The inclusion of these permitted activities suggests that the term "commercial use" should not be given broad scope, as it was in San Pedro Neighborhood Ass'n , because doing so would render ineffective the provision on permissive uses. See Blue Canyon Well Ass'n v. Jevne , 2018-NMCA-004, ¶ 9, 410 P.3d 251 ("We interpret statutes to avoid rendering the Legislature's language superfluous." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ).
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-202(a), (b). See Blue Canyon Well Ass'n v. Jevne, 410 P.3d 251, 255 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (explaining that unincorporated associations have no legal existence and may not bring suit unless they comply with certain statutory requirements). The district court treated the argument as a motion to reconsider the magistrate judge's ruling that MTGLQ was a limited partnership and declined to address it because Wellington had not complied with procedural rules regarding the filing of motions.
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 15-202(a), (b). See Blue Canyon Well Ass'n v. Jevne, 410 P.3d 251, 255 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (explaining that unincorporated associations have no legal existence and may not bring suit unless they comply with certain statutory requirements). The district court treated the argument as a motion to reconsider the magistrate judge's ruling that MTGLQ was a limited partnership and declined to address it because Wellington had not complied with procedural rules regarding the filing of motions.
The UCC counters that the property could not have been held in trust because, before they incorporated in 2013, the parishes were legal nonentities, incapable of being trust beneficiaries. See N.M.S.A. § 53-10-1 et seq. ; see also Blue Canyon Well Assoc. v. Jevne , 410 P.3d 251, 254-55 (N.M. App. 2017) ("For those intending to create an association under Section 53-10-1, the filing of statutory documents is mandatory"). This is a difficult issue.
The omission of such specificity neither supports nor undermines either parties’ positions on appeal given that silence "is at best a tenuous guide to determining legislative intent." Blue Canyon Well Ass'n v. Jevne , 2018-NMCA-004, ¶ 17, 410 P.3d 251 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The Legislature knows how to include language in a statute if it so desires."
{¶25} We adhere to the principle that "words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning," Blue Canyon Well Ass'n v. Jevne, 2018-NMCA-004, ¶ 9, 410 P.3d 251 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and "presume the [L]egislature is aware of existing law when it enacts legislation." State v. McClendon, 2001-NMSC-023, ¶ 10, 130 N.M. 551, 28 P.3d 1092 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
. {16} While the ordinary and usual meaning of a word or phrase is an important consideration in the construction of a rule, Blue Canyon Well Ass'n v. Jevne , 2018-NMCA-004, ¶ 9, 410 P.3d 251, we must determine whether our Supreme Court intended a different meaning in Rule 1-053.2(H)(1)(b) ’s second sentence, which states, "The hearing shall consist of a review of the record unless the court determines that additional evidence will aid in the resolution of the objections." According to Mother, "[t]he second sentence of the rule implies that at the required hearing, the district court may decide whether to take evidence."
See Diamond v. Diamond , 2012-NMSC-022, ¶ 25, 283 P.3d 260 ("When interpreting a statute, all sections of the statute must be read together so that all parts are given effect." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Blue Canyon Well Ass’n v. Jevne , 2018-NMCA-004, ¶ 9, 410 P.3d 251 ("We interpret statutes to avoid rendering the Legislature’s language superfluous." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).