Opinion
CV-21-00072-TUC-RM
11-04-2022
James Blankinship, Plaintiff, v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, Defendant.
ORDER
Honorable Rosemary Marquez United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff James Blankinship's (“Plaintiff” or “Blankinship”) Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. 82) from this Court's September 6, 2022 Order granting Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's (“Defendant” or “Union Pacific”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78) and entry of final Judgment (Doc. 79). Defendant responded in opposition (Doc. 87), and Plaintiff replied (Doc. 90). For the following reasons Plaintiff's Motion will be denied.
The facts as stated in the Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78) are incorporated by reference into this Order. Nonetheless, this Order will briefly summarize the relevant factual history of the case.
The Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) regulations require railroad conductors to pass a vision acuity examination which tests a conductor's ability to distinguish the colors of railroad signals. (Doc. 68 at 2 ¶ 9; Doc. 72 at 2 ¶ 9); see also 49 C.F.R. § 242.117(h)(3). Railroads are required to determine each individual meets the FRA visual acuity standards before certifying or recertifying that individual as a conductor. 49 C.F.R. § 242.117(b). If an individual fails to meet the visual acuity thresholds, on request, they would be subjected to further medical evaluations to determine the individual's ability to safely perform as a conductor. Id. § 242.117(j). The further evaluation employed by Union Pacific consists of a Color Vision Field Test (“CVFT”) which measures the speed and accuracy of an individual's ability to identify railroad signals. (Doc. 68 at 3 ¶ 17; Doc. 72 at 3 ¶ 17.) In 2016, Defendant implemented a revised CVFT, known as the Light Cannon Test. (Doc. 68 at 5-6 ¶¶30-33; Doc. 72 at 4-5 ¶¶30-33.) The parties dispute whether the Light Cannon Test meets the FRA requirements that the testing be valid, reliable, and comparable. (Doc. 68 at 5-6 ¶¶30-36; Doc. 72 at 4-5 ¶¶30-36.)
Plaintiff underwent color vision testing for the FRA recertification process on three separate occasions before the implementation of the Light Cannon Test (Doc. 68 at 7 ¶ 38; Doc. 72 at 6 ¶ 38.) Plaintiff failed the initial examination in 2011 but passed the then 2011 version of the CVFT. (Id.) In January 2017, Plaintiff failed the initial examination, then failed the newly implemented Light Cannon CVFT. (Doc. 68 at 7 ¶ 41; Doc. 72 at 6 ¶ 41.) Consequentially, it was determined that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for recertification, and he was removed from the conductor position. (Doc. 68 at 7-8 ¶¶ 42-44; Doc. 72 at 6 ¶¶ 42-44.)
Plaintiff took and failed a Second Light Cannon Test in February 2017. (Doc. 68 at 8 ¶¶45-46; Doc. 72 at 6 ¶¶ 45-46.)
II. Procedural History
In February 2016, Union Pacific employees initiated a class action alleging disability discrimination; a class action in which the Court recognized Plaintiff to be a putative class member. (Doc. 31 at 2.) The initial class definition from the Harris complaint focused on employees removed from service for reasons relating to a fitness-for-duty evaluation. (Doc. 68-26 at 17.) However, on August 17, 2018, the Harris plaintiffs narrowed the operative class definition when moving for class certification on the disparate treatment claim only and defined the class as: “All individuals who have been or will be subject to a fitness-for-duty examination as a result of a reportable health event at any time from September 18, 2014 until the final resolution of this action.” (Doc. 68 at 9 ¶¶ 52-53; Doc. 72 at 6-7 ¶¶ 52-53; Doc. 68-27 at 2; Doc. 73-15 at 22.) Defendant's Medical Rules define “reportable health event” as “a new diagnosis, recent event, or change in prior stable condition for... [significant vision change in one or both eyes affecting... color vision.” (Doc. 68 at 10 ¶¶ 54-55; Doc. 72 at 7 ¶¶ 54-55; Doc. 68-26 at 4-5, 44.) Plaintiff never experienced a reportable health event based on this definition at any time during his employment with Union Pacific. (Doc. 68 at 10 ¶ 57; Doc. 72 at 7 ¶ 57.)
See Harris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 F.R.D. 616 (D. Neb. 2019), rev'd, 953 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2020).
