Prosser and Keeton, Torts at 710 (5th ed. 1984).See Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732 (Fla. 1989); Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 354 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1977); Cho v. Mackey, 567 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Goode v. Walt Disney World Company, 425 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 436 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1983); Blaw-Knox Food Chemical Equipment Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 351 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).See Florida East Coast Railway Company v. Pickard, 573 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1990); Florida Power Light Company v. Lively, 465 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 476 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1985); Stahl v. Metropolitan Dade County, 438 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Banat v. Armando, 430 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 446 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1984); Fellows v. Citizens Federal Savings Loan Association of St. Lucie County, 383 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).

Id. (citing Madden, supra, at 272). "Ordinarily, the issue of proximate causation is one for the jury, unless the issue is so clear that reasonable people could not differ."Brito, 753 So.2d at 113 (citing Blaw-Knox Food Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)). If a plaintiff does not read the allegedly inadequate warning label, however, the inadequacy of the warning cannot as a matter of law be a proximate cause of that plaintiff's injuries. See Lopez, 580 So.2d at 865 (citing Ashby v. Division of Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 458 So.2d 335, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)).

We approve the decision of the Second District reversing the summary judgment and holding that material issues of fact are presented, including the proximate cause of Jones' injuries. The recent decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Blaw-Knox Food Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), is consistent with our holding in the present case. In Blaw-Knox the Fourth District held that the patent danger doctrine amounts to an assumption of the risk defense that is merged into the defense of contributory negligence subject to the principle of comparative negligence.

Nevertheless, AEW argues that the court still properly granted summary judgment because the insufficiency of the warnings, if any, did not proximately cause the death of the decedent. Ordinarily, the issue of proximate causation is one for the jury, unless the issue is so clear that reasonable people could not differ. Blaw-Knox Food Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604, 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Here, the evidence most favorable to Brito is susceptible of the inference that if the customary warning labels had been on this wheel the decedent would have been alerted to the fact that AEW's wheels were oversized and may have been improper and dangerous for mounting on his jeep.

Unless it be said that the failure to warn was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, the issue of proximate causation is one for the jury. Blaw-Knox Food and Chemical Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA) cert. dismissed, 351 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1977). Defendants insist that a warning would not have deterred Giddens from mounting the tire, because he believed that he was mounting a 16.5-inch tire.

In their answer petitioners sought to diminish any recovery by the degree of the decedent's negligence and/or assumption of risk; these affirmative defenses have merged. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Blaw-Knox Food Chemical Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). David's deposition was taken in the LaChance action and he testified that he had gone to Stephen's home on the date of the accident to buy the bike for $500.

Likewise, Florida, which adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision, has considered and rejected the argument. Blaw-Knox Foods&sChemical Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604 (Fla.App.1977). See also Teel v. Young, 389 A.2d 322 (Me.1978).

In addition, obviousness of a hazard is no longer an exception to liability on the part of a manufacturer, but is only a factor to be considered when applying principles of comparative negligence. Auburn Machine Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Ford v. Highlands Ins. Co., 369 So.2d 77 (Fla.1st DCA 1979); Blaw-Knox Food Chemical Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604 (Fla.4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 351 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1977). The issue with which we are confronted was addressed by the Second District Court of Appeal in Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So.2d 265 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1977).

We note that several Florida appellate courts have since considered — and rejected — the extension to costs of apportionment principles. For example, in Blaw-Knox Food Chemical Equip. Corp. v. Holmes (Fla.App. 1977) 348 So.2d 604, plaintiff had been found 48 percent contributorily negligent and defendant 52 percent negligent. The court held, nevertheless, that, where no counterclaim had been made by the defendant, there could be no apportionment of costs along comparative negligence lines.

But the "patent danger" rule, preventing liability by eliminating the duty to warn in certain cases, has now been abrogated. See Blaw-Knox Food Chem. Equip. Corp. v. Holmes, 348 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. dism., 351 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1977); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1977). Plaintiff's motion at trial to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence giving rise to a claim under Section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, made West applicable in this case.