See Cope v. Doe, 102 Ill.2d 278, 288 (1984); Brumm v. Goodall, 16 Ill. App.2d 212, 224-25 (1958); Decatur Amusement Park Co. v. Porter, 137 Ill. App. 448, 452 (1907). The appellate court in this case, agreeing with Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. App.3d 416 (1994), reasoned that since the District is as liable in tort as a private tortfeasor absent an immunity statute (see LaMonte, 41 Ill. App. 3 d at 705), then the District likewise owed Travis a duty of reasonable care. 267 Ill. App.3d at 288; Blankenship, 269 Ill. App.3d at 419-21.
Morton, 286 Ill. App. 3d 444, 454, 676 N.E.2d 985, 992. As the case does not cite authority supporting its position, we find Hudson unpersuasive.¶ 72 Defendant relies on Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. App. 3d 416, 422-23, 647 N.E.2d 287, 291 (1994). Blankenship involved a decedent's estate bringing suit against the Peoria Park District, alleging the defendant's failure to supervise a swimming pool caused the decedent's death.
” Id. at 287–88, 80 Ill.Dec. 40, 464 N.E.2d 1023. ¶ 42 In Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill.App.3d 416, 207 Ill.Dec. 325, 647 N.E.2d 287 (1995), the legislature's action in the matter of swimming pools was one of the appellate court's bases for refusing to hold that the defendant, a park district, had a common-law duty to supervise adult swimmers in its pool. The trial court in Blankenship had dismissed, for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the park district was liable because the decedent drowned in its pool while the lifeguards on duty were on break.
Rather, it is the law which, in the end, must say what is legally required. See Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill.App.3d 416, 422 (1994) (park district's internal rules requiring one lifeguard to remain on duty at all times did not create a legal duty to have one lifeguard on duty); Fillpot v. Midway Airlines, Inc., 261 Ill.App.3d 237, 244 (1994) (where airline owed no legal duty to remove snow or ice, airline's policy manual requiring the clearing of walkways did not create such a duty).
Curtis v. County of Cook (1983), 98 Ill.2d 158, 456 N.E.2d 116. A case similar to the instant matter is Blankenship v. Peoria Park District (1994), 269 Ill. App.3d 416, in which the court specifically rejected the plaintiff's claim that internal rules created a duty on the part of the park district to supervise adult swimmers. Blankenship stated, " '[A] legal duty is normally not established through rules * * * or internal guidelines.
Section 323 addresses cases concerning a duty assumed by a defendant to another. (See Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d 18, 23; see also Blankenship v. Peoria Park Dist. (Ill.Ct.App. 1994) 269 Ill.App.3d 416 [ 647 N.E.2d 287, 291-292, 207 Ill.Dec. 325] [swimming pool operator undertook duty to provide lifeguard to protect adult swimmer]; Feld v. Merriam (1984) 506 Pa. 383 [ 485 A.2d 742, 746-747] [apartment complex landlord undertook duty to provide security guards]; Wilson v. Texas Parks andWildlife Dept. (Tex. 1999) 8 S.W.3d 634, 635-636 [43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 634] [park district undertook to provide siren warning of impending flood]; Nelson by and Through Stuckman v. Salt LakeCity (Utah 1996) 919 P.2d 568, 573 [state undertook to erect and maintain fence between park and nearby river].) Similarly, section 324A of the Restatement addresses cases concerning a duty assumed by a defendant to third persons.
Fichtel v. Board of Directors of the River Shore of Naperville Condominium Ass'n, Hillcrest Management Co., 389 Ill. App. 3d 951, 959-60 (2009) (quoting Shank v. H. C. Fields, 373 Ill. App. 3d 290, 296-97 (2007), quoting Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 238 (1996)). In Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. App. 3d 416 (1994), the reviewing court held that the park district's internal rule requiring one lifeguard to remain on duty at all times did not create a legal duty to have one lifeguard on duty. The court observed that, "[w]hile the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human life or property is prima facie evidence of negligence [citations], 'a legal duty is normally not established through rules *** or internal guidelines[.
Rather, it is the law which, in the end, must say what is legally required. See Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. App. 3d 416, 422[, 647 N.E.2d 287, 291] (1994) (park district's internal rules requiring one lifeguard to remain on duty at all times did not create a legal duty to have one lifeguard on duty); Fillpot v. Midway Airlines, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 237, 244[, 633 N.E.2d 237, 242] (1994) (where airline owed no legal duty to remove snow or ice, airline's policy manual requiring the clearing of walkways did not create such a duty); Mattice v. Goodman, 173 Ill. App. 3d 236, 240[, 527 N.E.2d 469, 472] (1988) (where building owners owed no legal duty to assist elderly person through door, no such duty was created by building owner's employment of an employee who, in accordance with his job description, customarily assisted elderly persons through the door)." Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 238, 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1272 (1996) (no duty to promptly assist intoxicated individual discovered in warming house of commuter train system).
However, the existence of a duty and the existence of immunity are separate issues. Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. App. 3d 416, 421 (1994). Morever, failing to comply with self-imposed regulations does not generally impose a legal duty on a governmental defendant.
In this case it was an uncontested fact that there were two lifeguards on deck, and therefore, immunity was triggered and a directed verdict was proper. Plaintiff argues that Blankenship v. Peoria Park District, 269 Ill. App.3d 416, 647 N.E.2d 287 (1994) carves out an exception to the blanket immunity provided under Barnett. Specifically, plaintiff maintains that when the conduct of the lifeguards constitutes a "complete lack of supervision" the Act does not apply.