On February 5, 2019, the District of Nebraska certified the class as defined in the August 17, 2018 class definition. Harris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 329 F.R.D. 616, 628 (D. Neb. 2019). However, on March 24, 2020, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District of Nebraska and denied class certification. Harris v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 953 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2020). Therefore, on April 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Doc. 68 at 10 ¶ 59; Doc. 72 at 7 ¶ 59.) On February 20, 2021 Plaintiff initiated this action (Doc. 1) with a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on March 24, 2021 alleging violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Doc. 13).
On June 7, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 66.) At issue in the Summary Judgment Motion was whether Plaintiff was excluded from the class definition on August 17, 2018 when the Harris plaintiffs more narrowly defined the operative class to include individuals “subject to a fitness-for-duty examination as a result of a reportable health event.” (Doc. 67 at 3-7.) Defendant argues Plaintiff was excluded from this updated definition because Plaintiff did not experience a reportable health event relating to his color vision. (Id. at 4.) If Plaintiff were excluded from the class definition, it would cease tolling from August 17, 2018, and Plaintiff's FAC (“FAC”) would be per se untimely for the failure to file a charge of discrimination with EEOC within 300 days from when tolling ceased. (Id. at 4-7.)
On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response arguing that that the class definition included color vision plaintiffs because the Amended Class Action complaint included all plaintiffs who experienced adverse employment actions related to a “Fitness-for-Duty evaluation,” and that Defendant used an incorrect interpretation of the term “reportable health event.” (Doc 71 at 5-6.) Therefore, Plaintiff argues that his FAC (Doc. 13) was timely because he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the Eighth Circuit denial of the class certification. (Doc. 71 at 4-7.)
After Defendant's Reply (Doc. 76), on September 6, 2022, this Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 78). The Court found the class definition in the original Harris complaint to be broad enough to include Plaintiff as a putative class member; however, the class definition in the August 17, 2018 motion for class certification more narrowly defined the class to only include individuals “subject to a fitness-for-duty examination as a result of a reportable health event.” (Id. at 8.) Because Blankinship's change in color vision was not a “reportable health event,” but rather he was tested based on the FRA recertification process, he was not included in the Harris plaintiffs' motion for class certification. (Id. at 8-9.) As a result, Plaintiff's two remaining claims from his FAC (Doc. 13) were dismissed with prejudice as time barred for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies within the allowable time. (Doc. 78 at 10.)
The original complaint defined the class as individuals removed from service and/or suffered adverse employment actions for reasons related to a Fitness-for-Duty evaluation. (Doc. 68-26 at 17).
The Court found, at latest, the tolling would have ceased on February 5, 2019 when the class was officially certified. Plaintiff did not file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of this date. (Doc. 78 at 9, fn.9.)
Finding Plaintiff's claims to be time barred, the Court declined to address the merits of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 78 at 7.)
On September 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed this pending Motion. (Doc. 82.) In his Motion, Plaintiff attaches 12 exhibits totaling 645 pages to argue that Plaintiff should be relieved from final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3) because Union Pacific committed a fraud on the Court. (Doc. 83 at 9.) Plaintiff claims Defendant grossly misrepresented the definition of the term “reportable health event” and the record and procedural history of Harris. (Id. at 10.) Blankinship asserts he, along with numerous other color vision plaintiffs, was included on the class list provided by Union Pacific. (Id. at 10-11; Doc. 84-6 at 115.) Plaintiff also presents testimonial evidence from Defendant's Chief Medical Officer stating that no change or new diagnosis is required for the reportable health event policies to apply. (Id. at 11.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims Defendant misled the Court on the procedural history of Harris. (Id.) Plaintiff claims both sides submitted briefing indicating that color vision plaintiffs, such as Blankinship, were intended to be included among the class definition. (Id.) The District of Nebraska certified a class of over 7,000 employees, including Blankinship, and Union Pacific continuously referred to the class of this size on appeal to the Eighth Circuit. (Id.; Doc. 84-12 at 3.) Yet now at summary judgment in this case, Defendant is attempting to redefine the class to remove Blankinship. (Doc. 83 at 11-12.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues relief from judgment is justified under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) and 59(e) due to either a mistake by the court, extraordinary circumstances, or clear error respectively. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff states that even if no fraud is found, relief from judgment is warranted based on the clear evidence that Plaintiff and other employees removed from service following a Light Cannon CVFT were members of the class certified by the District of Nebraska. (Id.)
