Opinion
No. 109,399.
2013-12-6
BMO HARRIS BANK, N.A. f/k/a M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, Appellee, v. William DUNN, III, and Edwin H. Hawes, III, Appellants.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Gerald T. Elliott, Judge. James A. Kessinger and Luke A. Demaree, of Kessinger Law Firm, P.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellants. Steven M. Leigh and William H. Meyer, of Martin, Leigh, Laws & Fritzlen, PC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Gerald T. Elliott, Judge.
James A. Kessinger and Luke A. Demaree, of Kessinger Law Firm, P.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellants. Steven M. Leigh and William H. Meyer, of Martin, Leigh, Laws & Fritzlen, PC, of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., GREEN and BRUNS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Edwin H. Hawes, III and William Dunn, III appeal the district court's award of attorney fees to BMO Harris Bank (Bank). Hawes and Dunn claim: (1) the district court erred by awarding attorney fees to Bank for litigation of Bank's case-in-chief and also for litigation of affirmative defenses and counterclaims; (2) the district court erred by awarding an unreasonable amount of attorney fees; and (3) the district court erred by awarding attorney fees for work performed to recover the attorney fees. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the district court's judgment.
The background of this litigation is well known to the parties and will not be repeated in detail in this opinion. On September 6, 2007, Hawes, Dunn, and Lawrence B. McLellan signed a promissory note payable to Bank in the principal amount of $355,000. Bank later filed a lawsuit against the borrowers seeking a judgment for the unpaid balance of the promissory note. The case proceeded in district court against only Hawes and Dunn because McLellan filed for bankruptcy.
On September 10, 2012, the Johnson County District Court entered judgment in favor of Bank against Hawes and Dunn in the amount of $350,000 plus interest. The journal entry of judgment also awarded attorney fees to Bank based on the submission of an affidavit or following a hearing “if the parties cannot agree upon the amount of attorneys fees to be awarded to Plaintiff.” Hawes and Dunn appealed the judgment on the promissory note (with no issue raised as to attorney fees) and this court affirmed the judgment in favor of Bank in an unpublished opinion filed on June 21, 2013. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Dunn, No. 108,647, 2013 WL 3155797, *1 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed July 19, 2013.
Meanwhile, on August 24, 2012, after Hawes and Dunn filed their notice of appeal from the judgment but prior to their filing a docketing statement with this court, Bank filed with the district court a motion for attorney fees and costs, in which it requested a total of $204,424.84. Bank asserted that the attorney fees were a direct result of Hawes and Dunn asserting numerous factual and legal issues in their defense of Bank's lawsuit to enforce the promissory note. To calculate the attorney fees, Bank used the lodestar analysis in combination with other factors considered in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, as listed under Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) Rule 1.5(a) (2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 492). In addition, Bank requested attorney fees for work performed to recover the attorney fees.
Hawes and Dunn filed suggestions in opposition, in which they contended that Bank's request was unreasonable, especially when compared to Hawes and Dunn's total attorney fees and costs, which were $44,882.68. Hawes and Dunn alleged that Bank's attachments showed unreasonable billing and the majority of the requested fees were not reimbursable because they did not relate to enforcement of the promissory note.
