Opinion
CAUSE NO. IP 02-0014-C H/K
August 23, 2002
ENTRY ON PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiffs Rick and Lisa Blankenship have sued Morgan County, the City of Martinsville, Terry Weddle, Terry Iacoli, and St. Paul Insurance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating their civil rights. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to arrest them and procured their arrest with an invalid warrant.
The plaintiffs' claim stems from their January 2000 arrest in Morgan County for an alleged theft that occurred in 1995. The alleged theft involved approximately $40,000 worth of cigarettes, as well as several thousand dollars in cash and money orders from a retail store called "Joe's Tobacco" in Martinsville, Indiana. An official investigation in 1996 yielded no leads, causing Joe Ackerman, the owner of Joe's Tobacco, to hire Martinsville police officer Terry Weddle on a private basis to investigate further.
In November 1999 Weddle, in his official capacity as a Martinsville police officer, applied for and received a warrant for plaintiffs' arrest. The plaintiffs were then arrested in January 2000 on felony fugitive charges and on a felony theft charge. The State of Indiana eventually dismissed the charges against plaintiffs.
As a result of prior rulings in this action, the claims that remain are those against the City of Martinsville, Officer Weddle, Morgan County, and St. Paul Insurance. Morgan County filed a motion to dismiss, to which the plaintiffs have responded. The City of Martinsville, Terry Weddle, and St. Paul Insurance also filed a joint motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), the court treated the latter motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and gave the parties a reasonable opportunity to present pertinent information. In addition, plaintiffs filed a motion that they have designated as a motion for directed verdict.
For the reasons explained below, the court finds that Morgan County's motion to dismiss and the remaining defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted, while the plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict must be denied. A copy of the materials filed by the plaintiffs on May 13, 2002, shall be included with the distribution of this Entry.
I. Plaintiffs' "Motion for Directed Verdict"
The plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict seeks a finding that the arrest warrant was invalid and a court order recalling or expunging all records regarding the plaintiffs' arrest and prosecution. A court may grant a motion for a directed verdict on an issue when the facts and law presented at a trial are such that reasonable minds could not disagree as to the outcome of the issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Plaintiffs' motion is unsupported by any legal reasoning and does not include or make reference to any of the factual matters on which the motion is based. The motion for directed verdict must therefore be denied.
The plaintiffs' "protest" filed on May 13, 2002 relates to their dissatisfaction with unspecified "retained counsel" to aid them in this lawsuit. No attorney has ever appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs in this case. The dispute plaintiffs may have with an attorney they consulted is a matter between the plaintiffs and the attorney, and it is not before the court for resolution.
II. Morgan County's Motion to Dismiss
Morgan County seeks dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint based on its argument that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of the Reg'l Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1995).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Morgan County is liable for injuries caused by its employees when such injuries arise from execution of the county's "policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. . . ." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Ser., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Further, to hold the county be liable under § 1983, the deliberate action of the county must be the "moving force" behind plaintiffs' injury. Bd. of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
For plaintiffs to survive Morgan County's motion to dismiss, their complaint must contain enough information to enable the court and the defendants to understand the basis of their claim. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000) citing Payton v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 184 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1999). In a § 1983 action, plaintiffs must allege in their complaint one of the following: (1) that Morgan County had an express policy that results in a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) that Morgan County had an unwritten, widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom within the force of law; or (3) that a Morgan County official with final policy making authority caused plaintiffs' constitutional injury. Billings v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 807, 817 (7th Cir. 2001), citing McCormick, 230 F.3d at 324. Plaintiffs have not met this burden.
