Opinion
Civil Action 3:23-cv-01259
08-01-2023
JACOB ALEXANDER BLINKE, Plaintiff, v. LINDY LANE SWEENEY, et al. Defendants.
KANE, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, Jacob Alexander Blinke, has filed a pro se complaint, handwritten on a pre-printed form. (Doc. 1.) By a contemporaneously filed order, we have granted the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action.
In his complaint, Blinke asserts federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state magisterial district judge and a Pennsylvania state trooper arising out of an unspecified incident that occurred on May 27, 2023, in Loganville, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff claims that the defendants, Hon. Lindy Lane Sweeney, a state magisterial district judge, and Jacob Goranson, a state trooper, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and various federal criminal statutes.In support, the complaint only alleges in confusing and conclusory fashion that he suffered the following:
These include, in the order listed by the plaintiff: 18 U.S.C. § 241, § 242, § 245, § 1001, § 876, § 872, and § 3571.
[V]iolation of oath of office, denied proper warrants, denied right to truth in evidence, forced compliance to contracts not held, denied provisions in the constitution, treason, mail threats, fraud[,] . . . unlawfully detained, threatened, forced into contract for non-exsisting (sic) crimes, video evidence attached ....(Doc. 1, at 4.) As a consequence, Blinke alleges that he suffered the following injuries:
Violation of oath of office
Denied proper warrants
Denied right of reasonable defense arguments
Defense evidence
Slavery-Peonage
Denied provisions in the constitution
Treason
Mail threats
Fraud
Conspiracy
Extortion
Falsification of document(Id. at 5.) For relief, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $2,040,000. (Id.) As an exhibit to his pro se complaint, he has attached an ostensible schedule of fines or penalties applicable to crimes committed by governmental officials, the provenance of which is unclear. (Id. at 7-8.)
Standing alone, the pro se complaint is “so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” See Ruther v. State Ky. Officers, 556 Fed. App'x 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Simmons v. Abuzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). Ordinarily, we would be prompted to order the plaintiff to file an amended complaint that complies with the minimal requirements imposed by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. But in this case, considering publicly available state court records clarifies that any amendment would be futile.
A district court, of course, may properly take judicial notice of such state court records, as well as its own. See Fed.R.Evid. 201; Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007); Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty., 108 F.3d 486, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1997); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 373 F.2d 771, 778 (3d Cir. 1967).
On May 28, 2023, three traffic citations against Blinke were filed in state magisterial district court. The charging officer for all three was Trooper Jacob T. Goranson. The presiding judicial officer for all three was Hon. Lindy Lane Sweeney. In Commonwealth v. Blinke, Docket No. MJ-19304-TR-0000605-2023 (York Cnty. (Pa.) Magis. Dist. Ct.), Blinke was charged with the summary offense of driving an unregistered vehicle, in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1301(a). In Commonwealth v. Blinke, Docket No. MJ-19304-TR-0000606-2023 (York Cnty. (Pa.) Magis. Dist. Ct.), Blinke was charged with the summary offense of failing to drive within a single traffic lane, in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3309(1). In Commonwealth v. Blinke, Docket No. MJ-19304-TR-0000607-2023 (York Cnty. (Pa.) Magis. Dist. Ct.), Blinke was charged with driving a vehicle with improper sun screening on its windshield, side wing, or side windows, in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4524(e)(1). Following a summary trial on July 11, 2023, Blinke was found guilty on each of the three charges and sentenced to pay a fine.
Liberally construed, the pro se complaint appears to assert a § 1983 false arrest claim based on the traffic stop at which the traffic citations were issued, and a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on the subsequent summary offense proceedings. See generally Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a court's obligation to liberally construe pro se pleadings and other submissions).
With respect to a § 1983 false arrest claim, a plaintiff “must show that the arrest was made without probable cause. But the presumption of probable cause arising from a conviction can be rebutted only by showing that the conviction had been obtained by some type of fraud.” Massey v. Pfeifer, 804 Fed. App'x 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint alleges no facts to suggest that Blinke's arrest (the traffic stop) was fraudulent. Thus, his subsequent convictions for driving an unregistered vehicle, improper sun screening, and disregarding a traffic lane foreclose any plausible § 1983 false arrest claim under the circumstances alleged.
With respect to a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must allege that the underlying criminal proceeding ended in his favor. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994); Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007). Blinke has not so alleged, and publicly available court records confirm that he was indeed convicted on each of the three charges and sentenced to pay a fine. Moreover, a plaintiff must allege a “deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” See Johnson, 477 F.3d at 82. But the mere “issuance of traffic citations and the burden of fighting the violations in court-even fraudulent ones-do not give rise to a constitutional deprivation contemplated for a valid § 1983 claim.” Simpson v. Thompson, Civil Action No. 1:19-CV-971, 2020 WL 954016, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2020); see also Malcomb v. Dietz, 487 Fed. App'x 683, 685-86 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Holmes v McGuigan, 184 Fed. App'x 149, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2006); DiBella v Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, we recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Moreover, we recommend that it be dismissed without leave to file an amended complaint, as it is clear from the facts alleged and judicially noticed that any amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 1, 2023. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.