On September 11, 2012, the district court heard arguments on the motion. Bank argued that Hawes and Dunn's multiple defenses and counterclaims required Bank's attorneys to spend a considerable amount of extra time to enforce the promissory note. Hawes and Dunn repeated their written arguments and also asserted that Bank should have separated the time it spent defending counterclaims or other issues not related to collection of the promissory note, as those fees were not recompensable. Finally, Hawes and Dunn challenged individual charges, such as over 7 hours that were billed preparing for a deposition that lasted less than 45 minutes.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court ordered Bank to go through the timesheets and delineate which time was spent on the collection of the promissory note, on responding to affirmative defenses, and on responding to counterclaims. The district court clarified that, while some services might end up in more than one category, it wanted the time split into three categories: (1) proving its case-in-chief, (2) responding to affirmative defenses, and (3) responding to counterclaims. The district court ordered both sides to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On October 11, 2012, Bank filed its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which it alleged that it expended attorney fees of $126,182 pursuing its case-in-chief; $6,863.50 defending against Hawes and Dunn's counterclaims involving invasion of privacy and defamation; and $57,156 defending against Hawes and Dunn's additional counterclaims and affirmative defenses. Bank again argued its attorney fees request was reasonable under the lodestar analysis, in conjunction with consideration of the factors in KRPC 1 .5(a). Bank's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law awarded Bank $190,201.50 for the litigation and $6,000 in fees incurred or anticipated in pursuing attorney fees but subtracted $6,863.50 in fees incurred defending the invasion of privacy and defamation counterclaims. Thus, the final proposed award was $189,338.
Hawes and Dunn filed additional suggestions in opposition to Bank's motion for attorney fees and costs. As in its initial suggestions, Hawes and Dunn argued that Bank did not have a contractual right to recover fees for defense against counterclaims. Hawes and Dunn argued that Bank was required to segregate its fee statements into time spent prosecuting its case-in-chief and time spent defending against counterclaims. Because Bank had failed to segregate its statements, Hawes and Dunn asked the district court to deny attorney fees. Finally, Hawes and Dunn reasserted their position that Bank should not be awarded attorney fees for work performed to recover the attorney fees.
The district court held a second hearing on December 17, 2012. At the hearing, Bank explained that it had now color-coded the timesheets it filed with its proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, delineating which time was spent on its case-in-chief, which time was spent in responding to affirmative defenses, and which time was spent in responding to counterclaims. Bank conceded that it was not entitled to $6,863.50 in attorney fees related to the counterclaims for invasion of privacy and defamation. However, Bank contended that it was entitled to attorney fees on the counterclaims and defenses it had to defeat in order to prevail and recover judgment on the promissory note. Bank concluded that the fees related to the case-in-chief amounted to $126,182 and the fees for the defenses and counterclaims it had to defeat in order to prevail on the promissory note amounted to $57,156, for a total of $183,338. In addition, Bank reasserted its claim for attorney fees in the amount of $6,000 for work performed to recover the attorney fees.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge adopted Bank's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judge stated that he had considered the KRPC factors “[a]nd taking all of the factors into account, the Court feels that the request, exclusive, of course, of the fees charged for the defense of privacy and defamation, other than that, the fees are appropriate and reasonable.” On January 9, 2013, the district court filed its journal entry of judgment, including detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding judgment in favor of Bank against Hawes and Dunn for attorney fees in the total amount of $189,338. Hawes and Dunn timely appealed the district court's judgment.
Did District Court Err by Awarding Attorney Fees for Bank's Case–In–Chief and Also for Litigation of Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims?
Hawes and Dunn claim that the district court erred by awarding attorney fees to Bank for litigation of Bank's case-in-chief and also for litigation of affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Hawes and Dunn claim that (1) the attorney fees clause in the promissory note does not allow for recovery of attorney fees for litigation of affirmative defenses and counterclaims and (2) the district court erred in finding that Bank had to overcome the affirmative defenses and counterclaims in order to prevail on its case-in-chief. Hawes and Dunn contend that the defenses and counterclaims were based upon different facts than the case-in-chief and that Bank's segregation of fees was inaccurate.
In response, Bank argues that the fees were legitimate because, as the district court found, it needed to defeat the counterclaims and defenses in order to prevail and obtain judgment on the promissory note. Moreover, Bank argues that the district court correctly found that the facts underlying the case-in-chief, the defenses, and the counterclaims were intertwined to the point of inseparability. Authority in Individual Note
First, Hawes and Dunn argue that the district court exceeded the authority granted in the promissory note for awarding attorney fees. “The question of whether a court has the authority to award attorney fees is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. [Citations omitted.]” Snider v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 297 Kan. 157, 162, 298 P.3d 1120 (2013).
