Opinion
A-1-CA-39782
06-28-2023
BLOCHHOUSE, LLC, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. FRANCINE M. TRUJILLO and ALL OTHER UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS, Defendants/Counterclaimants-Appellants, and FRANCINE M. TRUJILLO, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. ESTANCIA BLUEWATER, LLC; DEVELOPING OPPORTUNITIES, LLC; and STEPHEN PALEVICH, Third-Party Defendants.
Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC James A. Chavez Albuquerque, NM for Appellee New Mexico Legal Aid Corinna Laszlo-Henry Las Vegas, NM for Appellant
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY Benjamin Chavez, District Court Judge
Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC James A. Chavez Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
New Mexico Legal Aid Corinna Laszlo-Henry Las Vegas, NM for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
KATHERINE A. WRAY, JUDGE
{¶1} Defendant Francine Trujillo (Tenant) appeals the district court's grant of a writ of restitution in favor of Plaintiff Blochhouse LLC (Landlord). Tenant argues that the district court erroneously granted Landlord possession of the property under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 47-8-1 to -52 (1975, as amended through 2007). We affirm.
{¶2} Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the background of this case, we discuss pertinent facts and procedural history as needed within our analysis.
DISCUSSION
{¶3} Tenant challenges the district court's (1) construction of the lease; (2) procedural handling of the case, including the bifurcation of the UORRA claims from Tenant's counterclaims; and (3) failure to apply equitable estoppel. Tenant, as the appellant, bears the burden to demonstrate error by the district court. See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063. We review contracts and statutory language de novo and the findings of the district court for substantial evidence. Cheng v. Rabey, 2023-NMCA-013, ¶¶ 19, 22-23, 525 P.3d 405. We review the district court's decision to bifurcate for an abuse of discretion. Sandoval v. Gurley Properties Ltd., 2022-NMCA-004, ¶ 5, 503 P.3d 410. We begin with the district court's construction of the lease agreement.
I. The District Court Properly Construed the Lease Agreement
{¶4} Tenant argues that Landlord sought eviction for "no cause" but that the lease agreement and the related option agreements did not permit termination of the tenancy without cause. At the hearing, however, the district court clearly articulated that the basis for the writ was Tenant's nonpayment of rent. Tenant acknowledges that both the lease and the option agreements permit termination for nonpayment and does not dispute that the evidence supported a finding that she did not pay (although Tenant did dispute the amount owed). See Cheng, 2023-NMCA-013, ¶ 22 (reviewing the district court's findings of fact for substantial evidence). Nor does she specifically challenge on appeal the district court's finding of nonpayment. See Seipert v. Johnson, 2003-NMCA-119, ¶ 26, 134 N.M. 394, 77 P.3d 298 ("An unchallenged finding of the trial court is binding on appeal."). Although Tenant claims that the district court should have considered extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities in the agreements, Tenant points to no ambiguity in the portions of the agreements that permit termination for nonpayment or explain what extrinsic evidence would refute a finding of nonpayment. We therefore are not persuaded that the district court erred in granting the writ of restitution based on nonpayment of rent. As a result, we decline to consider whether the lease or option agreements prohibited termination without cause.
Tenant argued in the district court that if the eviction was for nonpayment, our Supreme Court's COVID moratorium on evictions would stay any writ of possession. The district court rejected this argument based on its construction of the moratorium. Because the moratorium has since been lifted, see Order, In the Matter of Lifting the Stay of Writs of Restitution Issued Under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act and the Mobile Home Park Act During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, No. 22-8500-012, at 3-4 (N.M. March 16, 2022), https://supremecourt.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/04/Order-No. 22-8500-012.pdf, we do not address the district court's interpretation of the moratorium's application in this case.
II. Tenant Did Not Demonstrate That the Procedures Employed Were an Abuse of Discretion
{¶5} Tenant maintains that the district court improperly used a bifurcated summary proceeding to separate the UORRA claims from the counterclaims and should have permitted Tenant to offer evidence to support contract ambiguity asserted in a motion to dismiss. According to Tenant, "[t]he district court erred by determining that the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts were required to yield to the expedited trial provisions" of UORRA because the present case involved "the existence of an option agreement, other complex contractual issues, and a 15-year history of instruments and orally-modified agreements." We discern no abuse of discretion. The bifurcated and expedited procedure is permitted by both UORRA and the rules. See § 47-8-42 (requiring bifurcated proceedings); § 47-8-43 (requiring expedited proceedings); Rule 1-001(A) NMRA (permitting application of statutory provisions that are contrary to rule provisions); Rule 1-042 NMRA (permitting bifurcation). This Court has further acknowledged the need to quickly evaluate possessory proceedings in part for the benefit of dispossessed tenants. Cf. White v. Farris, 2021-NMCA-014, ¶ 24, 485 P.3d 791 ("recognizing an immediate right to appeal enables residents to avoid the drastic consequences of eviction until their appeal is heard"). The district court granted Tenant's initial request for more time and five months after the petition was filed, heard Tenant's motion to dismiss and the writ of restitution back-to-back. Tenant remained in the home during this extended period. Despite the argument that this procedure disregarded normal procedures, Tenant identifies no particular procedural rule that the district court sacrificed for the purposes of expediency.
{¶6}Tenant next contends that to establish contractual ambiguity and the parties' intent, the district court should have allowed the introduction of evidence and testimony on the motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss, however, like the motion brought by Tenant under Rule 1-012(B) NMRA, does not allow the district court to consider "matters outside the pleadings." See Rule 1-012(C). And although the district court did not take evidence at the motion to dismiss hearing, Tenant points to no witness who was prevented from testifying at the trial on Landlord's writ of possession, which was held later that same day. Further, although Tenant suggests that discovery might have been helpful, she has identified no discovery sought during the five-month proceeding. Tenant has not met the "burden on appeal to demonstrate through discussion of facts, arguments, and rulings appearing in the record how the district court abused its discretion." Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104.
III. Tenant Did Not Preserve the Estoppel Argument
{¶7} Tenant argues on appeal that Landlord should have been estopped from pursuing the writ of possession because of Landlord's past acceptance of late payments and prior willingness to create a payment plan for Tenant. In the answer to the complaint, Tenant raised a similar affirmative defense but has not identified for this Court where in the record the argument made on appeal was offered at trial or when a ruling was invoked from the district court. We therefore conclude that this argument was unpreserved and decline to consider it further. See McDonald v. Zimmer Inc., 2020-NMCA-020, ¶ 39, 461 P.3d 930 ("[A]n affirmative defense is not preserved for our review unless it is litigated before the district court and a ruling is invoked on the issue.").
CONCLUSION
{¶8} For these reasons, we affirm the district court.
{¶9} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge, JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge