Blount appealed his 2011 conviction, on the ground that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender. Blount v. State, 111 So.3d 1216, 1219 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012). He argued that his conviction for simple assault on a police officer in 1993 did not constitute a crime of violence as required by the habitual-offender statute.
Blount appealed his 2011 conviction, on the ground that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender. Blount v. State, 111 So.3d 1216, 1219 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012). He argued that his conviction for simple assault on a police officer in 1993 did not constitute a crime of violence as required by the habitual-offender statute.
We upheld Blount's 2011 vehicle-theft conviction and life sentence on direct appeal, rejecting his argument that his conviction for simple assault did not involve an assault on a law enforcement officer and thus did not qualify as a crime of violence for habitual-offender status. Blount v. State, 111 So.3d 1216, 1222 (¶ 22) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (rehearing denied Feb. 5, 2013, and certiorari denied May 2, 2013). But while his appeal was pending, Blount filed a PCR motion in the circuit court under cause number 94–3–38, which concerned his 1996 cocaine-possession charge.
We upheld Blount's 2011 vehicle-theft conviction and life sentence on direct appeal, rejecting his argument that his conviction for simple assault did not involve an assault on a law enforcement officer and thus did not qualify as a crime of violence for habitual-offender status. Blount v. State, 111 So. 3d 1216, 1222 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (rehearing denied Feb. 5, 2013, and certiorari denied May 2, 2013). But while his appeal was pending, Blount filed a PCR motion in the circuit court under cause number 94-3-38, which concerned his 1996 cocaine-possession charge.