Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:04-cv-0331-B.
January 7, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company's ("Ford") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed March 10, 2004. For the reasons stated in this order, the Court GRANTS Ford's Motion in part and DENIES it in part.
I. Factual Background
The background facts are derived from Plaintiff's Original Petition (the "complaint") and on undisputed facts gleaned from the parties' court papers. Where there may be a dispute over a stated fact the Court has so indicated by claiming the fact as one stated by that party to be true.
Blanks, proceeding pro se, asserts several causes of action against Defendants Ford and Mike Nelson (collectively, "Defendants"), including claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and various other statutes. With respect to his ADA claim, Blanks alleges that he suffers from a compressible lower back and a shoulder injury sustained while working for a previous employer. (Compl. p. 2). Blanks complains that his repeated requests for modifications to his workstation to accommodate his back condition went ignored by Defendants. (Compl. p. 4). As a result of Defendants' failure to modify his workstation, Blanks asserts that he was forced to take a workers' compensation leave of absence. ( Id.). Upon his return from leave, Blanks was demoted and re-assigned to a salary-grade post in the mail room requiring him to lift and deliver hundred of boxes of paper, each weighing 70 to 80 pounds. ( Id.). Blanks worked in the mail room for three months, after which time he resigned to seek less strenuous employment. (Compl. p. 5).
With respect to his remaining claims, Blanks alleges that while working as a Ford employee he purchased a 2002 Lincoln LSE from Ford in February 2002 and makes payments on that car in the amount of $779.00 per month. ( Id.). After purchasing the car, Blanks allegedly requested, and Ford acceded to, a two-week extension to meet his payment obligations. ( Id.). According to Blanks, Ford's records reflect the extension, yet Ford nevertheless failed to properly process it and reported to credit agencies that his account "is three times past 31 days delinquent." ( Id.). Blanks also alleges that Ford violated his rights by, among other things, obtaining a copy of his credit report in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, posting personal information on his automobile account, and breaching an alleged contract. Ford moves to dismiss all of Blanks's claims for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. Analysis
A. Legal Standard
Motions to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). The Court liberally construes the complaint in Plaintiff's favor, and all pleaded facts are taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). Unless it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts entitling him to relief, the complaint should not be dismissed. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 42, 45 (1957). Complaints drafted by pro se plaintiffs are evaluated under less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys. Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002).
B. ADA Claim
To prove discrimination under the ADA, Blanks must show that he "is a qualified individual with a disability, and that negative employment action occurred because of the disability." Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1998)). In its Motion, Ford disputes that Blanks is an "individual with a disability." To qualify as "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA, an individual must meet what the Supreme Court has characterized as a "demanding standard." Toyota Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). This standard requires that an individual have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A). To make this showing, Blanks must demonstrate that his impairment "prevents or severely restricts" him from engaging in activities that "are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. The Supreme Court provided by way of example in Toyota that "household chores, bathing, and brushing one's teeth" are such activities. Id. at 202.
Blanks alleges in his complaint that he suffers from "a compressible lower back", "bouts of low back repetitive stress and neck injuries", "lower lumbar injuries", and a "shoulder injury." (Compl. pp. 3, 4, 5). Ford contends that these complaints do not amount to a "disability" as that term is defined by the ADA. At this motion to dismiss stage, and with due regard for Blanks's pro se status, the Court cannot say that Blanks can prove no set of facts showing that the conditions of which he complains substantially limit one or more of his major life activities. Accordingly, Ford's motion to dismiss Blanks's ADA claim is denied.
C. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA")
There are two bases for Blanks's FDCPA claim. First, Blanks charges that Ford violated the FDCPA by reporting to credit agencies that he was "three times past 31 days delinquent" on payments toward his 2002 Lincoln LSE. (Compl. p. 6). According to Blanks, Ford had agreed to extend the payment deadline yet nevertheless reported Blanks's delinquency to credit agencies. ( Id.). And Blanks further alleges that he had timely made the payments reported as delinquent. ( Id.). Under the FDCPA, "[a] debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. A false representation of "the character, amount, or legal status of any debt" constitutes a violation of § 1692e. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Other conduct which violates § 1692e includes the communication or threat to communicate "to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8).
Because Ford did not contend otherwise in its Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes for purposes of this order that Ford is a "debt collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA.
Ford first argues that Blanks has failed to plead facts establishing that Ford made a representation "in connection with the collection of any debt". Ford maintains instead that it was "simply reporting the timeliness of payments made by Plaintiff." (Mot. Dismiss p. 4). This argument is unavailing. "Because reporting a debt to a credit reporting agency can be seen as a communication in connection with the collection of a debt, the reporting of such a debt in violation of the provisions of § 1692e(8) can subject a debt collector to liability under the FDCPA." Sullivan v. Equifax, Inc., 2002 WL 799856, at *4 (E.D. Penn. April 19, 2002). Therefore, the Court finds that, taking the allegations in the complaint as true, Ford's reporting to credit agencies that Blanks's account was overdue may constitute a representation "in connection with the collection" of a debt.