Plaintiffs have not alleged wrongful conduct by an employee of Morgan County. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege their injuries result from the conduct of a Martinsville police officer and the Morgan County Prosecutor. Neither of these individuals is an employee under the direction or control of Morgan County. Bibbs v. Newman, 997 F. Supp. 1174, 1178 (S.D.Ind. 1998) ("A prosecuting attorney in Indiana clearly acts as a state official when prosecuting criminal cases."); see Study v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 (S.D.Ind. 1991); Ind. Const. art. 7, § 16 (creating office of prosecuting attorney in each circuit). Though the court liberally construes pro se civil rights complaints, such complaints will be dismissed "if it is beyond doubt that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff could obtain relief." McCormick, 230 F.3d at 325; see Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1103 (7th Cir. 1982). Based upon the plaintiffs' complaint, there is no set of facts under which they could obtain relief from Morgan County.
III. Officer Weddle's Motion for Summary Judgment
The plaintiffs claim that defendant Terry Weddle violated their Fourth Amendment right against arrests unsupported by probable cause by filing a false affidavit for an arrest warrant. Officer Weddle contends he is entitled to qualified immunity from civil suit by plaintiffs. In their response to Weddle's motion, plaintiffs rely on evidence that Weddle was working as a paid private investigator for Joe Ackerman. Ackerman Dep. 59, 70-71. Plaintiffs contend that this private work biased Weddle's presentation of facts in his affidavit seeking the arrest warrant.
In addition, plaintiffs claim that Weddle failed to inform the court that informant Jonie Shadwick, who implicated the plaintiffs in the alleged crime, was paid approximately $500 for her deposition and lied to Weddle. However, plaintiffs have not identified actual evidence supporting the allegation that Shadwick was paid for her testimony or information. The plaintiffs' strongest evidence is that Ackerman extended credit to Shadwick for purchases of cigarettes, see Ackerman Dep. at 87, but that falls short of being evidence of payment for her testimony or information.
The qualified immunity defense to civil rights claims against individual officials is intended to strike a balance between two important values: the public interest in deterring unlawful conduct and in providing compensation for victims who suffer constitutional violations, versus the cost of subjecting public officials to suit, in terms of both the actual cost of litigation and the social cost of litigation, such as the risk of inhibiting government action. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-19 (1981). When applicable, a qualified immunity defense entitles an officer "not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001), quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Federal courts apply a two-part test to determine whether a government official is entitled to immunity from civil suit. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01; see also McNair v. Coffey, 279 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 2002); Marshall v. Teske, 284 F.3d 765, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2002). First a court asks whether the facts alleged demonstrate a constitutional violation when examined in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the facts as alleged reveal no constitutional violation, the inquiry ends and the officer prevails on the merits of the case. Id. If the facts alleged demonstrate a constitutional violation, the court next examines whether the right was "clearly established" at the relevant time. Id.; Marshall, 284 F.3d at 772. If both questions are answered in the affirmative, the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Plaintiffs Have Alleged a Constitutional Violation
Plaintiffs allege that the basis of Weddle's affidavit for their arrest warrant was invalid. Cplt., p. 3. The constitutional right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest in the absence of probable cause. See Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1999) (vacating a district court's denial of summary judgment for defendant police officer who allegedly omitted key information from probable cause affidavit for arrest warrant). Based on plaintiff's allegations, there are two ways Weddle could have violated plaintiffs' right to be free from arrest in the absence of probable cause: (1) if Weddle submitted a facially invalid affidavit to the magistrate, or (2) if Weddle knowingly or recklessly omitted material information from his affidavit that a reasonable person would have known that the issuing judge would have wanted to know. See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000).
1. Facial Validity of the Affidavit
An officer violates a person's Fourth Amendment rights by creating an unnecessary danger of an unlawful arrest. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). Such danger arises when an officer submits an affidavit for an arrest warrant that "is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable." Id. at 345; Neiman v. Keane, 232 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2000).
Taken at face value, the information in Officer Weddle's affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause. Shadwick told Weddle that she had witnessed the plaintiffs carrying cases of cigarettes from the store. Ackerman told Weddle that plaintiffs had keys to the store, but that no one had permission to be in the store after it was closed. The elements of burglary and theft were supported by the information learned by Weddle during his investigation. In his affidavit, Weddle said that he knew Shadwick, that she had been honest with him in the past, and had no reason to disbelieve her. When probable cause has been gained from a "reasonably credible victim or eyewitness," there is no constitutional duty to investigate further, even if such an investigation would have been prudent or yielded exculpatory evidence. Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 997 (7th Cir. 2000).
Shadwick's credibility later collapsed in a deposition. Such a later collapse by a witness does not undermine a police officer's right to rely upon the witness at earlier stages of the case. See Gramenos v. Jewel Co., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986) ("probable cause does not depend on the witness turning out to be right").
2. Omission from the Affidavit
Plaintiffs' claims against Weddle can also be understood as claims that Weddle failed to give the issuing magistrate important information that the magistrate would have wanted to know in deciding about probable cause. Plaintiffs contend that Officer Weddle had an obligation to tell the magistrate who issued the warrant that he was working as a paid private investigator on the case.The leading case on the effect of falsehoods or omissions in an affidavit on the validity of a warrant is Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Under the Franks test, a warrant is invalid if the officer "knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant, and that such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause." Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). Franks dealt with affirmative misrepresentations, but several circuits, including the Seventh, have extended the principle to deliberate omissions of material facts, which is the relevant point here.
See, e.g., Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 281 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The Franks rationale applies with equal force where police officers secure a warrant through the intentional or reckless omission of material facts.") (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1486-87 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1985) (material omissions from an affidavit are governed by Franks); United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 1984) ("We acknowledge that the rationale of Franks applies to omissions"); United States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("the reasoning of Franks `logically extends . . . to material omissions'"), quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.4 (Supp. 1982); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 959 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980) ("allegations of material omissions [are] to be treated essentially similarly to claims of material misstatements").
For purposes of the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, the plaintiffs have alleged a violation of their constitutional rights by Weddle's failure to disclose that he was working as a paid private investigator on the case. When a magistrate evaluates an application for a search or arrest warrant, the reliability and credibility of information in a warrant application are, of course, critical. Under well established Fourth Amendment principles, the magistrate may presume that factual information from a police officer is reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) ("Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.") (citations omitted); United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 277 (7th Cir. 1992) ("In determining whether probable cause exists, a magistrate is entitled to regard an affiant's fellow law enforcement officers as reliable sources."); United States v. Griffin, 827 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (following Ventresca, court could assume that experienced drug enforcement agents had sufficient training and experience to indicate their assertions were reliable); see also Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying general rule that information from victim-witness can usually be presumed reliable, unless police have indications to the contrary); Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 399 (5th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging general rule that information from victim-witness can be presumed reliable, but finding that rule did not apply where witness had known motive to lie or was otherwise known to have credibility problems).
Where information comes from unknown informants, by contrast, Fourth Amendment law takes into account the danger that private individuals may try to use law enforcement to carry out a private agenda or may lead law enforcement officers to invade the privacy of law-abiding citizens based on groundless rumors or suspicion. Cases involving the use of anonymous tips, for example, are legion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). These cases reflect a constant effort by courts to balance legitimate law enforcement needs against the danger that reliance upon unreliable information could lead to serious invasions of privacy or deprivations of liberty.
In light of these Fourth Amendment principles and values, the difference between information from a presumably unbiased police officer and information from someone working for a private client can reasonably be deemed material — something that an issuing judge would have wanted to know. In this case, the fact that the theft being investigated was several years old also should have raised concerns, as did Ackerman's possible financial motives for obtaining the warrant. In addition, Weddle identified himself as an officer with the Martinsville Police Department when applying for the arrest warrant. He said in his affidavit: "I had been asked by Joe Ackerman, the owner of Joe's Tobacco to talk to Jonie [Shadwick] and possibly proceed with charges reference the theft of cigarettes from his old store." Thus, Weddle told the judge that he had been asked by Ackerman, but not that he had been paid by Ackerman.
