Dkt. No. 4. Judge Duffin found that while 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) does not explicitly require exhaustion (as 28 U.S.C. §2254 does), federal courts commonly apply the exhaustion doctrine to petitions under 28 U.S.C. §2241. Id. at 2 (citing Blanck v. Waukesha Cty., 48 F. Supp. 2d 859, 860 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979)). He further noted that the exhaustion doctrine required the petitioner to use all available state procedures to pursue his claims before seeking federal habeas relief and that a petitioner would be found to have exhausted his remedies before trial only in "special circumstances."
Section 2254 applies only to collateral attacks on state court "judgments" and therefore has no application in situations where the petitioner is awaiting trial on criminal charges. See, Blanck v. Waukesha County, 48 F. Supp.2d 859, 860 (E.D.Wis. 1999); McGuire v. Blubaum, 376 F. Supp. 284, 285 (D.Ariz. 1974); Prock v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 391 F. Supp. 315, 316-17 (W.D.Okla. 1974); Prince v. Bailey, 464 F.2d 544, 545 (5th Cir. 1972).
In turn, “[t]he exhaustion doctrine requires a petitioner to use all available state procedures to pursue his claim before seeking federal habeas corpus relief.” Blanck v. Waukesha County, 48 F.Supp.2d 859, 860 (E.D. Wis. 1999). “In most cases courts will not consider claims that can be raised at trial and in subsequent state proceedings.
Id. "In most cases courts will not consider claims that can be raised at trial and in subsequent state proceeding." Blanck v. Waukesha County, 48 F. Supp. 2d 859, 860 (D. Wis. 1999). Courts have found that special circumstances existed where double jeopardy was at issue or where a speedy trial claim was properly raised. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 488 (1973) (speedy trial); Blanck, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (double jeopardy).
Id. "In most cases courts will not consider claims that can be raised at trial and in subsequent state proceeding." Blanck v. Waukesha County, 48 F. Supp. 2d 859, 860 (D. Wis. 1999). Courts have found that special circumstances existed where double jeopardy was at issue or where a specific speedy trial claim was raised. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 488 (1973) (speedy trial); Blanck, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (double jeopardy).
Id. "In most cases courts will not consider claims that can be raised at trial and in subsequent state proceeding." Blanckv. Waukesha County, 48 F. Supp. 2d 859, 860 (D. Wis. 1999). Courts have found that "special circumstances" existed where double jeopardy was at issue or where a speedy trial claim was raised. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 488 (1973) (speedy trial); Blanck, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (double jeopardy).
” Blanck v. Waukesha County, 48 F.Supp.2d 859, 861 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (citing Harpster, 128 F.3d at 325). “In Wisconsin, there is no absolute right to an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, but the state supreme court has encouraged the courts of appeal to grant review in such cases.” Id.
“In most cases courts will not consider claims that can be raised at trial and in subsequent state proceedings.” Blanck v. Waukesha Cnty., 48 F.Supp.2d 859, 860 (E.D. Wis. 1999). Courts have found that special circumstances existed where double jeopardy was at issue or where a speedy trial claim was raised.
, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 26, 2019) (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 487 (speedy trial violation); Blanck v. Waukesha County, 48 F.Supp.2d 859, 860 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (collecting cases as to double jeopardy issue); and Fullivore v. Glass, No. 16-CV-2143-PLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21953, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 16, 2017)
Although exhaustion of state court remedies is not explicitly required by § 2241(c)(3) like it is for a petition under § 2254, “the interests of comity have caused courts to apply the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies to [such petitions].” Blanck v. Waukesha County, 48 F.Supp.2d 859, 860 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (citing Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1979) (in turn citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of