A Kansas court may not award attorney fees unless a statute authorizes the award or there is an agreement between the parties allowing attorney fees. Snider, 297 Kan. at 162. Here, the promissory note contained an attorney fees clause, which states:
“Lender may hire or pay someone else who is not Lender's salaried employee to help collect this Note if Borrower does not pay. Borrower will be liable for all reasonable costs incurred in the collection of this Note, including but not limited to, court costs, attorneys' fees and collection agency fees, except that such costs of collection shall not include recovery of both attorneys' fees and collection agency fees.”
Hawes and Dunn point out that this clause does not specifically allow for recovery of attorney fees expended in defending counterclaims. They claim that because the promissory note only provided for recovery of “costs incurred in the collection of this Note,” the fees related to litigating defenses and counterclaims were not recoverable.
In district court, Bank conceded that it was not entitled to attorney fees stemming from defending the counterclaims for invasion of privacy and defamation. However, Bank claimed that it was entitled to reimbursement of attorney fees that resulted from litigating the remaining counterclaims and defenses because Bank had to defeat those in order to obtain its judgment; thus, they were reasonable costs incurred in the collection of the promissory note. The district court agreed with Bank and adopted Bank's proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. The district court stated that Bank was entitled to attorney fees on the counterclaims
“because those counterclaims were essentially mirror images of Defendants' affirmative defenses. Defending against those counterclaims involved proof of the same set of facts necessary for Plaintiff to prevail on its case in chief (namely that it was a holder of the Note entitled to enforce the Note), and the facts regarding Plaintiff's case in chief and the enumerated counterclaims were intertwined to the point of being inseparable.”
The district court went on to quote DeSpiegelaere v. Killion, 24 Kan.App.2d 542, Syl. ¶ 2, 947 P.2d 1039 (1997), in which this court stated:
“An exception to the duty of a prevailing party's attorney to segregate work on several causes of action arises when the attorney fees rendered are in connection with claims arising out of the same transaction and are so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts. Therefore, when the causes of action involved in the suit are dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances and, thus, are intertwined to the point of being inseparable, the party suing for attorney fees may recover the entire amount covering all claims.”
As for its authority to award attorney fees to Bank to defeat the affirmative defenses and counterclaims, the district court concluded:
“Here, the facts necessary to: (i) prove Plaintiff's case in chief on its action for breach of promissory note; (ii) defeat the affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants; and (iii) defend against and defeat Defendants' counterclaims [other than those for defamation and invasion of privacy] entailed ‘proof or denial of essentially the same facts' and were ‘intertwined to the point of being inseparable.’ All required a showing by Plaintiff that it was a proper holder of the Note with the right to enforce the Note. Thus, the rule in DeSpiegelaere applies in this case and Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of its attorney[ ] fees for defending against the enumerated counterclaims.”
We agree with the district court that the facts necessary to prove Bank's case-in-chief and to defeat the various defenses and counterclaims were intertwined to the point of being inseparable. Hawes and Dunn's primary argument in the underlying litigation was that K.S.A. 58–2323 applied to the facts of the case and prevented Bank from enforcing the promissory note. If the district court had agreed fully with Hawes and Dunn's position, it would not have allowed Bank to recover on the promissory note. Because Hawes and Dunn claimed that K.S.A. 58–2323 prevented enforcement of the promissory note, the district court correctly found that Bank needed to overcome the claim in order to succeed on its case-in-chief. The same reasoning applies to the remaining claims and defenses asserted by Hawes and Dunn in the underlying litigation.
The promissory note from which the district court obtained its authority to award attorney fees states: “Borrower will be liable for all reasonable costs incurred in the collection of this Note....” Given this broad language, the costs of Bank's litigation to defeat Hawes and Dunn's affirmative defenses and counterclaims were “reasonable costs incurred in the collection” of the promissory note. The district court did not exceed its authority by granting fees incurred in both Bank's prosecution of its case-in-chief and in defeating Hawes and Dunn's affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
Did the District Court Err by Awarding an Unreasonable Amount of Attorney Fees?