Viewing the allegations and facts in the light reasonably most favorable to plaintiffs, the allegations demonstrate a constitutional violation. Officer Weddle was seeking a warrant from a judge to open a very stale case, and he was presenting himself as a disinterested police officer rather than as a paid private agent for the alleged victim. A magistrate considering such an application for a warrant might reasonably deem those differences material in evaluating the credibility of the information being presented. The court cannot say as a matter of law that such information would not be material in this unusual case. Compare United States v. Sorrells, 714 F.2d 1522, 1527 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting presumption of reliability for part-time "special employee" of Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms who was paid for information), with Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99,105-07 (2d Cir. 1999) (ordering dismissal of claim against police officer who obtained arrest warrant for an alleged child molester where ample evidence supported probable cause, but where officer did not inform magistrate of pending divorce action and other exculpatory evidence), and Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 439 (police could make arrest based on information from supermarket's private security guard: "a guard is not just any eyewitness," and the "chance that the complainant is pursuing a grudge, a risk in believing an unknown witness, is small in an institutional setting"). The court does not find that Officer Weddle actually violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights, but the court finds that plaintiffs' allegations and evidence, viewed in the light reasonably most favorable to plaintiffs, could establish a Fourth Amendment violation.
B. The Law Was Not Clearly Established
At the second step of the Saucier test for qualified immunity, the court evaluates whether the right violated was clearly established within the law. 533 U.S. at 201. The purpose of this step is to determine whether the officer was on notice that his conduct would be unlawful. Id. at 202. Qualified immunity will shield an officer from suit if his "actions did not violate `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2514 (2002) (qualified immunity did not apply to practice of locking prisoner to hitching post in the hot sun for hours) quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
A constitutional right is clearly established when its contours are sufficiently clear so that the reasonable officer would understand that his conduct violates that right. Hope, 122 S.Ct. at 2515. The existence of previous cases with materially similar facts is not always required: "a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though `the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.'" Id. at 2516, quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that even in novel factual contexts, officials can be on notice that their conduct violates established law. Id. at 2516. The salient inquiry in this step of analysis therefore is whether the law in 1999 gave Officer Weddle fair warning that his (alleged) conduct violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
More specifically, the decisive question in this case is whether a reasonable police officer would have known that failing to disclose to the magistrate issuing the warrant that he was investigating the case in a paid unofficial capacity would be material to the magistrate's determination of probable cause for arrest. In Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit addressed a similar problem and recognized that the police must, to some extent, select the information that is presented in a warrant application: "We cannot demand that police officers relate the entire history of events leading up to a warrant application with every evocative detail that would interest a novelist or a gossip." Id. at 787. The Third Circuit chose to "follow the common sense approach of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and hold that omissions are made with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that `[a]ny reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.'" Id. at 787-88, quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993).
In Wilson, the issue was whether an arrest warrant application in a robbery case contained material omissions. The warrant application informed the judge that witnesses had said the robber's height was between 6'3" and 6'5." The Third Circuit ultimately affirmed summary judgment for the officer. The court found that any reasonable person would have wanted to know that the suspect's driving record said he was only 5'11" tall, and that an eyewitness victim had failed to pick the suspect out of a photo array. 212 F.3d at 788; accord, 212 F.3d at 796 (Pollak, J., concurring in relevant part). The Third Circuit also found, however, that the officer was not required to note for the judge ethnic differences between the suspect and others in the photo array or the absence of height and weight information from the photo array. Id. at 788 (majority opinion). The panel majority found that probable cause still would have been established by another victim's positive (but incorrect) identification of the suspect as the robber, despite the problems with identification by the first witness.
