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noting that while court had jurisdiction over habeas petition, committing court had concurrent jurisdiction and greater familiarity with the facts
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Civil No. 02-1114(DWF/JGL)
August 19, 2002
William Blohm, Rochester, MN., Petitioner pro se.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
This matter is before the Court upon Petitioner's objections to Chief Magistrate Jonathan G. Lebedoff's Report and Recommendation dated July 22, 2002, recommending that Petitioner's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus be summarily dismissed; Petitioner's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees be denied; Petitioner's motion for consolidation be denied; Petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction or restraining order be denied; Petitioner's motion for declaratory judgment be denied; Petitioner's "Motion to Compel Officer to Do her Duty" be denied; Petitioner's motion for summary judgment be denied; Petitioner's second "Motion to Compel Officer to Perform a Duty" be denied; and the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.1(c).
Based upon the Court's review of the record, the Court's review of the arguments and submissions of the parties, and the Court being otherwise duly advised in the premises, the Court hereby enters the following:
ORDER
1. Chief Magistrate Judge Jonathan G. Lebedoff's Report and Recommendation dated July 22, 2002 (Doc. No. 22), is ADOPTED AS MODIFIED.
2. Petitioner's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. No. 1), is DENIED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
3. Petitioner's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Doc. No. 2), Petitioner's motion for consolidation (Doc. No. 6), Petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction or restraining order (Doc. No. 7), Peititoner's motion for declaratory judgment (Doc. No. 11), Petitioner's "Motion to Compel Officer to Do Her Duty" (Doc. No. 12), Petitioner's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 16), and Petitioner's second "Motion to Compel Officer to Perform a Duty" (Doc. No. 21), are DENIED AS MOOT.
4. This ACTION is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
MEMORANDUM
In 1986, Petitioner William Blohm ("Blohm") was arrested for mailing threatening letters to a judge. On December 9, 1986, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (the "North Carolina court") determined that Blohm was incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). On September 23, 1988, the North Carolina court determined that Blohm was sufficiently recovered to be conditionally released. However, on July 31, 1989, the North Carolina court determined that Blohm had threatened two federal judges and the staff at FMC-Butner and that Blohm was unwilling to take his medication. Accordingly, the North Carolina court rescinded the release order.
On August 20, 1990, the North Carolina court again conditionally released Blohm. While on conditional release, however, Blohm wrote a letter threatening then-President Bill Clinton. On December 17, 1993, Blohm pled guilty to threatening the President, and he was sentenced to 16 months.
Shortly before Blohm completed the 16-month sentence on June 10, 1994, the United States filed a Section 4246 Petition with the North Carolina court. On August 31, 1994, the North Carolina determined, after an evidentiary hearing, that Blohm was suffering from a mental disease and defect and found that his release would pose a substantial risk to the general public. Accordingly, the North Carolina court ordered that Blohm be committed to the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
In March of 2001, Blohm, then confined to FMC-Rochester, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court (Civil File Number 01-533). Chief Magistrate Judge Jonathan Lebedoff entered a Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 15), recommending that Blohm's petition be dismissed because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and because, even if his failure to exhaust were not a bar to his claims, his claims lacked merit. Blohm did not object to the Report and Recommendation, and the case was dismissed on February 19, 2002.
Blohm now asserts that he was conditionally released from FMC-Rochester prior to the issuance of the Report and Recommendation and that he did not receive the Report and Recommendation until after the Court dismissed his action. The record seems to support his contention.
On March 26, 2002, however, Blohm's conditional release was revoked and he was remanded to FMC-Rochester. His revocation hearing was not conducted by the North Carolina court until July 2, 2002, but at that time his commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246 was reinstated.
On May 25, 2002, Blohm filed the instant Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Blohm asserts: (1) his initial commitment and his placement at FMC-Rochester are unconstitutional; (2) his detention on March 26, 2002, was unconstitutional; (3) the delay between his detention and the revocation hearing on July 2, 2002, was undue and contrary to law, and it violated his due process rights; and (4) that FMC-Rochester's decision to place Blohm on oxycodone rather than morphine sulphate for cancer-related pain is unconstitutional.
Chief Magistrate Judge Lebedoff issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Blohm's claims be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), because all of his claims either were raised in the habeas petition filed in 2001 or could have been raised in that petition.
The Court notes that Chief Magistrate Judge Lebedoff's conclusion is accurate as to Blohm's claim regarding the constitutionality of his initial commitment and his placement at FMC-Rochester. Those claims were raised and dismissed in Blohm's earlier habeas petition. Blohm's claim that the dismissal of his first petition should not count against him because he did not have an opportunity to respond to the Report and Recommendation is unavailing. To the extent that he suffered any prejudice, his recourse is to seek to have the earlier case reopened, not to bring a new habeas petition.
Moreover, the Court cannot fathom what argument Blohm would have made which would have changed the fact of the dismissal.
Regarding Blohm's claim about his medication, the date on which Blohm's medication was changed is unclear, so it is equally unclear whether that claim could have been raised in the earlier habeas petition. However, even if the claim arose after the earlier habeas petition was dismissed, dismissal of this claim would nevertheless be appropriate because Blohm has admittedly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Blohm's argument that, as a committee, he has no obligation to exhaust administrative remedies has been rejected by this Court before.
However, despite the Court's conclusion that most, if not all, of Chief Magistrate Judge Lebedoff's conclusions are legally correct, the Court declines to dismiss the instant habeas petition as a successive petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, or for lack of merit. Rather, the Court dismisses Blohm's habeas petition and this entire action because the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over this matter.
Section 4246 does not impair habeas corpus, and this Court has jurisdiction over Blohm's confinement by virtue of his presence in the District. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(g). However, the North Carolina court has continuing jurisdiction over the order committing Blohm to FMC-Rochester. See, generally, U.S. v. Copley, 150 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 1998). Given the North Carolina court's continuing concurrent jurisdiction, the North Carolina court's far greater familiarity with the factual underpinnings of this claim, and the lack of any evidence or assertion that the North Carolina court either cannot or will not provide a fair opportunity to be heard to Blohm, the Court will not, as a matter of discretion and comity, exercise habeas jurisdiction. See Seelig v. U.S. 310 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1962); Johnson v. Settle, 310 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1962); Birnbaum v. Harris, 222 F. Supp. 919 (W.D.Mo. 1963).
Accordingly, while the Court agrees, at least in part, with the rationale of Chief Magistrate Judge Lebedoff's Report and Recommendation, the Court dismisses the action for different reasons, specifically because the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a matter already soundly committed to the jurisdiction of another federal district court.