Next, Hawes and Dunn claim that the district court erred by awarding an unreasonable amount of attorney fees in the underlying case. Hawes and Dunn argue that the district court erroneously refused to review individual entries on Bank's billing statements and to evaluate the entries for reasonableness. They assert that the amount of the final award was unreasonable and should be reversed. Bank, on the other hand, contends that the district court properly reviewed its timesheets and billing entries and that the final award was reasonable.
Where the district court has authority to grant attorney fees, “the amount awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.]” Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs, Inc., 297 Kan. 926, 942, 305 P.3d 622 (2013). “A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if the action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) is based on an error of law; or (3) is based on an error of fact. [Citation omitted.]” Snider, 297 Kan. at 169.
In deciding the reasonableness of an attorney fee, courts should consider the eight factors set forth in KRPC 1.5(a). 297 Kan. at 169. A district court is an expert on attorney fees and may draw upon its own knowledge and expertise in determining fees. An appellate court is also an expert on the reasonableness of attorney fees but will not substitute its judgment for the district court's judgment except in the interest of justice. Johnson v. Westhoff Sand Co., 281 Kan. 930, 940, 135 P.3d 1127 (2006).
Hawes and Dunn first argue that the district court erroneously refused to review individual entries on Bank's billing statements and to evaluate the entries for reasonableness. For example, Hawes and Dunn complained to the district court that Bank's counsel billed an unreasonable. 7.2 hours to prepare for and attend the deposition of Bank's employee, a deposition for which the transcript was only 28 pages. The district judge responded specifically to the deposition challenge by stating:
“Look, this is a complicated case. There [are] lots of pieces of paper here. And you have to look at a lot of the pieces of paper in the context of a lot of other pieces of paper. And this case was aggressively tried, to say the least. And I don't fault either side for the fact that it was aggressively tried. It was an important case. It presented some important issues to both sides. Both sides worked very hard. Did a good job, actually, of informing the Court about the information that it needed.
“But it—look, you don't look at a 28 page deposition and say, seven hours, or whatever it was, to prepare for it, is unreasonable, ipse dixit. I mean, that's just not—that just doesn't make sense. That's not the way you analyze things.
“Now it seems—seven hours seems like a lot. I don't mind you making the argument. I'm not offended by that. But, I'm just here to tell you what we as courtroom lawyers—and I include myself as one. And I certainly include all of you as courtroom lawyers. You know full well that in a given case, a complex, highly controverted case, it may be entirely appropriate—depending on the number of exhibits that you have, and what you want to look at, and what you want to compare with it—it may be entirely appropriate to spend that seven hours.
“ And I just want you all to know that when I went through these time sheets—and there are a lot of time sheets here. You can't just say, Hey, this was a suit on a note. And it's a lot more [straightforward] than $204,000 in attorney's fees.” (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the district judge's comments that the judge did, in fact, review the individual timesheets and billing entries submitted by Bank. But in complex litigation such as this, appellate courts have held that a district court is not required to examine every time entry to determine whether the time spent on each individual task was reasonable. For example, in Case v. Unified School Dist. No. 233, Johnson County, Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir.1998), the court stated:
“ ‘[T]here is no requirement ... that district courts identify and justify each disallowed hour. Nor is [there] any requirement that district courts announce what hours are permitted for each legal task.’ [Citation omitted.] In fact, in cases such as this one, in which the parties generated thousands of pages of written work product and the appellants submitted well over a hundred pages in billing statements with several entries per page, ‘[i]t is neither practical nor desirable to expect the trial court judge to have reviewed each paper in th[e] massive case file to decide, for example, whether a particular motion could have been done in 9.6 hours instead of 14.3 hours.’ [Citation omitted.] Instead, ‘[a] general reduction of hours claimed in order to achieve what the court determines to be a reasonable number is not an erroneous method, so long as there is sufficient reason for its use.’ [Citation omitted.]”
