Neither this court nor the superior court is authorized to rectify this failure by uninformed speculation or conjecture as to petitioner's future conduct. (See H.D.Wallace Associates v. Department of Alcoholic etc. Control (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 589, 593 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 749]; Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners (1927) 87 Cal.App. 193, 196 [ 261 P. 1036].) For detailed bibliographies, see I. Bieber, Homosexuality, A Psychoanalytic Study (1962) pp. 351-353; M. Hoffman, The Gay World, supra, pp. 203-205; A. Cory, The Homosexual in America, supra, pp. 293-295.

(5) Both the purpose and the standards for determining guilt in disciplinary proceedings against real estate brokers and attorneys are essentially the same. ( Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 790 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521]; Black v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 219, 222 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 518, 368 P.2d 118]; Furman v. State Bar (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212, 229 [ 83 P.2d 12]; Cornell v. Reilly (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 178 [ 273 P.2d 572]; Marks v. Watson (1952) supra, 112 Cal.App.2d 196. ) "It may be conceded that in disciplinary administrative proceedings the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative ( Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 193 [ 261 P. 1036]), and that guilt must be established to a reasonable certainty ( Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal.2d 212 [ 83 P.2d 12]; Coffman v. Board of Architectural Examiners, 130 Cal.App. 343 [ 19 P.2d 1002]) and cannot be based on surmise or conjecture, suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or uncorroborated hearsay. (See cases collected 2 Cal.Jur.2d 248, § 145.)

This is a statutory exception to the usual rule. ( Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 193, 195 [ 261 P. 1036].) [4] The section does not expressly nor by implication prohibit the department from exercising its discretion in determining a licensee to be a negligent operator.

We do not think that the above is substantial evidence to support the order of the city council. [3] As said in Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal.App.2d 178 at 183 [ 273 P.2d 572]: "It may be conceded that in disciplinary administrative proceedings the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative ( Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 193 [ 261 P. 1036]), and that guilt must be established to a reasonable certainty ( Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal.2d 212 [ 83 P.2d 12]; Coffman v. Board of Architectural Examiners, 130 Cal.App. 343 [ 19 P.2d 1002]) and cannot be based on surmise or conjecture, suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or uncorroborated hearsay." [2b] It is our view that the record shows that appellant was discharged from his position on charges that were based on suspicion, conjecture and hearsay, and not on substantial evidence necessary to warrant his discharge.

The validity of the revocation, therefore, must be upheld, if at all, upon the charge of hiring employees for the purpose of soliciting drinks. [2] It may be conceded that in disciplinary administrative proceedings the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative ( Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 193 [ 261 P. 1036]), and that guilt must be established to a reasonable certainty ( Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal.2d 212 [ 83 P.2d 12]; Coffman v. Board of Architectural Examiners, 130 Cal.App. 343 [ 19 P.2d 1002]) and cannot be based on surmise or conjecture, suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or uncorroborated hearsay. (See cases collected 2 Cal.Jur.2d 248, § 145.)

This, of course, does not mean that a licensee is without remedy where the facts do not support the action of the board. ( Great Western Power Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 180 [ 149 P. 35]; Brecheen v. Riley, 187 Cal. 121 [ 200 P. 1042]; Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 193 [ 261 P. 1036]; Bold v. Board of Medical Examiners, 133 Cal.App. 23 [ 23 P.2d 826].) It has been held that an injunction may issue restraining a public officer, acting under the special authority of a statute which prescribes a particular method in which he shall perform his duties, from exceeding his powers ( Cowell v. Martin, 43 Cal. 605), or where the invalidity of the statute under which he is acting is shown.

( Gordon v. Industrial Acc. Com., 199 Cal. 420, 427 [ 249 P. 849, 58 A.L.R. 1374]. See, also, Messner v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 199, 204 [ 262 P. 58], and Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 193, 196 [ 261 P. 1036], where a similar meaning is ascribed to the word "manager".)

The right to practice such a profession has been recognized as a "valuable right" or a "property right" in other jurisdictions. State v. Schultz, 11 Mont. 429, 28 Pac. 643: Baker v. Department of Registration, 78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082; Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal. App. 193, 261 Pac. 1036. From the case of Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 Pac. 724, we quote the following: "Where the state confers a license upon an individual to practice a profession, trade or occupation, such license becomes a valuable personal right which cannot be denied or abridged in any manner except after due notice and a fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal." (Emphasis supplied.)

12 P.2d 401; Ex parte Robinson, 19 U.S. 505. "The right to practice dentistry, acquired by several years of study and training, is a property right which is not to be taken away on mere suspicion or conjecture." Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, (Cal.) 261 P. 1036. "The right to practice dentistry, like the right to practice any other profession, is a valuable personal right, in which, under the constitution and laws of the state, one is entitled to be protected and secured.

The right to engage in a lawful business is a valuable property right which is protected by the constitution and laws of the state and in the enjoyment of which one is entitled to be secured. Brecheen v. Riley, 187 Cal. 121, 125, 200 P. 1042; Hewitt v. Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 592, 84 P. 39, 3 L.R.A.,N.S., 896; Bley v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 193, 196, 261 P. 1036; Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 831, 835, 123 P.2d 457; Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247, 249, 187 P. 965. The right of every person, and this includes corporations, American De Forest Wireless Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. 533, 535, 96 P. 15, 17 L.R.A.,N.S., 1117; Riley v. Stack, 128 Cal.App. 480, 483, 18 P.2d 110, to the protection of his property is as securely safeguarded by both federal and state constitutions as is any other right.