Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9371, No. 5102.
August 9, 2006.
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Winston S. Burbank, Judge. Trial Court No. 4FA-04-01019 CR.
Mike H. Biderman, Assistant Public Defender, Fairbanks, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Jill S. Dolan, Assistant District Attorney, Jeffrey A. O'Bryant, District Attorney, Fairbanks, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Rodney K. Bluel II was convicted of driving without a valid license and of failing to produce proof of insurance. Before trial, he moved to suppress the evidence obtained during his stop. Although he conceded that the state trooper had a valid reason to stop him — flames were coming out of his tailpipe — he argued that the trooper exceeded the permissible scope of the stop by asking to see his driver's license. For the reasons discussed below, we reject Bluel's claim and affirm his convictions.
Facts and proceedings
On March 26, 2004, at about 11:00 p.m., Alaska State Trooper Rachel Foster observed sparks and flames coming out of the tailpipe of an older model pickup being driven on Chena Pump Road in Fairbanks. Trooper Foster was concerned the flames and sparks might escalate into a dangerous vehicle fire, as she had seen happen in the past. Trooper Foster turned on her overhead lights, pulled the truck over, and contacted the driver, Bluel. When Trooper Foster approached Bluel, he turned off the ignition and the tailpipe flames subsided. Trooper Foster told Bluel why he had been stopped and asked for his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Bluel produced identification, but no driver's license. After confirming through dispatch that Bluel did not have a driver's license, Trooper Foster arrested him. Trooper Foster did not cite Bluel for any traffic violation related to his flaming muffler. Ultimately, Bluel was convicted of driving without a valid license and of driving without proof of insurance.
AS 28.15.011(b).
AS 28.22.019(a).
Before trial, Bluel moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his stop. He conceded that Trooper Foster had valid safety reasons for stopping him but argued that she exceeded the permissible scope of the stop by asking to see his driver's license. Bluel argued that Trooper Foster should have ended the stop as soon as she determined that the truck was not on fire.
District Court Judge Winston S. Burbank denied the motion to suppress. Judge Burbank found that the stop was a valid community caretaker stop and that Trooper Foster was justified in asking Bluel for identification in the context of that stop. Bluel appeals Judge Burbank's ruling.
Why we reject Bluel's claim that his stop was illegal
On appeal, Bluel renews his claim that Trooper Foster illegally detained him by asking for his driver's license. He concedes that his initial stop was valid. But he argues that the stop should have ended as soon as its purpose was accomplished — that is, as soon as Trooper Foster advised him that his tailpipe was sending out sparks and flames. He argues that Trooper Foster exceeded the permissible scope of the stop by asking to see his driver's license.
Judge Burbank found that Bluel's stop was a valid community caretaker stop. In Ozhuwan v. State, we held that a Fourth Amendment seizure may be justified without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity if the police are validly acting within their community caretaker role — that is, if they are "aware of at least some specific circumstances supporting a reasonable belief that the occupants of a vehicle need assistance."
786 P.2d 918 (Alaska App. 1990).
Id. at 922.
However, we find it unnecessary to reach this issue in this case. Judge Burbank found that Trooper Foster saw sparks and flames coming out of the tailpipe of the truck Bluel was driving and that she stopped Bluel because she was concerned for his safety. Bluel has not challenged those findings. Those facts, as a matter of law, gave Trooper Foster probable cause to stop Bluel for a violation of 13 Alaska Administrative Code 04.007, which prohibits a driver from operating an unsafe vehicle. Although Judge Burbank found that Trooper Foster stopped Bluel to warn him, not to cite him for a violation of the traffic code, Trooper Foster's subjective intent is irrelevant to the probable cause analysis. The pertinent question is whether the facts known to Trooper Foster, viewed objectively, justified the traffic stop.
We review de novo whether the facts found by the trial court justify a finding of probable cause. See Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148 (Alaska App. 2005).
See Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118, 1121 n. 1 (Alaska App. 1992).
See id.; see also Cruse v. State, 584 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)) ("Probable cause exists where `the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers'] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed").
A driver is required to have a current license as a condition of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway and to present that license for inspection on the request of a police officer. And a motorist is required to carry proof of insurance and present that proof when requested by a police officer. Although Judge Burbank did not uphold the stop on this ground, we can affirm the trial court's ruling on any basis supported by the record.
AS 28.15.011(b).
AS 28.15.131.
AS 28.22.019(a).
See Northern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 563 P.2d 256, 257 (Alaska 1977).
Trooper Foster had probable cause to stop Bluel for a traffic violation, and she did not exceed the permissible scope of that stop by asking him for a driver's license and his proof of insurance. We therefore hold that Judge Burbank did not err in denying Bluel's motion to suppress.
Conclusion
We AFFIRM Bluel's convictions.