Blount v. Industrial Commission

5 Citing cases

  1. Crown Atl. Co. v. AP Wireless Invs. I, LLC

    No. 1 CA-CV 14-0159 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015)

    " But the trial court correctly rejected this argument because, to the extent the meaning of "at" is established in Arizona law, no interpretation of the word has resulted in "at" meaning "after." See Ring v. Taylor, 141 Ariz. 56, 69, 685 P.2d 121, 134 (App. 1984) (superseded by statute) (interpreting "at the time alleged" and "at that time" to mean "the time of the alleged offense"); Blount v. Indus. Comm'n., 19 Ariz. App. 245, 247, 506 P.2d 285, 287 (App. 1973) (interpreting "at the time of the subsequent injury" to mean "the time the subsequent injury was received"). ยถ9 Crown argues that Ring and Blount do not apply because they are contextually inapposite.

  2. Pena v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona

    668 P.2d 900 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)

    To the contrary, in the ordinary case where a previously closed scheduled disability is subsequently reopened and then closed with increased impairment, the resulting disability is scheduled. Claimant would receive additional scheduled benefits only. See Blount v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ariz. App. 245, 506 P.2d 285 (1973). The present case, however, is not the ordinary scheduled disability case.

  3. Kovacs v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona

    132 Ariz. 173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 3 times

    Building upon this premise, an additional principle which appears to be settled in Arizona law is that in the absence of the availability of a Ronquillo presumption, in order to convert a later scheduled impairment to unscheduled, evidence must be presented which permits a reasonable inference to be drawn that the loss of earning capacity resulting from the prior impairment exists "at the time of the subsequent injury." A.R.S. ยง 23-1044 E; Ronquillo v. Industrial Commission, supra; Borsh v. Industrial Commission, supra; Blount v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ariz. App. 245, 506 P.2d 285 (1973); Yount v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz. App. 527, 514 P.2d 280 (1973); Bozman v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz. App. 390, 513 P.2d 679 (1973). With these principles in mind, we now review claimant's contentions concerning his alleged prior physical impairment and its effect on his earning capacity at the time of the subsequent injury. Claimant testified that in 1941 he injured his back while working for a Michigan employer. At that time he continued working without any substantial problems.

  4. Alsbrooks v. Industrial Com'n

    118 Ariz. 505 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 2 times

    Second, this prior injury earning capacity disability must have been in existence at the time of the occurrence of the second injury. Blount v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ariz. App. 245, 506 P.2d 285 (1973); Bozman, supra. In the language of the statute, it is the `previous disability as it existed at the time of the subsequent injury' which is pertinent.

  5. Ross v. Industrial Commission

    22 Ariz. App. 209 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 3 times

    Second, this prior injury earning capacity disability must have been in existence at the time of the occurrence of the second injury. Blount v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ariz. App. 245, 506 P.2d 285 (1973); Bozman, supra. In the language of the statute, it is the "previous disability as it existed at the time of the subsequent injury" which is pertinent.