In United States v. Jacobs, the case cited in Wilson, the Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction based on the evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant for a package. 986 F.2d 1231. The magistrate in Jacobs was told that a canine "sniff" of the package had produced "interest." The officers failed to inform the magistrate, however, that the dog's response was not an "alert," which is the trained response to the presence of drugs, and that a second test by another dog produced no alert or interest. Id. at 1233. The court found that the omissions were so obviously material that the omissions were at least reckless, and that a complete presentation would have negated probable cause. Id. at 1235.
On the other hand, in the case of Smith v. Edwards, the Second Circuit held that omission from an arrest warrant application of some exculpatory information and of information regarding the complaining party's potential biases did not violate the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights. 175 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999). Edwards involved allegations that the plaintiff had sexually abused his young daughter. These allegations originated from the plaintiff's wife, who had started divorce proceedings. Medical examinations of the child had been inconclusive, and, after an evidentiary hearing on the abuse allegations, the divorce court had denied the mother's request for a restraining order. In the application for the arrest warrant, the defendant police officer did not mention the divorce proceedings, the divorce court's denial of a restraining order, the inconclusive medical evidence, or the earlier allegations that another person had abused the child. After the criminal charges were dropped, the child's father sued the officer who obtained the arrest warrant. The district court denied the officer's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the Second Circuit reversed. The court concluded that even if the omitted information had been included, the completed application still would have supported a finding of probable cause, so that the officer was entitled to summary judgment on the merits (not on qualified immunity). Id. at 106-07.
Cases involving alleged omissions from warrant applications come in many varieties, presenting a host of different issues. Plaintiffs have not identified cases establishing clearly the requirement that a moonlighting police officer disclose the connections between his private work and his official application for a search or arrest warrant. In the absence of such cases or other decisions sufficient to put a reasonable officer on notice of such a duty in 1999, Officer Weddle is entitled to qualified immunity.
In summary, the court finds that a reasonable police officer would not have had notice in 1999 that disclosure of his work as a paid private investigator on the case would have been material to the judge being asked to issue an arrest warrant. Therefore, Officer Weddle is entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. City's Motion for Summary Judgment
Though the City of Martinsville is a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the city is liable for a constitutional violation by an employee only if action pursuant to an official policy or custom of the city caused the constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
The claim against the City of Martinsville does not satisfy the custom or policy test of Monell and its progeny. Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that the reckless disregard for the truth in the course of seeking arrest warrants or the filing of criminal charges is common in the City of Martinsville, and have not produced evidence of even one prior incident. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (in absence of policy that is unconstitutional itself, "considerably more proof than [a] single incident will be necessary . . . to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the `policy' and the unconstitutional deprivation"). The City of Martinsville cannot be held liable on the theory of respondeat superior simply because it employed Officer Weddle and cloaked him with the authority of a police officer. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 at 388 (municipality liable under § 1983 for conduct of its employees only where its "failure to train its employees in a relevant aspect evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants"). The evidence does not support a claim against the city based on any recognized theory of liability.
V. St. Paul's Motion for Summary Judgment
Finally, there is no allegation of wrongdoing in this action against St. Paul Insurance. No recovery can be had when there is no allegation of wrongdoing, just as the evidentiary record here shows no duty by St. Paul Insurance toward the plaintiffs. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (Supreme Court has "repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability," and has interpreted the statute in light of the background of tort liability) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
VI. Conclusion
Morgan County's motion to dismiss is granted. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.2d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999). The other defendants are entitled to summary judgment because the evidentiary record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Summary judgment is not a discretionary remedy. If the plaintiff lacks enough evidence, summary judgment must be granted."), aff'd, 515 U.S. 304 (1995). The court will enter final judgment in favor of defendants.
So ordered.
FINAL JUDGMENT
The court, having previously dismissed plaintiffs' claims against defendants Terry Iacoli and the State of Indiana, and having this day granted defendant Morgan County's motion to dismiss and the motions for summary judgment filed by defendants City of Martinsville, Terry Weddle, and St. Paul Insurance, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs Rick Blankenship and Lisa Blankenship take nothing by their complaint and that this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.