As the Tenth Circuit recognized, it was unnecessary for the district court in this case to have reviewed each individual billing in order to determine whether the amount of time spent on each task was reasonable. In complex and protracted litigation such as this, the court should have the discretion to take a broader view, especially considering Kansas' long-standing rule that district courts, as experts in the area of attorney fees, are vested with wide discretion to determine the amount of an award of attorney fees. See Johnson, 281 Kan. at 940;In re Marriage of Strieby, 45 Kan.App.2d 953, 973, 255 P.3d 34 (2011) (stating district courts have wide discretion on attorney fee amounts).
Next, Hawes and Dunn assert that the overall time billed for the case-in-chief is unreasonably high. The attachments to Bank's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on attorney fees show that Bank billed 44.2 hours of paralegal work at $85 per hour, 580.85 hours of senior attorney work at $200 per hour, and 27.8 hours of senior partner work at $225 per hour. Hawes and Dunn do not challenge the rates charged by Bank's attorneys and paralegals, but they contend that this is an unreasonable amount of time to bill for collection of a promissory note.
In deciding the reasonableness of an attorney fee, courts should consider the eight factors set forth in KRPC 1.5(a). Snider, 297 Kan. at 169. These factors are:
“(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
“(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
“(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
“(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
“(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
“(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
“(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
“(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” 2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 492–93.
Here, the district court considered each factor and found that the attorney fees Bank proposed were reasonable. Although Hawes and Dunn do not explicitly challenge the district court's finding on any specific factor, their complaints mostly relate to the first factor, which requires consideration of “(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.” 2012 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 492. Regarding this factor, the district court noted that Hawes and Dunn asserted over 30 defenses and counterclaims, all of which Bank had to overcome, in order to prevail on its enforcement of the promissory note.
The district court specifically considered the time and labor required by the litigation and concluded that “[t]his case was made complex and expensive as a direct result of [Hawes and Dunn's] strategy to pursue numerous defense theories, and [Bank] necessarily incurred attorneys' fees in defeating these wide[-]ranging defenses and theories.” In light of these considerations, the district court's conclusion that the amount of attorney fees Bank sought was reasonable under the first factor—and the other factors as well—was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or based upon an error of law or fact. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding an unreasonable amount of attorney fees.
Did the District Court Err by Awarding Attorney Fees for Work Performed to Recover the Attorney Fees?
In their final issue, Hawes and Dunn challenge the district court's award to the Bank of attorney fees for work performed to litigate the amount of attorney fees. Here, the district court awarded $6,000 to the Bank for attorney fees incurred in its pursuit of attorney fees. Hawes and Dunn assert that these fees are beyond the scope of the attorney fee provision in the promissory note and that the amount is unreasonable.
“The question of whether a court has the authority to award attorney fees is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review. [Citations omitted.]” Snider, 297 Kan. at 162. Where the district court has authority to grant attorney fees, “the amount awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.]” Rinehart, 297 Kan. at 942.
Regarding a fee award for time spent pursuing attorney fees, the district court stated only:
“It is appropriate for this Court to assess attorney[ ] fees for time spent litigating the amount of such fees. Mercy Regional Health Center, Inc. v. Brinega[r], 43 Kan.App.2d 156, 223 P.3d 311 (2010). Accordingly, the Court has added, in addition to the amounts set forth in the detailed billing statement, a reasonable amount of attorney[ ] fees for the preparation and presentation of the attorney[ ] fee application totaling $6,000.00.”
Mercy Regional Health Center concerned a proceeding in which the hospital sued a husband and wife to collect for medical services rendered for their daughter. Initially, the defendants disputed the debt, but, prior to trial, they agreed to a judgment for the amount of the hospital bill. The district court granted judgment in favor of the hospital, including an award for attorney fees under K.S.A. 50–634(e) and K.S.A. 60–211. On appeal, this court determined first that attorney fees were appropriately awarded under K.S.A. 60–211, which allows a district court to impose attorney fees upon a person who files a signed but improper pleading, motion, or other paper. 43 Kan.App.2d at 165–68.
