Opinion
702.
Decided November 13, 2003.
The following named papers numbered 1 to 5 were submitted on this Notice of Motion and Notice of Cross-Motion on October 17, 2003:
Papers numbered
Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed1-2
Notice of Cross-Motion and Affidavit3-4
Affidavit in opposition to Cross-Motion X
Reply Affirmation 5
"It is blackletter law that a judgment rendered without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and that the defect may be raised at any time and may not be waived (citation omitted)," Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71 (1976). The instant motion and cross-motion compel this Court to revisit the concept of the court's competence to entertain this action which has been pending for almost two years and which has been marked "final for trial".
On or about December 12, 2001, the plaintiff commenced this action by service upon the defendant of a summons and complaint. The complaint in its ad damnum clause pursuant to CPLR 3017(a) seeks "judgement against the defendant for $15,744 with interest from Sep. 11, 2000 and costs". The complaint alleges that the plaintiff sold and delivered appliances to or for the defendant at an agreed price of $53,921, of which the plaintiff claims a balance of $15,744 is due. Demand for this amount has allegedly been made but payment has not been forthcoming.
The defendant answered the complaint on December 28, 2001, denying the central allegations in the complaint and raising several affirmative defenses and eight counterclaims (ranging from breach of warranty to loss of income to goods sold and delivered). The defendant counterclaimed for $50,000 on its first six counterclaims and $5,166 for goods sold and delivered and an account stated on its seventh and eighth counterclaim.
Plaintiff had moved for an order striking the defendant's answer and counterclaims for failure to answer interrogatories. However, that motion was withdrawn on October 17, 2002.
Commencing February 14, 2003, this matter has remained on the trial calendar. After being adjourned numerous times, the matter appeared before the undersigned for trial on September 19, 2003. However, during settlement discussions, this Court noted the "wherefore" clause and the requested relief. The instant motions (one to dismiss the complaint and the cross-motion to amend the ad damnum clause) ensued.
The monetary jurisdictional limit of the District Court is $15,000, exclusive of interest and costs, UDCA § 201, 202. Where the requested for relief exceeds this monetary limit, the action must be dismissed, see The Board of Managers of Sea Breeze II Condominium v. Kwiecinski, N.Y.L.J. 10/30/03, p. 30, col. 3 (App Term 9th 10th Jud Dists). As this Court stated in Lemard v. Star Auto Sales, Inc., 2002 NY Slip Op 50207U, 2002 WL 1275100:
"A court cannot expand its jurisdiction and cannot exceed its monetary jurisdictional limits," Board of Managers of the Mews at North Hills Condominium v. Farajzadeh, 189 Misc.2d 38, 730 N.Y.S.2d 180 (App. Term 9th 10th Jud Dists 2001). It is axiomatic that neither the Court nor the parties may consent to subject matter jurisdiction where none exists. Morrison v. Budget Rent A Car Systems, Inc., 230 A.D.2d 253, 657 N.Y.S.2d 721 (2nd Dept. 1997). . . . When a summons is served in a District Court action, the action is commenced (unlike in the Supreme Court where the action is commenced by filing, CPLR 304), UDCA section 400. It is at this point that jurisdiction attaches. To thereafter move or amend the complaint as of right to reduce the ad damnum clause is irrelevant at the time the summons and complaint were served, the action was started and jurisdiction attached (or did not). See, e.g., Nowinski v. La Monte, 168 Misc. 586, 5 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Municipal Ct 1938); Mend-Foley v. Spencer Management Corp., 158 Misc.2d 471, 601 N.Y.S.2d 553 (City Court of New Rochelle, 1993); Dobrikin v. Union Ry. Co., 130 Misc. 796, 225 N.Y.S. 376 (NY Civil Ct, 1927) appeal denied, 256 NY 561 (1929). If the Court is without jurisdiction to consider a matter when the matter is commenced, it cannot get jurisdiction (whether by agreement of the parties or the sua sponte amendment of the plaintiff) afterwards.
The plaintiff requests that the court "find a way" to permit the amendment of the complaint. The Court knows of no such way. Without jurisdiction initially, this Court cannot "find" it, see Providian National Bank v. Capolino, N.Y.L.J. 3/2/00, p. 35, col. 2 (City Court White Plains, 2000); Wildeb Rest. Inc. v. Jolin Restaurant, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 1012, 331 N.Y.S.2d 575 (District Court Suffolk County 1972).
The plaintiff argues that when UDCA 202 is read in conjunction with UDCA 203, "the $15,000 ceiling does not forever dictate subject matter jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced". This Court disagrees. In an action involving a request for a money judgment, "the amount sought to be recovered or the value of the property" cannot at the time the action is commenced exceed $15,000. An increase in the amount being sought over the course of the litigation must lead to a CPLR 325(b) motion. A court of limited jurisdiction cannot award increased monetary damages on a single cause of action in excess of its subject matter jurisdiction. While this Court may "stack" causes of action that are not interrelated so as to be the "alter egos" of the same cause of action, it cannot consider a case which is beyond its subject matter jurisdiction as defined by the ad damnun clause. See, e.g., Spetler v. Jogel Realty Co., 224 A.D. 612, 231 N.Y.S. 517 (1st Dept. 1928); Silverman v. Abdul, 85 Misc.2d 11, 379 N.Y.S.2d 671 (County Court 1976).
This, however, only takes the Court part of the way to a final decision the counterclaims must be addressed. Again, the UDCA permits counterclaims of unlimited amount, UDCA § 208(b). Here, had this Court had the competence to address plaintiff's claim, there is no question that the $50,000 counterclaims would have been proper. However, with the complaint dismissed, the counterclaims now take the position of the main claim subject to the same $15,000 monetary jurisdiction of any complaint. See, e.g., CPLR 3019(d) ; Wildeb Rest. Inc. v. Jolin Restaurant, Inc., supra at 69 Misc.2d 1014, 331 N.Y.S. 2d 578 ["However, the motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint has been dismissed and the defendant is without authority to interpose a counterclaim, since this may be done only though service of an answer and no answer is required"]. With the complaint dismissed, there is no answer interposable with or with counterclaims, CPLR 3019. Accordingly, the counterclaims must be dismissed. See White v. National Bondholders Corp., 191 Misc. 536, 78 N.Y.S.2d 468, (Supreme Court New York County) aff'd 273 App.Div. 963, 79 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1st Dept. 1948); Newman v. Newman, 245 A.D.2d 353, 665 N.Y.S.2d 423 (2nd Dept. 1997).
Additionally, since six of the eight counterclaims exceed the $15,000 limit of the Court, they while standing alone, exceed the subject matter of this court. Just as a claim must stand on its own four corners, so too must the counterclaim where the claim has been dismissed. As concerns the last two counterclaims for goods sold and delivered, the Court finds that these ancillary causes of action are so interrelated to the main claims and counterclaims that they too must be dismissed in the interests of justice.
Thus, it is the Court's determination that it lacks the subject matter to consider this case under this index number. The complaint and counterclaims are dismissed without prejudice to recommencement in a proper court or for a proper amount, CPLR 205(a). See Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533 (1915).
This constitutes the decision and Order of the Court.