Opinion
No. 03 C 3573
August 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kevin L. Blankenship, a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) at East Moline Correctional Center, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials at Stateville Correctional Center. Blankenship asserts his constitutional rights were violated when he was injured unloading a truck, received inadequate medical care, and was subsequently transferred and denied work release placement.
Blankenship has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Before ordering service on defendants, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the court to conduct an initial review of the complaint and to dismiss any portion the court finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. In determining whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court accepts the allegations of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 591-92 (7th Cir. 2001).
Following the factual allegations, the complaint sets forth four "counts," according to the legal theories Blankenship believes entitle him to recovery. Because each "count" is not limited to a single theory and some theories are mistaken, the complaint cannot be analyzed count by count, but must be broken down into potential claims.
I. Negligence Claim Against Defendant Kittle
On February 20, 2003, Blankenship was working at the Stateville minimum security unit standing inside the back of a produce truck helping to unload it. The truck started to roll backwards, allegedly because defendant correctional officer Kittle had neglected to leave the truck in gear or set the brakes. Just as Blankenship tried to jump clear of the moving truck, the truck hit a culvert, pitching him out. Blankenship sustained injuries to his neck, arm and shoulder.
Blankenship does not have a constitutional claim against Kittle for causing the accident. If Kittle failed to take precautions in parking the truck, he could be found to have violated a duty of reasonable care owed to Blankenship, rendering Kittle liable for damages under Illinois negligence law. But a negligence claim arises from the breach of a duty created by state law, not the United States Constitution. A prisoner's injury caused by a state employee's negligence is not a constitutional violation because the Eighth Amendment only forbids cruel and unusual punishment. An accident is not punishment because it is unintentional. Only injury resulting either from a defendant's intentional actions or his or her deliberate indifference — conscious disregard of a known, serious risk to the prisoner — can be considered punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-39 (1994); Williams v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-300 (1991). Kittle's failure to set the parking brake is not the kind of criminal recklessness that violates the Eighth Amendment. See Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 646 (7th Cir. 1997) ("deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness").
Although Blankenship labels Count I of his complaint "Deliberate Indifference," the label is not enough. A plaintiff may plead a legal conclusion such as "deliberate indifference," see, e.g., McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000), but a legal conclusion may be ignored if the allegations are inconsistent with it. Liberal federal pleading "is not a mandate to countenance balderdash." Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1441 (7th Cir. 1990). Deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge of a serious risk of harm; it is not enough that a defendant Stateville minimum security unit. Blankenship appears to allege that his transfer from the Stateville minimum security unit to East Moline Correctional Center was retaliatory, and that as a result of retaliation he was denied an opportunity for work release.
A prisoner has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in being assigned to any particular correctional facility or remaining there, and may be transferred without notice or an opportunity to be heard. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1995). The regulation governing eligibility for work release, 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 455.30, also creates no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, because meeting the criteria for eligibility does not guarantee placement in work release. More prisoners are eligible for work release than there are places in community correctional centers. Because prison officials have discretion to choose among eligible prisoners, eligibility alone creates no protected entitlement. DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1992).
A prisoner who has actually been assigned to work release may have a protected interest in keeping the assignment, preventing his reassignment without due process of law. Compare Hamilton v. Peters, 919 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D.Ill. 1996) (Plunkett, J. (no protected interest) with Segreti v. Gillen, 259 F. Supp.2d 733, 738 (N.D.Ill. 2003) (Gettleman, J.) (protected interest in remaining in work release). Blankenship does not allege that he had been assigned to work release, or that his application had received the final approval of the Director of IDOC or his designee as provided in 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 455.40.
Nevertheless, inmates have a First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances without fear of retaliation, and permissible conduct can become impermissible when done for retaliatory reasons. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2000) (loss of prison job); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996) (retaliatory transfer). Although the complaint, read liberally, might adequately state a claim for retaliation, see Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2002), rather than let the case proceed on this claim alone, the court will permit Blankenship to file an amended complaint restating both his retaliation and medical care claims. The amended complaint should state (a) what grievances or complaints Blankenship alleges subjected him to retaliation, (b) what adverse actions were taken against him in response, and (c) how each defendant participated in such actions and shared or knew of the retaliatory motive.
CONCLUSION
Blankenship's constitutional claims against Kittle are dismissed with prejudice, and his state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice to his raising them in an appropriate state court. Blankenship's claims against Briley for failure to train or supervise Kittle, and for failure to train or supervise counselors with respect to their handling of grievances, are dismissed with prejudice. Blankenship's claims of retaliation and denial of medical care are dismissed without prejudice to his filing an amended complaint repleading these claims within thirty days of the date of this order.
The amended complaint must name all defendants in the caption. Defendants whose names are unknown may be named and referred to as "John Doe #1," "Doctor John Doe #2," or the like. The amended complaint should allege which defendant was responsible for each alleged action or failure to act. Allegations should be set forth in numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph limited to a statement of a single set of circumstances as far as practicable. Claims based on separate occurrences should be stated in separate counts. See Rule 10(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.
Because the amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, all allegations against all defendants must be set forth in the amended complaint without reference to the original complaint. Exhibits may be attached to the amended complaint, but all relevant factual allegations should be included in the amended complaint itself. For example, if a grievance was filed with respect to an incident, a copy of the grievance may be attached as an exhibit, but the relevant facts regarding the incident should be set forth in numbered paragraphs in the amended complaint.
Blankenship must provide a signed original amended complaint, a copy for the judge, and an additional copy for each defendant. All copies must have a complete set of exhibits attached. If Blankenship fails to comply with these instructions, this action may be dismissed.