Opinion
Civil Action 24-10015 (MAS) (TJB)
11-15-2024
KAREEM ABDUL BLOCKER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. BLEE, et al., Defendants.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OPINION
Michael A. Shipp, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Kareem Abdul Blocker's civil complaint (ECF No. 1) and application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1-1.) Having reviewed the application, this Court finds that in forma pauperis status is warranted in this matter, and Plaintiffs application is therefore granted. Because the application shall be granted, this Court is required to screen Plaintiffs complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs complaint shall be dismissed without prejudice in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a state pre-trial detainee currently detained in the Atlantic County Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 1-3.) According to Plaintiff, he was previously released from jail into a “recovery court” program. (Id. at 5-6.) Although it is difficult to decipher because of Plaintiffs handwriting, it appears that this release was thereafter revoked and he was placed back into jail by Defendants Blee, Taylor, and Wilson, all of whom are state court judges who are related to Plaintiffs criminal case. (Id. at 4-6.)
IL LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court must screen Plaintiffs Complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 Fed.Appx. 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers Tabeis and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,”' and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant's liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise federal civil rights claims against three state court judges based on the revocation of his release into a drug court or probationaiy program. State court judges, however, are absolutely immune from suit in a federal civil rights matter unless they acted “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Little v. Hammond, 744 Fed.Appx. 748, 750 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991)). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the three state defendants, all of whom are Superior Court judges in Atlantic County, were involved in the revocation of his release from jail into a recovery court program. As Plaintiff admits that he was involved in criminal proceedings which were deferred into a recovery court program and that program was revoked, he is challenging the actions of state court judges related to criminal proceedings over which they at least appear to have jurisdiction. Because Defendants were not clearly acting in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity and Plaintiff s claims against them must be dismissed as such.
Plaintiff briefly questions why Judge Blee, who he alleges is a “Cape May” judge, was involved in his recovery court proceedings. Judge Blee, however, is not just a judge for Cape May County, but is the assignment judge for the Superior Court of New Jersey's Atlantic and Cape May County vicinages. See Atl./Cape May, https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/vicinages/atlantic-cape-may (last visited October 25, 2024). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff questions Judge Blee's authority in Atlantic County, that challenge appears to be based on a false assumption as to Judge Blee's position.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1-1) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety because all named Defendants are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.