Section 8 reflects fundamental and firmly established public policy against employment discrimination based on certain classifications including race and sex. See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88-91; Sistare-Meyer v. Young Men's Christian Assn. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 10, 14-15; Badih v. Myers (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1296; Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 387. See Rojo v. Kliger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at page 90 (sex) ; Sistare-Meyer v. Young Men's Christian Assn., supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pages 14-15 (race); Carmichael v. Alfano Temporary Personnel (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1126, 1132 (race and sex).
A number of other examples can be cited. In Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 382 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 139], the court found an action in tort would lie for wrongful termination in retaliation for the employee's refusal to obey the employer's order to "Americanize" its predominantly Japanese staff, in violation of the FEHA. (3 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) In Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522], the court held that an action for wrongful termination in retaliation for the employee's resistance to his supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate, in violation of the FEHA, was not preempted by workers' compensation.
" ( Id. at p. 657.) Walrath v. Sprinkel (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1237 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 806] ( Walrath) decided that a cause of action against a supervisory employee is not barred by Reno. Walrath stated: "[T]here is authority recognizing a common law cause of action for retaliatory wrongful discharge as well as a cause of action against an individual supervisor for retaliation in violation of FEHA. Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 382 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 139] and Carmichael v. Alfano Temporary Personnel (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1126 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 143] recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in retaliation for an employee's action seeking to correct employment discrimination. (See also Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157] [recognizing common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against age discrimination].)
(1 Cal.4th at p. 1091.) In Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 382 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 139] and Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 453] the courts upheld causes of action for tortious wrongful discharge where the plaintiffs alleged they were terminated for reporting violations of law to their employers. The court in Collier concluded reports of unlawful conduct to the employer are as much in the public interest as reports to a law enforcement agency.
In addition, Colton's terminating Parada for his attempts to correct certain Colton officials' noncompliance with the comprehensive laws regulating building and construction gives rise to Parada's wrongful retaliatory discharge cause of action based on breaches of the public policy underlying those laws. Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 389 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 139] held that: "In sum, Tameny [v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 ( 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R. 4th 314)] and its progeny confirm, implicitly and explicitly, that discharge of an employee in retaliation for resisting employer violations of laws that secure important public policies contravenes those policies, and gives rise to a common law action in tort. (Accord, Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1127 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 453]. . . .)"
(2) An action for wrongful discharge will lie when the basis of the discharge contravenes a fundamental public policy. ( Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 91 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373]; Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 388, 389 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 139] .) However, the public policy must be grounded in constitutional or statutory provisions.
See Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 19 Cal.4th 66, 75-80, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046, 1051-54 (1998) (summarizing doctrine); Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc., 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 139, 143, 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 389 (1992). Winarto's selection for termination rests on Taylor's low performance review, which the record supports as an act of retaliation for Winarto's complaints. Because the firing was premised on acts that (1) violated federal and state laws that (2) furthered some policy in the public interest that (3) were well established at the time of the discharge and (4) were substantial and fundamental, defendants are also liable for the California common law tort of wrongful discharge.
Asserting one's civil rights, as Brooks did by complaining of Selvaggio's conduct, is a protected activity under Title VII and FEHA. See EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 1983); Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (USA), Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 388, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 139 (Cal.Ct.App. 1992). Brooks's complaint about Selvaggio's harassment thus satisfies the first step of our inquiry.
Asserting one's civil rights, as Brooks did by complaining of Selvaggio's conduct, is a protected activity under Title VII and FEHA. See EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 1983); Blom v N.G.K. Spark Plugs (USA), Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 388 (Cal.Ct.App. 1992). Brooks's complaint about Selvaggio's harassment thus satisfies the first step of our inquiry.
While § 8 has been expanded to protect more classifications of people and to cover "employment," the word "disqualified" remains, indicating that § 8 governs actions which result in the complete exclusion of an individual from employment with a particular employer, and does not reach conduct affecting particular aspects of an individual's job. See, e.g., Rankins, 593 P.2d at 856-57 (finding that a teacher was wrongfully threatened with discharge for taking religious holidays and holding that "article I, § 8 forbids disqualification of employees for religious practices unless reasonable accommodation by the employer is impossible without undue hardship"); Badih v. Myers, 43 Cal.Rptr. 2d 229, 232-33 (Ct.App. 1995) (holding that a woman terminated because of pregnancy could maintain cause of action for wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy because § 8 prohibits pregnancy discrimination); Blom v. N.G.K. Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc., 3 Cal.App.4th 382, 387, 4 Cal.Rptr. 2d 139, 141-42 (Ct.App. 1992) (following Rojo in finding that plaintiff could bring wrongful discharge claim based on § 8 because of public policy against national origin discrimination); Carmichael v. Alfano Temporary Personnel, 233 Cal.App.3d 1126, 1131-1132, 285 Cal.Rptr. 143, 146-47 (Ct.App. 1991) (following Rojo in finding wrongful termination claim based on policy against racial discrimination in § 8); see also Merrell v. All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 815, 819 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (finding private cause of action under § 8 where pregnant woman with permanent position was offered temporary position with fewer fringe benefits and voluntarily resigned); Froyd v. Cook, 681 F. Supp. 669, 673 n. 11, 676 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (former police dispatcher alleging sexual harassment and retaliatory constructive discharge stated claim for discharge in violation of public policy articulated in § 8); Smithberg v. Merico, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 80, 83 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (finding that employee who was allegedly discharged for ob