Opinion
CASE NO.: 19-24854-CIV-SINGHAL
2021-03-04
Marianne BLESSINGER, Lawrence Blessinger, Jr., and Odds & Ends, Ltd., Plaintiffs, v. AECOM and Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc., Defendants.
Tara A. Campion, Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, Bruce S. Rogow, Bruce S. Rogow, PA, Cedar Mountain, NC, for Plaintiffs. Andrew Douglas Craven, The Chartwell Law Offices, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant Aecom. James Norford Hurley, Christine Margaret Walker, Fowler White Burnett, Miami, FL, for Defendant Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc.
Tara A. Campion, Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, Bruce S. Rogow, Bruce S. Rogow, PA, Cedar Mountain, NC, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew Douglas Craven, The Chartwell Law Offices, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant Aecom.
James Norford Hurley, Christine Margaret Walker, Fowler White Burnett, Miami, FL, for Defendant Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc.
ORDER
RAAG SINGHAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Defendant's (Aecom) Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (DE [58]). Plaintiff filed a response (DE [61]) and Defendant filed a reply (DE [62]). Accordingly, the matter is ripe for review.
I. BACKGROUND
This is an action for damages to a 64’ Hatteras yacht, Odds & Ends (the "Vessel"). The Vessel was seized by the United States in connection with a criminal matter. At the time of the seizure, the Vessel was owned by Odds & Ends, Ltd., a Cayman Island corporation. The corporation had three equal-part shareholders: a criminal defendant, Lawrence W. Blessinger, who is not a party to this case, and his two adult children, Plaintiffs Marianne Blessinger ("Ms. Blessinger") and Lawrence Blessinger, Jr. ("Mr. Blessinger") (collectively "Plaintiffs"). As part of a negotiated plea arrangement, Lawrence W. Blessinger agreed to forfeit his one-third interest in the Vessel and the Government agreed that upon selling the vessel, it would return to Plaintiffs two-thirds of the net proceeds from the sale.
Defendants Aecom and Nielsen Beaumont Marine, Inc. ("Nielsen") (collectively "Defendants") were contracted by the United States Government to take care, custody, control and to maintain and safe keep the Vessel until the criminal matter was resolved. Plaintiff alleges the Vessel was severely damaged through a series of negligent acts and omissions on the part of the Defendants. Plaintiffs assert the Vessel was in pristine condition, left its dock in Key West under the care, custody, and control of Defendant Aecom, and arrived via tow two days later into a marina in Miami. The Vessel sustained such damage in that forty-eight-hour period that it sank five days later.
Plaintiffs allege Defendants then failed to perform necessary repairs to the Vessel. As a direct result of those damages and subpar repairs, on March 28, 2018, the Vessel was sold for an amount considerably less than its value on the day it was entrusted to the Defendants. On November 22, 2019, Plaintiffs sued Aecom based on Negligence (Count I) and Breach of Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Performance (Count II) and sought monetary damages. Plaintiffs sued Nielsen based on Negligence (Count III) and Breach of Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Performance (Count IV) and sought monetary damages.
On August 28, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint (DE [56]) for the sole purpose of adding the corporation Odds & Ends, Ltd. as a Plaintiff. While not disputing the applicability of admiralty jurisdiction, Plaintiffs brought this case based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and amended the original complaint to acknowledge 28 U.S.C. § 1333 jurisdiction. Nielsen filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Second Amended Complaint (DE [57]). In its Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (DE [58]), Aecom argues the statute of limitations bars the action and the complaint fails to state a claim.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
At the pleading stage, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Rule 8(a) does not require "detailed factual allegations," it does require "more than labels and conclusions ... a formulaic recitation of the cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and must be sufficient "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court's review is generally "limited to the four corners of the complaint." Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc. , 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty. , 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) ). Courts must review the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and it must generally accept the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) ; Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez , 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). However, pleadings that "are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant Aecom seeks dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint (DE [22]) based on the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30106 which provides: "a civil action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of a maritime tort must be brought within 3 years after the cause of action arose." 46 U.S.C. § 30106. In the alternative, Aecom moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiffs’ Response (DE [61]) challenges application of the statute of limitations in three respects. First, Plaintiffs argue that the three-year General Maritime Law statute of limitations only applies to personal injury matters, not a claim for property damage which exists here. Next, Plaintiffs argue their cause of action accrued within the three-year period based on the date when the Vessel was sold and their damages realized. Finally, Plaintiff argues it is entitled to amend should this Court dismiss its claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2).
A. Failure to State a Claim
This Court is not persuaded by Aecom's argument that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (DE [22]) fails to state a claim. Plaintiffs have brought two claims against Defendants: negligence and breach of implied workmanlike performance. "In analyzing a maritime tort case, we rely on general principles of negligence law." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp. , 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc. , 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980) ). "To plead a viable claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant owed a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm." Moseley v. Carnival Corp. , 593 Fed. Appx. 890, 893–94 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). The warranty of workmanlike performance is an implied warranty imposed on a maritime service contractor which requires services to be performed with reasonable care, skill, and safety. See Vierling v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , 339 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs alleged the Vessel was in pristine condition with an appraisal value of $1,750,000 on November 24, 2015, when it was seized by the Government. Then Aecom accepted the Vessel for safekeeping, yet, it breached is duties as a professional custodian by allowing the Vessel to take on water. Whether or not Plaintiffs ultimately prevail is not determinative, however, a plausible claim for relief has been properly stated.
B. Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of ... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333. The parties agree, this claim is governed by general maritime law. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen , 244 U.S. 205, 215, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917) ("In the absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."). Under the uniform statute of limitations for maritime torts, "a civil action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of a maritime tort must be brought within 3 years after the cause of action arose." 46 U.S.C. § 30106. The parties spar over the meaning of the word "accrue" as used in 46 U.S.C. § 763(a) versus the meaning of the word "arose" as used in 46 U.S.C. § 30106. "[T]he Supreme Court practically invited Congress to set things right if the Court had misjudged the legislative intent on the matter; it did so by noting that Congress had the ultimate power to change the meaning of ‘accrue.’ " White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc. , 129 F.3d 1428, 1434 (11th Cir. 1997). Congress exercised that power in 2006 by enacting 46 U.S.C. § 30106, which is the current and applicable statute. Nonetheless, such distinction is unnecessary. "[W]ithin 3 years after the cause of action arose" occurs when a plaintiff knows or should know of his injury and its cause. 46 U.S.C. § 30106 ; see also White , 129 F.3d at 1435. Plaintiffs assert they satisfied this requirement because the complaint was filed within three years from when their cause of action arose. The linchpin of this argument is Plaintiffs’ contention that their claim arose on March 28, 2018, when the Vessel was sold at a United States Treasury auction for $756,500. However, the Vessel sank on November 30, 2015, four days after it arrived at the marina in Miami. Thus, Plaintiffs first knew of their injury, the Vessel taking on water, and the cause, Aecom's transportation, 3 years, 11 months, 23 days before this cause of action was filed.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30106 is not applicable in this case because it does not involve personal injury or death. As such, Plaintiff insists a four-year statute of limitation applies pursuant to section 95.11(3), Florida Statutes. Aecom disagrees and insists this Court cannot supplement general maritime law with Florida law when applying the statute of limitation to the facts of this case. The general maritime statute of limitations, however, offers little specific guidance for the recovery of property damages. It states:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of a maritime tort must be brought within 3 years after the cause of action arose .
46 U.S.C. § 30106 (emphasis added). "Maritime law governs actions arising from alleged torts committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters." Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. , 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019). Again, there is no disputing the applicability of admiralty jurisdiction in this case. "Drawn from state and federal sources, the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules." Misener Marine Constr., Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co. , 594 F.3d 832, 838 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. , 476 U.S. 858, 864–65, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986) ). "[I]n the absence of an established federal maritime rule, [the courts] ‘may borrow from a variety of sources in establishing common law admiralty rules to govern maritime liability where deemed appropriate.’ " Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp. , 965 F.3d 1170, 1178 (11th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). For maritime tort cases in particular, "we rely on general principles of negligence law." Chaparro v. Carnival Corp. , 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
"The elements of a maritime negligence claim, in turn, are well-established, and stem from general principles of tort law." Tesoriero , 965 F.3d at 1178. "The last element constituting a cause of action for negligence ... is the occurrence of damages." Kelly v. Lodwick , 82 So. 3d 855, 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson , 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003) ). "Moreover, Florida courts have found that the limitations period does not begin to run until a plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury ." F.D.I.C. v. Stahl , 89 F.3d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Lund v. Cook , 354 So. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) ); see also Jones v. Childers , 18 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Generally under Florida law, a party is held to have been put on notice when he discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, facts alerting him of the existence of his cause of action.").
Again, this Court finds Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the existence of a cause of action when the Vessel sank on November 30, 2015. While Plaintiffs’ damages may have been amplified by the sale of the Vessel at a substantially lower price because of its condition, Plaintiffs’ had knowledge of its condition three years before the sale and almost four years before the filing of this action. Nonetheless, the general maritime law statute of limitation provides a three-year period for "a civil action for damages for personal injury or death arising out of a maritime tort ...." 46 U.S.C. § 30106 (emphasis added). This Court agrees with Plaintiffs that this is not such an action. It is a negligence claim for property damages to the Vessel, which does not involve personal injury or death. And, just as Congress exercised its power to more well define "accrue" as discussed earlier, so too could Congress add property damage here to "personal injury or death" for statute of limitations purposes. It is not, however, for this Court to do.
Federal maritime law applies to actions arising from alleged torts committed aboard a ship sailing in navigable waters. Smith v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. , 620 Fed. Appx. 727, 729 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc. , 867 F.2d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1989) ). "When neither statutory nor judicially created maritime principles provide an answer to a specific legal question, federal courts may apply state law provided that the application of state law does not frustrate national interests in having uniformity in admiralty law." Id. (citing Misener Marine Constr., Inc. , 594 F.3d at 839 ). As such, the four-year statute of limitations applies. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat.; but see Beckman v. Rick's Watercraft Rentals , 719 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1998) (applying the maritime statute of limitations instead of the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes, where the negligence caused serious personal injury).
"Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ‘on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent from the face of the complaint’ that the claim is time-barred.’ " Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. , 410 F.3d 1275, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). "At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a complaint may be dismissed on the basis of a statute-of-limitations defense ‘only if it appears beyond a doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that toll the statute.’ " Id. at 1288 n.13 (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs filed this action before the four-year window closed. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's Aecom Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (DE [58]) is DENIED . Defendant Aecom's Answer to the Second Amended Complaint (DE [56]) is due by March 26, 2021 . Furthermore, the parties are directed to file an amended Joint Scheduling Report by March 15, 2021 . DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 4th day of March 2021.