orp., supra; Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., supra; New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining Manufacturing Co., supra; Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d 875, 880-881 (7th Cir. 1943).See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 348 F. Supp. 606, 616 (C.D.Cal. 1972); Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76, 81 (N.D.Cal. 1972); Isidor Weinstein Inv. Co. v. Hearst Corp., 310 F. Supp. 390, 391 (N.D.Cal. 1970); Metric Hosiery Co. v. Spartans Indus. Inc., 50 F.R.D. 50, 52 (S.D. N Y 1970); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72, 80-88 (D.Haw. 1969); Metropolitan Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 946, 948 (E.D.Wis. 1969); Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt Associates, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (D.Conn. 1969); Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 734-735 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 525-526 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D.Ill. 1964); cf. Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 1959); Bender v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.2d 360, 370 (2d Cir. 1959). Contra, Isidor Weinstein Inv. Co. v. Hearst Corp., 303 F. Supp. 646 (N.D.Cal. 1969), rev'd, 310 F. Supp. 390 (N.D.Cal. 1970); Highland Supply Co. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 245 F. Supp. 510 (E.D.Mo. 1965); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D.Haw. 1964), overruled in Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., supra.
Both the Fifth Circuit, see Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1967), and Judge McLean in the Southern District of New York, see Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 523-526 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), have held that there can be a claim for money damages for a violation of section 7, though the latter case contains some qualifying language. Moreover, a number of other cases have impliedly sanctioned such a cause of action, dismissing or affirming the dismissal of section 7 money damage claims only for the lack of a sufficient showing of specific, proximate injury. See, e.g., Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959); Bender v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.2d 360, 370 (2d Cir. 1959); Rayco Manufacturing Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D.Ill. 1964). In Minnesota Mining Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 85 S.Ct. 1473, 14 L.Ed.2d 405 (1965), the Supreme Court itself held that the statute of limitations did not bar a private, treble-damage action based on alleged violations of both section 7 of the Clayton Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act; although the issue was not discussed, the Court evinced no qualms about dealing with a section 7 money damage claim.
However, it is fully recognized in Clayton Act litigation that the requirements of certainty of damages are applied more liberally in favor of the plaintiff than is usual at common law; and the "tendency of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done." Nevertheless, a plaintiff in such actions may not recover compensatory damages for loss of prospective profits based on mere speculation, surmise and conjecture. Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853 (7 Cir. 1959); Flintkote Company v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9 Cir. 1957); Peller v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 227 F.2d 593 (7 Cir. 1955); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9 Cir. 1955); Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F.2d 875 (7 Cir. 1943) cert. den. 322 U.S. 743, 64 S.Ct. 1143, 88 L.Ed. 1576; Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 138 F.2d 967 (7 Cir. 1943) cert. den. 1944, 321 U.S. 792, 64 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed. 1081; Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F.2d 217 (2 Cir. 1935). However, excessiveness or inadequacy of verdicts is not a question for consideration by this Court.
Relief under plaintiff's cross-counterclaim cannot be predicated on the cross-licensing agreement. Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 7 Cir., 271 F.2d 853, 854-855. It is unnecessary that we consider the specific findings made by the District Court as to its validity or effects otherwise. Between 1951, when defendant began to market its No. 2 Process on a commercial scale, and 1955 the license agreement contained license-back provisions requiring that future inventions by the licensee pertaining to method and apparatus for electrostatic atomization of liquids or to coating with electrostatically atomized liquids be licensed to defendant royalty-free, on a nonexclusive basis, with the right to sub-license.
Although plaintiffs might prove monopolization and price-fixing, they must also prove that they suffered damages and, with some reasonable degree of certainty, the extent of the damages. Gottesman v. General Motors, 436 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1971); Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959). As Judge Angelli stated in City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Company, supra, 53 F.R.D., at 72, wherein a consumer class of gasoline purchasers in a two-state area was denied:
" Rayco Manufacturing Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D.Ill. 1964). And see Blaski v. Inland Steel Co., 271 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959); Beegle v. Thompson, 138 F.2d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943); Peterson v. Borden Co., 50 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1931). Proof that a competitor made sales after it was unlawfully acquired by another, even if the complainant competed for those sales, is not evidence that the sales were the "direct and proximate result" of the unlawful acquisition.
Count I: Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, a civil suit may lie upon a showing that (1) the acquisition did or reasonably might substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly, and (2) the complainant suffered some special damage to his business as a direct and proximate result of the acquisition. Blaski v. Inland Steel Co. (7th Cir., 1959), 271 F.2d 853, 855; Bender v. Hearst Corp., (2nd Cir., 1959), 263 F.2d 360, 370. It is not enough that counterclaimant has suffered injury as a result of extraneous actions, such as Rayco's termination of the franchise on account of competitive purchasing. Rather, the injury must result from the lessened competition or monopoly itself.