It appears to be settled under the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions the homestead right upon the death of the deceased inured to the benefit of the plaintiff herein, and according to the allegation of the bill was not subject to administration.         See Pioneer Mortgage Co. v. Carter, 84 Okl. 85, 202 P. 513; Bledsoe v. Green, 138 Okl. 15, 18, 280 P. 301, 303; Miller v. Farmers' State Bank of Temple, 137 Okl. 183, 279 P. 351, 353. Such property is not an asset of the estate.

Since the case was tried on the theory of partnership liability the judgment should have been against the firm. However, Dolly Young did not complain of the judgment rendered against her personally, took no appeal therefrom, and the judgment has become final as to her. Bledsoe v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301. Plaintiff contends that Bond v. Cornell, 204 Okla. 377, 230 P.2d 476, 477, is authority for the proposition that he may have judgment against Dolly Young, individually, in his action against the partnership.

In Tresse v. Spurrier Lumber Co., 115 Okla. 188, 242 P. 235, Bailey v. Wood, 183 Okla. 450, 83 P.2d 180, and Jameson v. Goodwin, 43 Okla. 154, 141 P. 767, we held that the administrator or executor was the proper party defendant and that the heirs were not necessary parties defendant. In Bledso v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301, we reiterated such rule but made exception thereto in the case of an action involving the homestead on the grounds that the homestead is not an asset of the estate and that the administrator was not entitled to possession thereof and was therefore not the proper party against whom revival should be made. We have found no case holding that revivor must be had in the names of the heirs of the deceased defendant where the action involved property which was properly classified as an asset of the estate of the deceased defendant.

The contention that the sale, had within six months following the time of the judgment, is void because the mortgages waived appraisement, is without merit. As hereinbefore stated, the junior mortgage contained a waiver of appraisement but the senior mortgage contained no such waiver unless the waiver therein of homestead and stay laws (quoted, supra) is an equivalent thereof as is contended. That such is not the case we specifically held in Bledsoe, Adm'r, v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301, as follows: "The express waiving `of all benefits of the homestead exemption and stay laws of the State of Oklahoma' is not equivalent to waiving appraisement, and that language in a mortgage does not constitute a waiver of appraisement."

Two of them were minors. Assuming the land to be homestead, the minors then became necessary parties as a condition precedent to the effective foreclosure of their interests, and the failure to join them resulted in their interests not being foreclosed. Bledsoe v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301. So discovering, the plaintiff then filed the present action, against the adult child and the two minor children by their guardian ad litem.

We consider it well settled that the administrator, under the facts here shown, represented the interest of the heirs of W.J. Wood, Sr., in the former suit, and represented the title which the deceased had at the time of his death, and that such heirs were concluded by the judgment rendered in such former suit. Jameson v. Goodwin et al., 43 Okla. 154, 141 P. 767; McClung v. Cullison et al., 15 Okla. 402, 82 P. 499, and Cunningham v. Ashley, 45 Cal. 485. See section 1194, O. S. 1931, 58 Okla. St. Ann. sec. 252. See, also, Treese v. Spurrier Lbr. Co., 115 Okla. 188, 242 P. 235, and Bledsoe v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301, and Barnes v. Logsdon, 178 Okla. 645, 63 P.2d 964, which cite with approval Jameson v. Goodwin, supra, and McClung v. Cullison, supra. The record does not support the plaintiff's contention that under the pleadings in the former case the administrator was not there representing the interests of the heirs, or that the judgment rendered therein was without the issues.

The errors of this judgment, unless void on its face, are not before this court. In Bledsoe v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301, we held: "Where a court of competent jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of an action, renders judgment therein, it matters not that such judgment may be erroneous; not having been appealed from, it is final, became the law of the case and the parties are bound thereby."

This similarity in governing principles has been previously noted by this court. Bledsoe, Adm'r, v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301. It is not necessary in this litigation to determine whether the rule announced in Kleindorfer v. Dascomb-Daniels Lbr. Co., supra, is applicable to a probate homestead.

If it is merely an erroneous judgment, it will not be disturbed on collateral attack. Gray v. Gray, 57 Okla. 667, 157 P. 730; Robinson v. Anderson, 88 Okla. 136, 212, P. 121; Gillespie v. Wilson, 101 Okla. 62, 221 P. 82; Johnson v. Ray, 101 Okla. 160, 222 P. 667; Bucy v. Corbin, 101 Okla. 124, 223 P. 134; Ahrens v. Commercial National Bank of Muskogee, 100 Okla. 250, 229 P. 237; Fowler v. Marguret Pillsbury General Hospital, 102 Okla. 203, 229 P. 442; Griggs v. Brandon, 132 Okla. 180, 269 P. 1052; Bledsoe v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301; Peter v. Mozier, 138 Okla. 288, 281 P. 141; and Billy v. LeFlore County Gas Electric Co., 146 Okla. 227, 293 P. 1009.

As stated before, this right was definitely and finally waived and destroyed by Maudie Hembree. Counsel for minor defendants have urged the case of Bledsoe, Adm'r, et al. v. Green, 138 Okla. 15, 280 P. 301, as authority for their proposition that the homestead right vested in the children upon the death of the father. An examination of that case reveals a state of facts wholly different in character from the facts herein involved.