Opinion
1:22-CV-00022-SPB-RAL
10-12-2023
MICHAEL LLOYD BLOOM JR., Plaintiff v. JOHN DOE 1, JOHN DOE 2, LT. JADLOCKI, CO FROEHLICH, CO ARNOLD, CO BANKS, CO SUNBERG, CO WELTON, LT. BEDNARO, SGT. WATSON, CO BLACKWELDER, CO LUCKOCK, CAPT. SISSEM, LT. STAFFORD, C.O. JORDAN, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
ECF NO. 31
RICHARD A. LANZILEO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IL REPORT
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Michael Bloom brings this pro se civil rights action against thirteen individuals (collectively, “Defendants”) employed at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”), where he was previously incarcerated. Bloom's Amended Complaint is the operative pleading before the Court. See ECF No. 21. It asserts violations of Bloom's rights
Defendants are Captain Howard Sissem; Sergeant Michael Watson; four lieutenants, William Jadlocki, Todd Stafford, Richard Bednaro, and Christopher Froehlich; and seven corrections officers, Arnold, Otis Jordan, Elijah Sundberg, Matthew Banks, Thomas Luckock, Justin Blackwelder, and Terry Welton. See ECF No. 21. Bloom initially sued several John Doe defendants. See ECF No. 7. Bloom later filed an Amended Complaint identifying the Defendants. See ECF No. 21.
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and seeks compensatory and punitive damages against all Defendants. See id.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 31, 32. Two months after the deadline for Bloom to file his brief in opposition to the motion, he filed a pleading captioned as an “Amended Complain” (sic). See ECF No. 36. Upon review of the document, the Court construes it as a supplement to the Amended Complaint and will consider its allegations as such.
B. Factual Allegations
The Amended Complaint and supplement allege the following facts, which the Court considers as true for purposes of the pending motion.
On December 3, 2020, at approximately 10:30 AM, Defendants Banks and Arnold were escorting a handcuffed Bloom from his cell to medical. During this transport, Bloom was “pushed, pulled and poked by the CO's [sic], and the handcuffs.” ECF No. 21, p. 2. Along the way, Banks and Arnold threw him “onto the ground in a mud puddle .. . completely unprovoked.” ECF No. 36, p. 2. While on the ground, “[he] kept asking them to get [him] out of the water, but they kept pulling [him] back into it, holding [his] face down.” ECF No. 21, p. 2. Defendant Jadlocki then “arrived and started saying, stop resisting or [Bloom] was going to be sprayed.” ECF No. 36, p. 2. Bloom did not resist at any point during this incident, but “only kept asking them to be taken out of the water.” ECF No. 21, p. 2.
“Other corrections officers” then brought a restraint chair and placed Bloom in it. ECF 36, p. 2. The officers “excessively over tighten the restraints” despite Bloom's complaints that they were too tight. Id. They then brought Bloom to Medical. Id.
Staff members photographed Bloom's body immediately upon his arrival at Medical. ECF No. 21, p. 2. Because the alleged assault upon him had only just occurred, Bloom's bruises had not yet appeared. At the examination, Bloom “was afraid to tell medical exactly what happened during the escort because [he] was afraid the CO's might try to retaliate against [him].” Id. A corrections officer whose identity remains unknown to Bloom repeatedly accused Bloom of grabbing him inappropriately during the escort. ECF No. 36, p. 2. After Bloom's examination in Medical, he was brought “to a processing room that had many corrections officers in it” and “aggressively pulled out of the restraint chair.” Id. He was “then thrown face down on the floor” and “held down by multiple corrections officers, while another CO cut all the clothing off [his] body with a pair of scissors.” Id. (cleaned up).
The next day, Bloom submitted a sick call slip “so [he] could have photographs of all the bruising from the assault.” ECF No. 21, p. 2. He never received a follow-up appointment.
C. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).
Because Bloom is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read his pro se complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982).
D. Analysis
Defendants argue that the more specific provision rule precludes Bloom from bringing an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants also submit that the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims fail because the allegations do not identify any Defendant's personal involvement. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is barred by the more specific provision rule.