On October 4, 2022, Defendant filed its Response. (Doc. 87.) From the onset, Defendant claims it neither doctored, hid, nor was any uncovered new evidence found. (Id. at 1). Rather, Plaintiff is attempting a “prohibited second bite at the apple” by submitting almost 650 pages of exhibits that were not disclosed during the Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.) In argument, Union Pacific claims that it did not commit a fraud on the Court. (Id. at 3-4.) Defendant states that the Court simply resolved a dispute in its Order granting summary judgment and Plaintiff failed to meet his heavy burden to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence. (Id.) Additionally, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's cited authority in support of a fraud showing is inapplicable because, unlike the cited authority, Defendant did not suppress any evidence from Plaintiff or the Court. (Id. at 5-6.) In any case, Defendant claims that Plaintiff's Motion misrepresents the evidence. (Id. at 6-7.) Defendant claims the evidence indicates: (1) the referenced spreadsheet that includes the name of Plaintiff was not a class list (Id.; Doc. 84-5 at fn.1-2, 4); (2) Defendant was careful to formally deny this list was a class list (Doc. 87 at 6-7; Doc. 88-1); (3) Plaintiff's counsel's corrected on the record the inaccurate statement claiming the list was a class list (Doc. 87 at 7; Doc. 88-2); and (4) the District of Nebraska rejected the list as a class list. (Doc. 87 at 7; Owen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:19CV462, 2020 WL 6684504, at *5, fn. 2 (D. Neb. Nov. 12, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-3411, 2021 WL 1977771 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 2021). Additionally, the spreadsheet in question was from February 2018, before the list was narrowed and when Defendant was meaning for the list to be overinclusive. (Doc 87 at 8.) Defendant claims Plaintiff misstates the deposition testimony of Defendant's Chief Medical Officer. (Id. at 8-9.) The testimony did not state that no change is necessary in an employee's medical condition for the reportable health policies to apply. (Id.) Defendant further argues that the briefing from the Harris case is inapplicable and holds no value because this discovery predated the operative class definition from August 17, 2018. (Doc. 87 at 10-11.) Finally, Defendant states that Plaintiff provided no specific evidence of clear error nor any extraordinary circumstances to justify relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6), or 59(e). (Id. at 11-12.) Therefore, Defendant requests this Court to reject Plaintiff's inaccurate accusations and deny his Motion. (Id. at 13.)
On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Reply. (Doc. 90.) Plaintiff reiterates that the District of Nebraska certified a class that included Blankinship and that Blankinship remained a member of the class until the Eighth Circuit reversed class certification on March 24, 2020. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC less than 3 weeks later and clearly within 300 days. (Id.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues Defendant is representing to the Court that Plaintiff was excluded from the operative class. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff claims this is evidence of clear error and warrants the granting of Plaintiff's Motion. (Id.) Plaintiff argues this misrepresentation by Defendant constitutes fraud on the court despite the lack of intentionally hidden facts, and the Court should use its inherent authority to remedy the fraud. (Id. at 2-4.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims the disputed list, which included Blankinship, was considered a class list because all employees on the list were given notice of class certification. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff concludes his Reply by requesting that the Court remedy the mistake made because of Union Pacific's misrepresentations. (Id. at 6.)
III. Applicable Law
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(g)(1) guides the Court on the standards for a motion for reconsideration. The rule states,
The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence. Any such motion shall point out with specificity the matters that the movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, any new matters being brought to the Court's attention for the first time and the reasons they were not presented earlier, and any specific modifications being sought in the Court's Order. No motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order. Failure to comply with this subsection may be grounds for denial of the motion.See also Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[Motions for Reconsideration] may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”)
Motions for reconsideration should only be granted in rare circumstances. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). A motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the district court “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also, Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Reconsideration is indicated in the face of the existence of new evidence, an intervening change in the law, or as necessary to prevent manifest injustice.”) Motions for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court “to rethink what the court had already thought through - rightly or wrongly.” Defenders of Wildlife, 909 F.Supp. at 1351 (citations omitted). Nor should a motion for reconsideration be used to repeat any argument already presented to and rejected by the court. Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003). Whether to grant a motion for reconsideration is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Navajo Nation, 331 F.3d at 1046. In the District of Arizona, motions for reconsideration will be granted when:
(1) There are material differences in fact or law from that presented to the Court and, at the time of the Court's decision, the party moving for reconsideration could not have known of the factual or legal differences through reasonable diligence;
(2) There are new material facts that happened after the Court's decision;
(3) There has been a change in the law that was decided or enacted after the Court's decision; or
(4) The movant makes a convincing showing that the Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to the Court before the Court's decision.Motorola, Inc., 215 F.R.D. at 586.