Next, Ford contends that Blanks has failed to plead that any representations Ford made to credit agencies were false. But Blanks does allege that the three payments Ford reported as delinquent to credit agencies were timely received by Defendants. (Compl. p. 6). If Blanks indeed made such payments in a timely fashion as alleged, any representation by Ford to the contrary would necessarily have been false. Although the clarity of Blanks's pleading leaves much to be desired, the Court finds that, taking his allegations as true, Blanks has sufficiently pleaded that the representations made by Ford "in connection with the collection" of a debt were false.
D. Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA")
Ford next argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the FCRA for "illegally receiving a copy of Plaintiff's credit report" because (1) only credit reporting agencies, not lenders, may be held liable under the FCRA; and (2) the credit report at issue was furnished for a permissible purpose because it was obtained in connection with a credit transaction. Ford's first argument is unavailing in light of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), which provides that "[a] person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any purpose unless — (1) the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the consumer report is authorized to be furnished under [§ 1681]." 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f). The defendants in Cole v. U.S. Capital made a similar argument to the one made by Ford here — that the FCRA only imposes liability for the dissemination of consumer credit reports by consumer reporting agencies, not to those who merely obtain the credit report. 389 F.3d 719, 731 n. 14 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, noting that the Federal Trade Commission and "every circuit to address the issue" recognizes that the FCRA "now imposes liability for using or obtaining a consumer report in violation of the FCRA, not simply for releasing or disseminating a report." Id.; see also Mendoza v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 2003 WL 2005832, at *3 (S.D. Tex. March 25, 2003) ("Section 1681b(f) imposes liability, actionable through sections 1681n and 1681o, for obtaining and using a consumer credit report for an unauthorized or uncertified use."). Therefore, Ford may be held liable under the FCRA if it obtained Blanks's credit report for an impermissible purpose. See Adams v. Phillips, 2002 WL 31886737, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2002).
Ford claims in any event that it obtained Blanks's credit report for a permissible purpose under the FCRA because the report was used in connection with Blanks's purchase of a 2002 Lincoln automobile. Although Ford lists various permissible purposes under the statute, it fails to articulate the specific purpose for which it obtained Blanks's credit report ( i.e. whether for the extension of credit, to collect on an account, or for some other legitimate business need). This failure, together with Blanks's allegation that Ford obtained the report for an improper purpose (Compl. p. 7) prevents dismissal of Blanks's claim under the FCRA at this juncture.
While Ford does state that Blanks's purchase of the 2002 Lincoln automobile was financed through Ford, it fails to specify how or why it needed to obtain Blanks's credit report in connection with the car's financing.
E. Discrimination
Blanks purports to assert a cause of action for "discrimination" without specifying any sort of statutory basis for the claim. He vaguely alleges that the customer service division at Ford's Irving, Texas location favors women by promoting them at an accelerated rate over their male counterparts. (Compl. p. 8). The Court agrees with Ford that Blanks's allegations are too vague and unsupported in fact to state a cause of action. Accordingly, Blanks's purported cause of action for "discrimination" is dismissed.
F. Deceptive Trade Practices and Truth in Lending Act
Blanks further alleges that Ford committed unfair and deceptive acts and practices and violated the Truth in Lending Act by "posting information pertaining to his separation and divorce on his automobile account." (Compl. p. 8). With respect to the deceptive trade allegations, Blanks does not identify any specific provision of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, or any other statute, of which Ford's alleged conduct would be in violation. As a consequence, Blanks's attempt to make out a deceptive trade practices claim must fail.
Next, Blanks contends that Ford violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., by posting his personal information on his automobile account and by failing to correct a "known billing error". As pointed out by Ford, the purpose of the TILA is to "assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (a). Blanks fails to cite any specific provision of the TILA addressing either the dissemination of personal information or the failure to correct a billing error. The Court finds that Blanks has accordingly failed to state a claim under the TILA.
G. Breach of Contract
Blanks finally asserts that Ford breached a contract by "reporting information other than payments, correct payment history and or insurance or like information on Plaintiff's automobile account" and by "choosing to defame Plaintiff (a customer) further by failing to process the previous extension". (Compl. p. 10). The Court finds that Blanks has sufficiently stated a breach of contract claim to the extent he alleges that Ford failed to abide by its purported agreement to extend Blanks's payment deadline. Ford appears to recognize as much in its Motion to Dismiss, conceding that Blanks's allegation that Ford failed to change the due date "may give rise to a breach of contract claim[.]" (Mot. Dismiss p. 4).
H. Miscellaneous Causes of Action
Blanks also makes oblique references throughout the complaint to sundry causes of action including: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, official oppression, violations of the 9th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, violations of the "Age Discrimination Act", the Consumer Leasing Act, the Lanham Act, violations of the "Federal Trade Commission" and for "False Advertisement." Because there are no factual bases supporting these claims (some of which are not even causes of action) set forth in the complaint, all such claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Ford's Motion to Dismiss. The Court GRANTS Ford's motion to dismiss the following claims: "Discrimination", deceptive trade practices, Truth in Lending Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, official oppression, violations of the 9th and 14th Amendments; violations of the "Age Discrimination Act", violations of the Consumer Leasing Act, violations of the Lanham Act, violations of the "Federal Trade Commission" and all claims for "False Advertisement."
In all other respects, Ford's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.