Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-1274
September 9, 2002
LEONARD G. BROWN, III, CLYMER MUSSER, P.C., LANCASTER, PA, for Plaintiffs.
CHRISTOPHER S. UNDERHILL, HARTMAN, UNDERHILL BRUBAKER, LANCASTER, PA, DAVID P. KARAMESSINIS, DEVLIN, DEVINE AND CASEY CONSHOHOCKEN, PA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Douglas Bleecher, Lisa Bleecher, Galen Keck, Ruth Keck, Henry Clodi, Jackie Abreu, Jose Abreu, Jason Carr, David Skidmore, Diana Skidmore, and Andrea Folgelberg commenced this action against Defendants Manheim Township ("the Township"), and Chief Paul Rager and Sergeant Dale McCurdy of the Manheim Township Police Department ("the Department") in both their official and individual capacities, alleging that Defendants violated their constitutional rights and conspired to do so. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety.
In considering Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), I must accept as true all of the factual allegations pleaded in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the non-movants. See Fuentes v. S. Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1991). In addition, I must "refrain from granting a dismissal unless it is certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved." Id.
Plaintiffs allege that since March 1995 Sergeant McCurdy and his wife "have engaged in a systematic campaign of harassment" against them. (Compl. ¶ 15.) Moreover, the Department has been "on notice that one of its Sergeants and his wife were engaging in systematic harassment . . . within the Department's jurisdiction." (Id.) Plaintiffs further allege that Chief Rager "approved the official policy and custom of allowing Sergeant McCurdy and his wife to harass plaintiffs . . . while refusing to do anything to stop the harassment over a period of time greater than five years." (Compl. ¶ 16.) Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated their right to equal protection of the laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also plead that the Defendants have conspired to deprive of them of their constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
I agree with Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a cause of action under § 1985(3). "In general, the conspiracy provision of § 1985(3) provides a cause of action under rather limited circumstances against both private and state actors." Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001). Specifically, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997).
Because § 1985(1) governs interference with the duties of federal officials only and § 1985(2) targets the obstruction of justice in federal and state courts, the only basis for Plaintiffs' claim is under § 1985(3).
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the second element, the importance of which has been emphasized by the Supreme Court: "The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose — by requiring . . . that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); see also Brown, 250 F.3d at 805 (discussing requirement that "a racial or other class-based invidious discriminatory animus lay behind the coconspirators' actions"); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 722 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring in judgment) ("[section] 1985(3) protects only those groups that have been previously determined by Congress or the courts to need special Federal assistance in protecting their civil rights."). According to the allegations set forth in their complaint, Plaintiffs have little in common, except that they are not members of the Department (Compl. ¶ 24) and their rights have been violated by Defendants. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they belong to a "class" recognized for purposes of a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. Consequently, Plaintiffs will not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved, and the § 1985 claim must be dismissed.
Regarding their § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs have not clearly articulated the theory upon which they are proceeding. Nonetheless, I cannot conclude that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which would entitle them to relief. The focus of § 1983 is on the "[m]isuse of state power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). As such, Plaintiffs may be able to succeed on this claim.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of September, 2002, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs' response, and Defendants' reply thereto, and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 7) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED PART. Defendants' motion is GRANTED to the extent Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count II) are dismissed, and DENIED in all other respects.