We concluded, "some peninsulas are too much like an island and therefore are prohibited." 2007 UT 57, ¶ 63, 167 P.3d 1016.Id. ¶ 64.

'"Bluffdale Mountain Homes v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ¶ 30, 167 P.3d 1016 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, ¶ 21, 70 P.3d 78 (quoting Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)).

See id. Thus, we must look beyond the plain language of this section to resolve the issue. See Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ¶ 70, 167 P.3d 1016 ("When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we first try to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the meaning and purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative history." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The duty to marshal the evidence "`requires an appellant to marshal all of the facts used to support the trial court's finding and then show that these facts cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial court, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee.'" Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, ¶ 52, 167 P.3d 1016 (quoting Wayment v. Howard 2006 UT 56, ¶ 9, 144 P.3d 1147). Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's finding, Defendants cite only to the evidence offered at trial that supports their position. "`An appellant may not simply cite to the evidence which supports his or her position and hope to prevail'" Id. (quoting Wayment, 2006 UT 56, ¶ 9, 144 P.3d 1147). ¶ 17 Although Defendants' failure to marshal the evidence is a sufficient basis for affirming, we also determine that sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court's finding that a mutual mistake of fact relating to the value and composition of the Kendall Agency and its book of business existed at the time the parties negotiated the sale of the agency.