Blomdahl v. Blomdahl

9 Citing cases

  1. Orwig v. Orwig

    2022 N.D. 29 (N.D. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    This section "provides continuing jurisdiction for contempt proceedings to enforce divorce judgments." Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, 2011 ND 78, ¶ 6, 796 N.W.2d 649; see also Giese v. Giese, 2004 ND 58, ¶¶ 6-7, 676 N.W.2d 794. In Blomdahl, at ¶¶ 7-8, this Court explained that contempt proceedings constitute special statutory proceedings rather than actions:

  2. Nygaard v. Taylor

    2017 N.D. 206 (N.D. 2017)   Cited 6 times
    In Nygaard, the fathers of two minor children were granted primary residential responsibility, but the mother of the children fled with both children to the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation in South Dakota and outside the district court’s jurisdiction.

    Although this Court has recognized courts' inherent contempt powers, we have also recognized that those powers may be limited by the legislature. See, e.g. , Blomdahl v. Blomdahl , 2011 ND 78, ¶ 9, 796 N.W.2d 649 ; Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig , 2010 ND 138, ¶ 41, 785 N.W.2d 863 ; Millang v. Hahn , 1998 ND 152, ¶ 10, 582 N.W.2d 665. The contempt power is inherent in the judicial power vested by our constitution in the judicial branch.

  3. State v. Hirschkorn

    2016 N.D. 117 (N.D. 2016)   Cited 13 times

    [¶ 11] In addition to the foregoing, “[w]e construe statutes to avoid absurd or illogical results.” Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, 2011 ND 78, ¶ 10, 796 N.W.2d 649. Just as N.D.C.C. § 39–10–45 does not require drivers to signal while exiting alleys, N.D.C.C. § 39–10–45 does not require drivers to obey, for example, lawful orders or directions from police officers, as required by N.D.C.C. § 39–10–02, or traffic-control devices, as required by N.D.C.C. § 39–10–04. Under Hirschkorn's interpretation, drivers exiting alleys would not be required to abide by either because neither appears in N.D.C.C. § 39–10–45.

  4. N. Excavating Co. v. Sisters of Mary of the Presentation Long Term Care

    2012 N.D. 78 (N.D. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    However, if the construction lien was ten dollars over the reasonable value of time and materials, it would be absurd to hold the owner has successfully contested the accuracy of the lien and is entitled to attorney's fees and all costs. This Court construes statutes to avoid absurd results. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–38(3); Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, 2011 ND 78, ¶ 10, 796 N.W.2d 649. It would be absurd to award an owner costs and attorney's fees after challenging a lien suffering only from a de minimis mistake. It would also be contrary to the legislative history of the statute, which was to prevent the filing of inflated construction liens in order to coerce an owner into settlement. Hearing on S.B. 2250, supra; seeN.D.C.C. § 1–02–39(1) and (3).

  5. Mertz v. City of Elgin, Grant County

    2011 N.D. 148 (N.D. 2011)   Cited 6 times

    [¶ 7] Mertz argued that if a fence is a structure, the ordinances lead to an absurd result where a fence can only be built seven feet from the lot line. This Court "construe[s] statutes to avoid absurd or illogical results," Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, 2011 ND 78, ¶ 10, 796 N.W.2d 649, and a court may resort to extrinsic aids to interpret a statute and avoid an absurd result. Stutsman Cnty. v. State Historical Soc'y of North Dakota, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D. 1985). Elgin's interpretation of the ordinances does not lead to an absurd result.

  6. F/S Manufacturing v. Kensmoe

    798 N.W.2d 853 (N.D. 2011)   Cited 2 times

    See N.D.R.Civ.P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by the service of a summons."); N.D.C.C. § 28-01-38 (an action is commenced when the summons is served on the defendant); N.D.C.C. § 32-01-01 (remedies in the courts are divided into actions and special proceedings); N.D.C.C. § 32-01-02 ("An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense."); cf. Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, 2011 ND 78, ¶¶ 6-8, 796 N.W.2d 649 (contempt proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-25.1 held not an "action upon the judgment" under N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15(1)).

  7. Grantham v. Sims

    No. 2 CA-CV 2015-0107 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sep. 13, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    In Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, the wife filed a motion to find her former husband in contempt for failing to comply with their dissolution decree, entered sixteen years earlier, awarding her an interest in his retirement account. 796 N.W.2d 649, ¶¶ 2-3 (N.D. 2011). These cases are distinguishable for the same reason Johnson is distinguishable.

  8. Dakota, Minnesota & E. R.R. v. Iowa Dist. Court for Louisa Cnty.

    898 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017)   Cited 10 times

    Contempt proceedings in civil cases impose penalties; they do not involve adjudication of private rights or the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture. Thus, contempt proceedings remain of a special character and are classified as "special actions" under Iowa law.Cf.Blomdahl v.Blomdahl , 796 N.W.2d 649, 652 (N.D. 2011) (concluding that contempt actions are "special proceedings" but that by statute, special proceedings are expressly not "actions" under North Dakota statutory law). Because a contempt proceeding is a "special action" under Iowa law, it is not subject to the requirement in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.301 that "a civil action is commenced by filing a petition with the court."

  9. Sakar v. State

    Court of Appeals No. A-10404 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2011)

    Because of this, one might reasonably question whether the legislature intended the statute to operate in this fashion. See Blomdahl v. Blomdahl, 796 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 2011), where the North Dakota Supreme Court held that when a divorce decree provides for payments of child or spousal support in installments, "the right to enforcement accrues upon each installment as it matures, and the statute of limitations begins to run against each installment from the time fixed for its payment." Id. at 655.