Blanchette v. Railway

4 Citing cases

  1. Hill v. Finnemore

    172 A. 826 (Me. 1934)   Cited 19 times

    It does not undertake to say 'how often he must look or precisely how far or when or from where.' . . . Failure to look or listen may be strong evidence of negligence. . . . Mere looking is not sufficient. One is bound to see what is obviously to be seen." Compare Shaw v. Bolton, 122 Me. 232; Sturtevant v. Ouelette, 126 Me. 558; Blanchette v. Railway, 126 Me. 40. One is not guilty of negligence as a matter of law in attempting to cross a street where there is no cross walk, although there is a cross walk some distance away. Page v. Moulton, 127 Me. 80, 81; Clancey v. Power Light Co., supra.

  2. Pence v. K.C. Laundry Service Co.

    332 Mo. 930 (Mo. 1933)   Cited 73 times
    In Pence v. K.C. Laundry Service Co., 332 Mo. 930, 939 (12), 59 S.W.2d 633, 636, three instructions authorized a verdict for the plaintiff but ignored a defense of the plaintiff's imputed contributory negligence, and this defense was not submitted in any other instruction.

    (c) The instruction erroneously eliminated from consideration the negligence of plaintiff continuing up to the very moment of the accident and contributing thereto. Shanks v. Springfield Traction Co., 101 Mo. App. 702, 74 S.W. 386; Sisk v. Industrial Track Const. Co., 316 Mo. 1143, 295 S.W. 751; Laughlin v. Ry. Co., 144 Mo. App. 185, 129 S.W. 1006; Gumm v. Railroad Co., 141 Mo. App. 306, 125 S.W. 796; Holwerson v. Ry. Co., 157 Mo. 216, 57 S.W. 770; Blanchette v. Railroad Co., 126 Me. 40, 136 A. 116; Clark v. Ry. Co., 319 Mo. 865, 6 S.W.2d 954; Pope v. Wabash Ry., 242 Mo. 232, 146 S.W. 790. (d) The instruction calls for undue prominence and emphasis and has the effect of excluding consideration of plaintiff's own negligence. (4) The court erred in permitting counsel for plaintiff to interrogate of the jury panel whether they had in mind any fixed amount beyond which they would not render a verdict as such inquiry did not tend to elicit the proper qualification of jurors and carried the inference that this was a very exceptional lawsuit for which generally accepted standards of compensation did not apply, and that members were not qualified to act as jurors unless willing to return an exceptionally large verdict. Sec. 3889, R.S. 1929; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230; State v. Tally, 22 S.W.2d 787. (5) The verdict of the jury is grossly excessive, unwarranted by the evidence and is the result of passion and prejudice erroneously, continuously and consistently engendered by plainti

  3. Smith v. Gould

    110 W. Va. 579 (W. Va. 1931)   Cited 39 times
    In Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S.E. 53, the first point of the syllabus omits direct reference to imputed knowledge of defendant as to plaintiff's peril.

    291 P. 87, 88), and for opposing the otherwise settled view that the doctrine of constructive knowledge does not apply in cases of actively concurring negligence. "Now it must be apparent upon even a slight analysis of the rule (last clear chance) that it can be applied only in cases where the negligence of the defendant is proximate and that of the plaintiff remote; for if the plaintiff and the defendant both be negligent and the negligence of both be concurrent and directly contributory to produce the accident, then the case is one of contributory negligence pure and simple." Drown v. Tr. Co., (Ohio) 118 Am. St. Rep. 844, 849; Aiken v. Metcalf, supra; Blanchette v. Ry. Co., (Me.) 136 A. 116, 118; Dyerson v. R. R. Co., supra; Leftridge v. Seattle, supra; Bourett v. Ry. Co., (Ill.) 121 N.W. 380; Evans v. Express Co., 122 Ind. 362; anno. 55 L.R.A. 465; note 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 958-9; note 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 896; note L.R.A. 1916A 944-5; 3 Harvard Law Rev. 263, 276; 24 Yale Law Journal 331-2; 45 C. J., subject, Negligence, sec. 542; 20 R. C. L., subject, Negligence, sec. 116; Beach on Contributory Negligence, sec. 56; Shearman Redfield, The Law of Negligence, (6th Ed.), sec. 101. The majority opinion would avoid this crushing weight of authority on the theory (according to the opinion) of "superadded circumstances which are of outstanding nature and controlling importance," which "should have put the defendant on guard; his senses should have been aroused; he should have been on the alert."

  4. Clancey v. Power Light Co.

    147 A. 157 (Me. 1929)   Cited 10 times

    Shaw v. Bolton, supra; Sturtevant v. Ouellette, 126 Me. 558. Failure to look or listen may be strong evidence of negligence. Shaw v. Bolton, supra; Sturtevant v. Ouellette, supra. Electric railroad tracks in a city street are places the crossing of which has elements of danger so that no one should come toward them without senses alert and used, or should attempt to pass over them without reasonable regard for his own safety. Philbrook v. Atlantic Shore Line Railway, supra; Blanchette v. Railway, 126 Me. 40, 42. Foot passengers in crossing streets should carefully observe the movements of street cars. Welch v. Street Railway, 116 Me. 191, 194. The plaintiff was familiar with the place, knew the car tracks were there, and had seen cars passing.