 103, 212 P. 128; Raulerson v. State Indus. Com., 76 Okla. 8, 183 P. 880; Wilson Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 77 Okla. 312, 188 P. 666; Northeast Okla. Ry. Co. v. State Indus. Com., 88 Okla. 146, 212 P. 136; Choctaw Portland Cement Co. v. Lamb, 79 Okla. 109, 189 P. 750; Board of County Commissioners v. Barr, 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206; Stephenson v. State Indus. Com., 79 Okla. 228, 192 P. 580; Booth Flynn v. Cook, 79 Okla. 280, 193 P. 36; Oscar Grace v. Vaught, 108 Okla. 187, 235 P. 590; Fitzsimmons v. State Indus. Com., 108 Okla. 276, 236 P. 616; St. Louis Mining Smelting Co. v. State Indus. Com., and R. J. Turner, 113 Okla. 179, 241 P. 170. The claimant alleges that he has worked for the respondent seven years and that his disability, evidenced by his recent illness, began three years ago, incident to his service as a painter and diagnosed as lead poisoning. He contends that the "accident," within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, was upon the date when his disability became so great or suffering so serious as to require his discontinuance of work.

While a number of witnesses for respondent testified that during the interim between the date of the injury on October 18, 1923, and February 8, 1924, the date on which claimant was laid off, they were constantly in the company of claimant and heard no complaint nor had they seen him limp, this court will not weigh the positive testimony of respondent and his witnesses against this character of testimony, and the finding of the Industrial Commission upon these disputed questions of fact must be sustained. Board of Commissioners of Cleveland County v. Barr, 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206; Choctaw Portland Cement Co. v. Lamb, 79 Okla. 109, 189 P. 750. A more serious question is presented when we come to consider the second proposition.

The claimant relies upon the accidental injury to establish his claim for compensation and the burden of proof is on him to establish, first, the accidental injury; and, second, the consequent resulting disability. Under the accepted rule of this court, the findings of fact by the State Industrial Commission are conclusive upon review and an award based thereon will not be disturbed when there is any competent evidence to support such findings, but in the absence of any competent evidence the question of liability becomes a pure question of law for the determination of this court. Choctaw Portland Cement Company v. Lamb, 79 Okla. 109, 189 P. 750; Board of County Commissioners v. Barr, 68 Okla. 193, 173 P. 206; Wilson Lumber Company v. Wilson, 77 Okla. 312 188 P. 667; Stephenson v. State Industrial Commission, 79 Okla. 228, 192 P. 530; Booth and Flynn v. Cook, 79 Okla. 280, 193 P. 36; Fitzsimmons v. State Industrial Commission, 108 Okla. 276, 256 P. 616. We are of the opinion, from a careful examination of the record, that the claimant failed to produce any competent evidence to form a basis for the finding by the Commission that the "accident," as claimed, resulted in the disability.