This court next addressed the defendants' argument that the district court erroneously awarded attorney fees for time spent litigating an attorney fees award, the same argument raised here by Hawes and Dunn. See 43 Kan.App.2d at 169. This court cited Moore v. St. Paul Fire Mercury Ins. Co., 269 Kan. 272, Syl. ¶ 2, 3 P.3d 81 (2000), in which our Supreme Court addressed K.S.A. 40–256, which governs attorney fees allowed in actions on insurance policies:
“The primary purpose of the Kansas fee-shifting statute is to benefit the insured. Fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney fees to be awarded are recoverable under K.S.A. 40–256. The fact that the award of such fee ultimately rests in the insured's attorney being paid to litigate the fees is collateral and incidental to the primary purpose of indemnifying an insured for the cost of counsel in an action against the insurer.' “ 43 Kan.App.2d at 169.
Hawes and Dunn claim that the district court's reliance on Mercy Regional Health Center was erroneous because that case concerned sanctions for improper pleadings, whereas the basis for fees here is a contract. Instead, they point this court to two federal cases: National Minority Supplier Dev. v. First Nat., 83 F.Supp.2d 1200 (D.Kan.1999), and Baxter State Bank v. Bernhardt, No. 96–2460–JWL, 1998 WL 164631 (D.Kan.1998) (unpublished opinion). But as Bank notes, National Minority Supplier did not address awarding attorney fees for litigation of attorney fees; rather, it found that the indemnification agreement at issue did not authorize recovery of attorney fees. 83 F.Supp.2d at 1207. Likewise, Baxter State Bank held that a party could not collect attorney fees related to collection of the operating loan when the contractual provision for attorney fees allowed only fees related to the enforcement of a specific guaranty; it did not address recovery of attorney fees for seeking attorney fees. See 1998 WL 164631, at *4–5.
Moreover, as Bank points out, this court has held that (1) where a clause in a contract allows recovery of attorney fees and (2) another clause allows a claimant to recover the expense of prosecuting a claim based on the opposing party's breach of contract by not paying attorney fees allowed under the first clause, such “fees on fees” are appropriate. See Wittig v. Westar Energy, Inc., 44 Kan.App.2d 216, 225–26, 235 P.3d 535 (2010), rev. denied 292 Kan. 969 (2011). Hawes and Dunn correctly point out that Wittig is not directly on point because the contract in that case contained a specific clause that allowed for advancement of attorney fees and another clause that allowed for recovery of attorney fees incurred by prosecution of a claim that the other party breached the advancement clause. See 44 Kan.App.2d at 219–20.
We conclude that the rationale of Moore and Mercy Regional Health Center allowing for the recovery of fees to pursue attorney fees should be extended to contractual provisions authorizing attorney fees as well as statutory provisions. Here, the primary purpose of the attorney fees clause in the promissory note was to indemnify Bank for a reasonable amount of attorney fees it incurred in collection of the promissory note. Bank must be awarded a reasonable amount of attorney fees to pursue collection of attorney fees in order to be made whole for its loss when Hawes and Dunn defaulted on the promissory note. Thus, the district court had authority under the promissory note to award attorney fees to Bank for work performed to recover the attorney fees.
Finally, Hawes and Dunn contend that the award of $6,000 for fees to collect the attorney fees was unreasonable. But the record on appeal shows that while Hawes and Dunn challenged the district court's authority to award attorney fees for pursuing attorney fees, they did not challenge the amount of the award in district court. Generally, issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. See Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, 403, 266 P.3d 516 (2011). Although there are exceptions to this general rule, Hawes and Dunn do not argue that any exceptions apply. Thus, we will not address the reasonableness of the amount of the district court's award of attorney fees to collect attorney fees.
Affirmed.