B. Relief from Judgment
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to relieve a party from final judgment under six circumstances: “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.; fraud. misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.; or any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
A party seeking relief from judgment under fraud “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct,” and that the alleged fraud was not discoverable by due diligence. Casey v. Albertson's Inc, 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting De Saracho v. Custom Food Machinery, Inc., 206 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Most fraud on the court cases involve a scheme by one party to hide a key fact from the court and the opposing party.” United States v. Est. of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011). But more generally, fraud on the court “must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” Pumphrey v. K. W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995).
Rules 60(b)(1) and 59(e) both allow a court to grant a party relief from judgement due to mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect, the only difference between the two rules being the timing on when a party must file its motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”); Siegler v. Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc., No. 318CV01681GPCMSB, 2019 WL 6877594, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019). The mistake or inadvertence is not limited, and Rule 60(b)(1) allows the court to correct mistakes made by the court itself. Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999). However, to amend a judgment from either mistake or inadvertence requires a showing of “clear error.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). This “clear error” must be definite such that the court is left with a “firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
Rule 60(b)(6) acts as a catch-all provision that affords the court discretion to grant relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Henson v. Fid. Nat'l Fin., Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 439 (9th Cir. 2019). However, this equitable rule should be used sparingly and “is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment,” and not when a party has simply “ignored normal legal recourse[].” United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is only available if “the moving party is able to show both injury and that circumstances beyond its control prevented timely action to protect its interests.” Id.
IV. Analysis
Plaintiff attaches nearly 650 pages of exhibits to his Motion. This newly presented evidence is neither recently discovered nor does Plaintiff indicate why the information was not presented earlier. Plaintiff offers no valid reason why he could not have made these arguments and presented this evidence in his Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, Plaintiff appears to be attempting to reargue his case after the Court's Order dismissing his case with prejudice, which applicable law prohibits. See LRCiv 7.2(g)(1); see also Kona Enterprises, 229 F.3d at 890. If motions for reconsideration were used to repeat arguments already presented and to ask the court to rethink what it already thought through, cases would never reach a clear resolution. Defenders of Wildlife, 909 F.Supp. at 1351. Regardless, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff's Motion.
A. Fraud
Plaintiff's Motion argues that Defendant committed a fraud through misrepresentations to the Court. However, the evidence shows that Defendant neither created a scheme to hide facts nor improperly influenced the Court's summary judgment decision. The parties simply presented conflicting arguments on the relevant factual disputes, which is how cases typically proceed through litigation.
Plaintiff claims that throughout the Harris litigation, Defendant referred to the list it produced as the class list and limited it to the individuals subject to a fitness-for-duty evaluation following a reportable health event but altered this viewpoint in its summary judgment motion. (Doc. 83 at 10-12.) Plaintiff alleges that this misrepresentation constitutes fraud and Defendant should have been estopped from claiming that the list, which included Plaintiff, was not in fact the class list. (Id.) However, Defendant reiterates that this list was meant to be overinclusive, the parties jointly understood the list was not the intended operative class list, and most importantly, the list was created before the Harris plaintiffs narrowed the operative class list when moving for certification on August 17, 2018. (Doc. 87 at 6-8.)
Additionally, Plaintiff claims Defendant misrepresented the definition of “reportable health event” to the Court based on Defendant's Chief Medical Officer's deposition testimony. (Doc. 83 at 11.) Plaintiff claims this testimony stated that no change in an employee's medical condition is necessary for the reportable health event policies to apply. (Id.) Defendant argues in opposition that Plaintiff misstates the deposition testimony. (Doc. 87 at 8-10.) Defendant's Chief Medical Officer never stated that no change is necessary for the reportable health events policy to apply; instead, the testimony stated that the broader fitness-for-duty policy may apply if a regulatory evaluation reveals an undisclosed reportable health event. (Id; 84-4 at 14-15.)