Bloom claims that the Defendants' assault upon him violated the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause ‘“protects individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The Supreme Court ‘has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.'” Porter v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 91 4 F.3d 431, 447 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125). Accordingly, where “a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)). See also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”).
The Amended Complaint does not assert a procedural due process claim.
Here, Bloom bases his Fourteenth Amendment claim on the same factual allegations that he alleges in support of his Eighth Amendment claim“[T]he Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners.” Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). See Betts, 621 F.3d 260-61 (listing cases). See also Ceasar v. Varner, 2022 WL 9491877, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2022) (quoting Scott v. Clark, 2020 WL 4905624, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4904212 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2020) (“an inmate's ‘claim concerning] his conditions of confinement and an alleged failure by the Defendants to ensure his safety ... fit squarely within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.'”) (quoting Beenick v. LeFebvre, 684 Fed.Appx. 200, 205 (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2017) (quoting Betts, 621 F.3d at 261))). Because the Eighth Amendment specially addresses his excessive force allegation, Bloom's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
Bloom does not enumerate his legal claims in the Amended Complaint. He does, however, aver that he submitted a grievance “for the violation of. . . [his] Eighth Amendment Rights and due process, Fourteenth Amendment” for the allegations set forth in the factual section of his Amended Complaint. ECF No. 21, p. 2. He therefore brings these claims based on the same set of allegations.
2. The Amended Complaint adequately alleges the personal involvement of Arnold, Froehlich, and Jadlocki, but no other Defendant.
Defendants next argue that Bloom “fails to provide enough factual matter to suggest any . . . Defendant was personally involved in the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint.” ECF No. 32, p. 6. In order to prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is axiomatic that liability under § 1983 requires a defendant's “personal involvement” in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Gould v. Wetzel, 2013 WL 5697866, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2013). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of allegations of fact demonstrating that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
Because the Amended Complaint identifies the respective involvement of Defendants Arnold, Banks, and Jadlocki in the alleged assault upon Bloom, it adequately supports their personal involvement in the violation of Bloom's rights. But the Amended Complaint fails to allege the personal involvement of any other Defendant. The factual allegations of the Amended Complaint do not even mention the name of any other Defendant. Instead, the Amended Complaint refers generally to the title of “CO” without identification of the corrections officer by name. Bloom's § 1983 claim fails against each Defendant against whom he has failed to allege facts to support personal involvement in conduct that violated his constitutional rights.
Therefore, Bloom's Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to § 1983 should be dismissed against Defendants Sissem, Watson, Stafford, Bednaro, Froehlich, Jordan, Sundberg, Luckock, Blackwelder, and Welton, but permitted to proceed against Arnold, Banks, and Jadlocki.
E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). And though “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court,” it may not “outright refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial.” Id. These instructions are equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, the legal insufficiency of Bloom's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim cannot be cured by amendment. Accordingly, that claim should be dismissed with prejudice. However, Bloom may be able to cure the deficiencies of his Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Sissem, Watson, Stafford, Bednaro, Froehlich, Jordan, Sundberg, Luckock, Blackwelder, and Welton. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment claim against them should be dismissed without prejudice and Bloom should be granted leave to file a second amended complaint to state the personal involvement, if any, of each Defendant. If Bloom presently lacks knowledge sufficient to enable him to allege the specific involvement of one or more of these Defendants, he should be permitted to seek leave of Court to file a further amended complaint after a reasonable period of discovery allows him the opportunity to ascertain the necessary information.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 31) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the motion should be granted as to Bloom's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim against all Defendants, and this claim should be dismissed with prejudice-, the motion should be granted as to Bloom's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Sissem, Watson, Stafford, Bednaro, Froehlich, Jordan, Sundberg, Luckock, Blackwelder, and Welton, and this claim should be dismissed without prejudice, and denied as to his Eighth Amendment claim against Arnold, Banks, and Jadlocki.
IV. NOTICE
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).