The Court does not find that Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct by contesting Plaintiff's interpretation of the relevant facts above or by arguing that Plaintiff was not a member of the certified class.
B. Mistake
Plaintiff could be relieved from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) or 59(e) for a mistake by the Court in its Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 78.) In that Order, the Court found that Plaintiff was not included in the Harris plaintiffs' motion for class certification and therefore tolling of Plaintiff's claims ended upon the filing of the motion for class certification on August 17, 2018, and granted Defendant's Motion on that basis. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff now asserts the Court made a mistake because Plaintiff was clearly a member of the class as certified by the District of Nebraska on February 5, 2019, and he remained a class member until class certification was overturned by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 24, 2020. (Doc. 90 at 1.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant acknowledged Plaintiff was a certified class member in Defendant's Eighth Circuit appellate briefing. This Court is and has been aware that Plaintiff was a putative class member in Harris. (See Doc. 31 at 2.)
See Smith v. Pennington, 352 F.3d 884 (4th Cir. 2003); Sawtell v. E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 248 (10th Cir. 1994).
See Defendant's Appellate Brief in the Eighth Circuit, Doc. 84-12 at 3:
The district court certified one of the largest Americans with Disabilities Act class actions in history-a sprawling, diverse class of more than 7,000 current and former Union Pacific employees claiming that the railroad violated the ADA by ensuring that people in safety-sensitive jobs are fit for duty and do not have a medical condition that could suddenly incapacitate them.
The District of Nebraska did refer to the list produced by Union Pacific as a class list. Harris 329 F.R.D. at 627 (“The list in question in this case was given to plaintiffs by Union Pacific. Thereafter, Union Pacific supplemented this production to identify a total of 7,723 current and former employees that are on this class list.”) (emphasis added). Additionally, Defendant did refer to the certified class as “more than 7,000 current and former Union Pacific employees” in its Eighth Circuit appellate briefing. But the operative fact is that the Harris court's Order certified the class as indicated in the August 17, 2018 motion for class certification, and the class certification definition that this Court relied upon excluded Plaintiff. Id. at 628. As the Court previously stated, individuals subjected to vision-related fitness-for-duty examinations were included in the certified class; however, individuals, including Plaintiff, who were subjected to color vision testing because of the FRA recertification processes, and not because of a reportable health event, were not. (Doc. 78 at 9, fn.8.)
Undisputedly, Plaintiff was not included in the class definition when the Harris plaintiffs moved for certification, and that remains true. Therefore, in accordance with Smith and Sawtell, tolling ceased once Plaintiff had adequate notice he was not included in the operative class definition. Smith, 352 F.3d at 894; Sawtell, 22 F.3d 253-54. This occurred on August 17, 2018, and because Plaintiff failed to file his charge with the EEOC within 300 days of this date, his FAC was correctly dismissed as time barred. The Court is not convinced that it made a mistake in its September 6, 2022 Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Even if Smith and Sawtell were to be rejected, and it was determined tolling did not cease until class certification on February 5, 2019, Plaintiff's claims would still be time barred.
That Order declined to address the merits of the parties' ADA arguments. This Order will do the same. But the Court is aware of Owen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 8:19CV462, 2020 WL 6684504 (D. Neb. Nov. 12, 2020). In that case the court avoided “getting into the weeds” on the complex question of class definition and tolling and instead skipped ahead to address the substantive review of the summary judgment motion. The court granted Union Pacific's motion because even if the plaintiff were to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Union Pacific displayed a nondiscriminatory reason for removing plaintiff from service due to safety concerns. Id. at 7. Additionally, the court determined that a fitness-for-duty evaluation was “a reasonable means of determining if an employee can safely do their job.” Id. at 8 (internal quotation omitted).
C. Any Other Reason Justifying Relief
Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is inapplicable here. There are no extraordinary circumstances to justify granting Plaintiff relief, nor are there any circumstances beyond Plaintiff's control that prevented him from making these arguments in his Opposition to Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion. Given that relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is to be reserved for extraordinary cases, and used sparingly, it would be inappropriate for the Court to grant Plaintiff relief under this theory.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment (Doc. 82) is denied, and this case is to remain closed.